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Faced with an increasingly turbulent world and armed with an intuitive 
insight as to what was driving the turbulence, the CEO’s of a group of mul-
tinational companies spanning across multiple industries joined forces to 
explore what their value could and should be in such a changed context.
Turbulence is at the same time familiar and somewhat frightening. Fa-
miliar when we dial up the volume on a water tap and the water suddenly no 
longer flows smoothly. Somewhat frightening when colliding airflows mix 
and lead to a bumpy flight. Something similar happens in socio-economic 
systems, interacting with the natural environment.1 When these systems are 
tightly coupled, they are likely to stumble across a threshold into turbulent 
behaviour. Stock markets crash, commodity prices leap, social unrest or 
extreme weather events occur. The insight the CEOs shared was that the 
ever-greater demands on food, water and energy systems, in the context 
of a changing climate, meant that in the future turbulence was likely to 
become a much more regular feature of the modern world.
In a turbulent world, it would no longer be enough to drive ever-higher 
economic efficiency and meet ever-more demanding customer needs. Those 
demands will not go away. What will be added is a requirement to make 
our socio-economic systems more resilient to the turbulence. To f ind out 
what this means and how multinational corporations can contribute, they 
assembled a project under the banner of the Resilience Action Initiative 
(RAI). In this book the companies share what they have learnt in their f irst 
two years of exploration.
Whenever I have described the story of RAI to people, they have inevita-
bly rushed to the conclusion that the work is only about the resilience of the 
companies themselves. It is not. Certainly companies need to be resilient, 
but that is something they worry about continuously and which is part of 
the core task of management and the board. The premise for RAI is that 
companies effectively have a societal licence to operate over the long term, 
but only if they meet a fundamental social need. Cynics may well point 
to plenty of exceptions, but over time there is little doubt that very large 
companies are part of society and need to be connected with its long-term 
requirements. So the focus of RAI is not only on the companies themselves, 
1 Scheffer (2009)
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but on the resilience of the cities and regions in which they operate and 
where they eventually sell their products and services. The companies have 
found that by engaging with the resilience of their environment and that 
of their clients, they also strengthen their own resilience. As such the two 
are intimately linked.
This is a book written by practitioners. Most of the authors are senior 
managers in multinational companies or advisors. As such their prejudice 
is towards action, rather than towards theory or conceptualisation. This 
perspective on the resilience of cities and regions is therefore different 
than what one might f ind from an NGO or academic perspective. It is not 
necessarily opposed or in contradiction, but the framing is a corporate 
framing. This matters because the gap between science and practice – as 
well as sometimes between NGOs and practice – is often one of framing 
even though it sometimes is perceived as one of opposed interests. As such, 
we hope that this book contributes to bridging those gaps by providing a 
perspective that is less often documented.
The concept of resilience is not new. In the 1970s Buzz Holling was one of 
its pioneers2 at the Vienna International Institute for Applied Systems Sci-
ence (IIASA)3 where he later became Director. In 1975 Jimmy Davidson, the 
head of Shell’s Group Planning, visited IIASA and concluded that resilience 
provides the necessary flexibility for societal and ecological systems: “[I]f 
this f lexibility was not possible or if it was too expensive, one had to assess 
whether the investment was still justif ied against the risk of not having 
such flexibility.”4 Resilience cannot be made sense of without the realisation 
that a system cannot be entirely explained by understanding all its parts. 
Resilience can only be conceptualised as a property of an interconnected 
and complex system. These insights are far from new, but a more scientif ic 
approach has been catalysed with the founding of the Santa Fe Institute for 
Complexity Science in 1986. While complexity science itself is in its infancy, 
its impact on practice can already be felt, in such wide-ranging areas as 
traff ic, epidemiology or public policy.5
More recently the Resilience Alliance6 has connected a network of 
universities, governments and NGOs. The chair of its board, Brian Walker, 
has been an advisor to RAI and has written the epilogue to this book. 
2 Hollings (1973)
3 http://www.iiasa.ac.at/
4 Quoted in Wilkinson and Kupers (2014)
5 Colander and Kupers (2014)
6 http://www.resalliance.org/
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The Rockefeller Foundation has championed multiple initiatives to put 
resilience into practice, most recently the 100 Resilient Cities initiative7 that 
provides direct support and connects resilience strategies in urban areas 
around the world. Other resilience initiatives are referred to throughout 
this book, but RAI stands out through its specifically corporate perspective.
Many companies have engaged with the idea of contributing to sustain-
able development, and the RAI companies have issued various sustainability 
reports and commitments. As such, the relationship between sustainability 
and resilience has come up repeatedly. We do not attempt to deal with this 
in the book, as the focus is resolutely on action, not debating concepts. 
Suff ice it so say here that the two are related. Resilience is more clearly 
def ined as the property of a system with certain dynamic attributes, and 
as such has more intellectual and practical running room. Sustainability is 
a powerful and intuitively appealing idea, but one sometimes struggles to 
add much practicality to it. However, ideas have both emotional, analytical 
and familiarity appeal, so the point is not deciding whether one concept 
is better than the other, but what is most effective in each circumstance. 
Personally, I have favoured resilience as an idea for a long time, as more 
actionable and more suitable for deepening our understanding.
As much as we live in a world infatuated with ‘newness’, the reality is 
that collective human thought moves slowly. It can take decades for an idea 
to reach the mainstream or to have widespread impact on the practical 
state of things. Witness ideas such as sustainability or climate mitigation. 
In the economic realm the validity of concepts such as privatisation, the 
primacy of shareholder value or market eff iciency take time to root, but 
also wax and wane. For our purpose, we should recall that companies are 
very large institutions, which also need time to absorb a new idea and 
work out how it can make a difference in practice. Resilience is not just 
about individual engagement, but institutional engagement. While this 
may seem slow at times, this is what makes it impactful. People will refer 
to the fact that a particular company is part of their project or involved in 
their initiative. However, the depth of those kinds of participations can vary 
immensely and sometimes it is merely a single employee. Companies are 
large institutions in their own right, and engaging them comprehensively is 
time consuming, as well as a major effort. The challenge of understanding 
and designing resilience solutions is one for the long haul, which will require 
deep engagement of substantial parts of the institutions. Part of the RAI 
7 http://100resilientcities.rockefellerfoundation.org/
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journey has been and will continue to be to deepen the roots of the idea in 
the various companies.
The book is structured as follows: After the preface by Peter Voser who 
took the initiative to convene the Resilience Action Initiative when he was 
the CEO of Royal Dutch Shell, followed by an introductory remark from 
Michel Liès, CEO of Swiss Re, Part I of the book contains a single chapter 
describing the activities and approach of RAI.
In Part II the tools and methods developed by RAI are listed. Chapter 
2 contains the simple resilience frame that was developed and f ine-tuned 
to engage project teams and look with them through the resilience lens. 
Chapter 3 further deepens the tools and applies them to consider how 
enterprise risk management becomes different in a resilience perspective. 
Chapter 4 is the result of a workshop convened by IUCN with a grant from 
the Rockefeller Foundation, which looked at cross-sector collaboration for 
resilience, and Chapter 5 lists examples for such collaborations and what 
success factors can be distilled from them.
In Part III aspects of resilience activities are described, ranging from 
green infrastructure in Chapter 6 and Nexus!, the resilience game developed 
for RAI, in Chapter 7. Due to the nature of its members as large companies, 
many of the projects that RAI considered tended to be large scale, so a 
project to experiment with bottom-up projects for resilience ran in parallel 
and is described in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 reflects on the f irst two years of 
RAI collaboration. Brian Walker, the Chairman of the Resilience Alliance, 
provides the epilogue.
As much as RAI focused on the challenges of translating the need for 
resilience into action, it cannot do this without the support of research-
ers furthering the science. As a small contribution, the royalties from the 
sales of this book are donated to the Resilience Alliance to support its 
research programmes. The contributions of the named authors are made 
individually, with mention of their aff iliations, in the context of an overall 
corporate collaborative project. Finally, I would like to express thanks to 
the RAI companies for the privilege of exploring resilience with them,8 to 
Brian Walker for being such an inspiring thinking partner to RAI, to the 
Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment for generously extending 
Associate Fellow status and to the team at Amsterdam University Press for 
their support and their ability to publish this book in record time.




In early 2010, as the multilateral world was still licking its wounds from the 
disappointing Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change, one of my advisors 
asked me about the evolving global policy and technology agenda and what 
Royal Dutch Shell’s role as an integrated energy company should be.
In response, I said that we as an innovative company needed to obtain a 
better understanding of the energy, water, food and climate ‘stress nexus’ 
by working in partnership with others across sectors and value chains and 
focusing on small-scale initiatives rather than grand designs.
That answer was based on the insights I had gained in over two years as 
CEO of Shell. I had engaged with many political, civil society and industry 
leaders, and several common themes had emerged. One shared concern 
was and continues to be the broken circle of trust between government, 
industry and society. The f inancial crisis in 2009 unleashed a wave of public 
scepticism in Western countries about banks and invited a host of policy 
measures. These measures came with spill-over effects for other sectors, 
including energy, chemicals and manufacturing. One aspiration I shared 
with CEOs of other leading industrial companies was to remind society of 
the importance of industry as a generator of real jobs, a funder of Research 
& Development and a provider of the energy and products without which 
modern society cannot exist. We also wanted to demonstrate that the 
people working in these companies have the talent and the commitment to 
contribute to society and drive progress on the ground, even in the absence 
of clear global policy frameworks.
In Asia and the Middle East, the attitude towards the energy sector and 
industrial enterprises tends to be more positive. Companies like Shell are 
seen as indispensable partners for fostering development and growth, while 
addressing the main downsides of development: environmental degradation 
and resource scarcity. Their key challenge is how to fuel and feed a growing 
population with energy, food and water against a backdrop of urbanisation 
and improving living standards.
Meanwhile, in Shell, our own experts were indicating that the water-
energy nexus was going to be absolutely vital for going forward, either as 
a fundamental challenge or as a critical success factor, depending on how 
Shell as a company would respond: it takes water to produce and process 
energy; it takes energy to produce, treat and transport water; and it takes 
14 Peter Voser 
both energy and water to produce food. We saw that the water-energy 
nexus was going to make itself especially felt in arid regions with growing 
populations like the Middle East and North Africa.
The 2010 conversations were the beginning of a new phase of strategic 
thinking to broaden the company’s understanding of the linkages and 
stresses in the world’s energy, food and water systems, to identify key factors 
that make companies, cities and countries resilient in the face of these 
stresses, and, f inally, to build partnerships to drive progress in these areas.
Shell’s New Lens Scenarios, published in 2013, included more think-
ing on energy-water-food, resilience and urbanisation than ever before. 
The scenarios were built on several years of joint research with academic 
institutions and think tanks. We included water data in Shell’s World Energy 
Model, so that Shell’s scenario team can now factor both CO2 pricing and 
water constraints into their modelling, thus contributing to the long-term 
resilience of the company.
Working on solutions to address the nexus and increase systemic re-
silience require new ways of working, as these complex challenges cross 
boundaries between countries, industries as well as the public and private 
sectors. Solving them requires a broad, holistic approach, an open mind and 
an understanding beyond our own areas of expertise.
To further foster systemic thinking and collaboration, I convened a small 
group of chief executives from a number of different sectors. We wanted to 
show that big corporations can make progress even if there is no pressure 
from government and civil society to do so. We were like-minded CEOs of 
companies that face similar or similar-scale challenges. We quickly found 
that mayors of cities are natural partners to CEOs, since their problems are 
just as concrete and their solutions have to be just as real. And we like to 
work together with NGOs such as The Nature Conservancy (TNC), Wetlands 
International, International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
or the World Resources Institute (WRI) that have the capacity and will to 
look beyond single issues and deal with complexity.
The f irst CEO meeting was held in Davos in early 2012 and brought to-
gether CEOs with a personal passion, a long-term vision, and a willingness 
to drive progress personally from the top. This meeting in Davos led to 
the creation of the ‘Resilience Action Initiative’. Since then, we have made 
progress, made mistakes and learned a lot. The rest of this book serves as 
testimony.
For CEOs interested in driving progress in areas that are unexplored and 
where progress cannot be measured in next year’s shareholder returns, I 
have some tips:
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 – Build your narrative carefully and gradually. Don’t give the whole story 
too early if you can’t make a link to foreseeable benefits. You will need 
to use lots of psychology.
 – Show resilience as a leader – keep pushing it through until key leaders 
and staff are convinced. At Shell, it took two years, and now senior Shell 
leaders in critical areas of the company are deploying systemic thinking 
and resilience methodology in different areas of operation.
 – Small pilot projects can be diff icult to set up and finish, but they are good 
for inspiration and encouragement and for creating feedback loops with 
knowledge work streams.
 – Embed new ways of thinking in your overall innovation drive and make 
clear innovation goes beyond technology.
 – Promote integration of thought leadership in these new areas with the 
brand expressions your people are already familiar with – the synergies 
will surprise and inspire your people and help you to overcome resist-
ance. (For instance, at Shell, we developed close integration between our 
resilience work streams and the Shell Eco-marathon and Shell Powering 
Progress Together events.)
 – Finally, be a collaborative leader, which means having the curiosity and 
willingness to learn, the humility to work with partners whose skills 
and capabilities complement your own, and the sense to be practical 
and action-oriented.
Looking back at my years as a leader at Shell, I am more convinced than 
ever that effective leadership is about having the right balance between 
focus and vision. It’s not an easy balance to achieve or maintain. The leader 
of an industrial company that aspires to be competitive had better stay 
focused on the company’s core skills and capabilities. At the same time, 
one needs to have the societal antenna to position the company in the 
cycle of major policy and technology trends, so it can help shape them. 
The stress nexus is going to be with us for decades to come, as will be the 
search for resilience. This search will require closer cooperation between 
companies, cities and NGOs than ever before in modern corporate history. 
It is satisfying to know that the Resilience Action Initiative has given its 
member companies a chance to dip into the future and position themselves 
as active and innovative players, rather than as passive bystanders.
Peter Voser, The Hague, May 2014

 Turbulence – by way of an introduction
Michel Liès
Sipping a cup of tea during a f light through blue skies is easy. If stormy 
weathers bring about considerable air turbulence, this simple task rapidly 
becomes pretty diff icult. Clouds announce a storm – hence one can prepare 
and safely stow the cup away in due time. But what if there are no visible 
early warning signs, as is the case with clear–air turbulence? And what 
if turbulence prevails? When will be the next chance to take a sip of tea 
again?
Such are the challenges for a global economy, which has grown fast for 
decades, providing wealth and more favourable conditions to ever more 
people. Stresses in critical sectors such as water, energy and food increase. 
These three sectors are inextricably linked, and changes in one area very 
often impact one or both of the others. The respective resources form a 
nexus which itself is affected by external factors such as a growing popula-
tion, changing economies, international trade, governance issues, health 
impacts, environmental degradation, and climate change. This high level 
of interconnectedness and the growing scarcity of resources will likely 
lead to prolonged times of turbulence – and their onset will be ever harder 
to predict.
Holding steady despite of turbulence might still work for some time– but 
resisting change will come at an ever higher cost, possibly until it is too late 
to change at all. Much better it seems to be to navigate turbulent waters in 
a more adaptive fashion, guided both by foresight and flexibility.
There are at least three elements that need to be present in order to do so: 
the willingness to collaborate, a shared vision, and a conceptual frame to 
integrate required actions. The concept of resilience lends itself to fostering 
concerted action and hence provides such a frame. Resilience is understood 
here to be the capacity of business, economic and social structures to 
survive, adapt, and grow in the face of change and uncertainty related to 
disturbances, whether they be caused by resource stresses, societal stresses 
and/or acute events.
A more resilient approach does not come for free – in fact costs will appear 
high compared to what the continuation of an assumedly a steady world 
would require. But with increasing levels and/or persistence of turbulence, 
benefits will outweigh costs. Hence a resilient approach will turn out to 
be the most economic one – for those who are in for the long run, at least.
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Looking into a specif ic case, namely how to strengthen disaster risk 
resilience in the face of climate change, decision makers need facts to start 
with: Not only do they need to know the potential climate-related damage 
over the coming decades, but also how these risks can best be managed, 
what measures need to be taken. They also need to know what investment 
will be required to fund those measures – and whether the benefits will 
outweigh the costs over time.
When studying the situation along the US Gulf coast, we learned that 
losses related to hurricane risk will increase substantially in the coming 
decades. The primary driver will be economic development, with the situ-
ation likely further aggravated by climate change. The good news is that 
a substantial amount of the risk can be cost-effectively averted. This does 
not come for free, but will nevertheless be far cheaper than bearing the 
cost of future damages. Investments in risk prevention and preparedness 
are complemented by risk transfer solutions designed to cope with low 
frequency/high severity events. Insurance puts a price tag on risks, hence 
provides risk transparency. This helps decision makers to internalise known 
externalities, even future ones, such as climate change impacts – and in 
addition, such a price tag incentivises preventive action.
Decision makers are thus enabled to integrate adaptation with economic 
development and sustainable growth. Commercial players in the Gulf region 
further realised that the earlier and more deeply they engage with the com-
munities they serve, the better off both their customers and they themselves 
are – hence building the case to strengthen societal resilience.
In the context of the present book, we have expanded on such f indings, 
since their relevance and effectiveness strongly depends on the character 
of the specif ic company and the environment in which it is embedded. By 
introducing a wider concept for enterprise resilience, we hope to provide 
practitioners well beyond the risk community with a novel and practical 
approach, namely the companies’ opportunity to look at their challenges 
through a series of resilience lenses.
Admittedly, in many areas, there are trade-offs between short-term 
eff iciency and long-term resilience. But instead of waiting for the occa-
sional shock to reveal whether enough responsive diversity is in place, the 
resilience lenses described in this book can be used to identify adequate 
levels of modularity and redundancy.
Such modular and redundant control systems are at work in airplanes, 
but more is needed to keep planes flying. Pilots do not fly in isolation. They 
are in regular contact with air traff ic control and are provided with mete-
orological forecasts. This way, clear–air turbulence can be anticipated in 
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the cockpit – and experienced turbulence is reported back. While weather 
matters for the single flight, thinking on longer timescales is required for 
the airline and its fleet: What destinations will be served, which technology 
will propel the planes, what stresses will need to be coped with? To answer 
these questions, forecasts will not be enough. Scenarios help to test the 
resilience of strategies for actors to navigate the unknown. In this context, 
continuous experimentation and innovation allow a company to learn 
faster. This increases adaptive capacity – to develop emergent responses 
in turbulent times.
Michel Liès, Zürich, May 2014





1 The Resilience action initiative: 
An introduction
Maike Böggemann1 and Norbert Both2
At f irst glance, large multinational companies such as Dow, DuPont, IBM, 
Royal Dutch Shell, Siemens and Swiss Re are resilient companies: they 
each have been around for over a century. But the future is volatile. The 
challenge these companies face today is how to help strengthen societal 
resilience in the face of increasing systemic turbulence caused by resource 
and environmental stresses – posing new risks to business continuity and 
therefore to their existence over the next 100 years.
These companies share a belief that the resilience lens can help. Resil-
ience is the ability to absorb disturbances, to change, to reorganise, and 
to learn from them at the same time. Resilience thinking goes beyond 
traditional risk management. It also prepares a society or a company for 
systemic changes or unforeseen events. The f inancial crisis of 2008 is an 
example. How likely is a crisis of this magnitude to reoccur, or should policy 
focus instead on increasing the systemic resilience for such shocks?
A major challenge for countries and companies is the security of global 
energy supply. The world needs to increase energy supplies for a growing 
and more prosperous population. This in itself will put the resilience of 
the energy system to the test. Because of the stresses on resources like 
energy, water and food – augmented by their interconnectivity and climate 
change – the world also faces an enormous systemic challenge. Growing 
prosperity can lead to stresses – environmental, political and social – that 
can undermine some of the benefits of prosperity.
The interconnections are complex, and there is an urgent need to under-
stand these connections and formulate answers. This is a collaborative task, 
with the dual aim of building society’s resilience and corporate resilience.
With the aim to improve understanding of the nexus, drive thinking on 
resilience, and test ideas on the ground in pilot projects and operations, the 
CEOs of a number of companies3 came together in Davos in January 2012 
1 Project Manager, Strategy & Scenarios, Shell. 
2 VP Corporate Communications, Shell.
3 Dow, Dupont, IBM, McKinsey & Company, Rio Tinto, Royal Dutch Shell, Siemens, Swiss Re, 
Unilever; Yara joined subsequently and Rio Tinto left the group.
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and agreed to launch a joint project to explore these questions together: 
the Resilience Action Initiative.
Understanding the ‘stress nexus’
In the decades ahead, as the world’s population continues to grow, the 
middle class continues to expand, and more people choose to live in ever-
larger cities, the stresses on global energy, water and food systems will 
become critical.
Every day, the number of people inhabiting our planet grows by more 
than 210,000. That adds up to 1.5 million more people each and every 
week, adding to the demands on our vital resources. At the same time, the 
world is becoming more prosperous, improving the quality of life almost 
everywhere. Over the past few decades, an estimated two billion people 
worldwide have attained a level of income to afford a middle-class lifestyle. 
That is a remarkable achievement.
By 2030, according to the United Nations and Shell’s Business Environ-
ment (Scenario) team,4 it is estimated that our world will need between 
30% and 50% more water, energy and food to keep up with rising demand. 
And we will need to provide that additional energy, water, and food in ways 
that signif icantly reduce CO₂ emissions.
Addressing any of these resource needs individually would be an im-
mense task. But the challenge of ensuring suff icient supplies of water, 
energy and food is magnif ied many times by the linkages between them. 
The potential effects of climate change will influence all three. So, if we 
are to succeed in meeting our resource needs, these must be addressed 
intelligently and holistically.
Energy, water and food are our most vital resources, sustaining life itself 
and fuelling our modern societies. And they comprise a tightly intertwined 
network: nearly all forms of energy production require water; energy also is 
needed to move and treat water; and producing food requires both energy 
and water.
Yet, around the world, little has been done to address our needs in a 
comprehensive way. Ineff icient resource use remains the norm. In develop-
ing countries – where most of the world’s population growth is occurring 
– sound water management is lacking, and up to 40% of electricity is lost 
due to poor transmission infrastructure. In the developed world, waste is 
4 Shell (2013)
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also prevalent: more than one-third of the food produced in the United 
States goes uneaten, for example.
At the same time, we live in an era of greater economic volatility. This, in 
turn, is generating more political volatility, which tends to impede progress on 
large-scale global issues. In response, we need to learn to adapt our resource 
systems and institutions to deal with the new pace of change and uncertainty.
Against this background, in 2011 Shell’s CEO Peter Voser launched a new 
phase of strategic thinking to broaden the company’s understanding of 
the growing stresses and linkages at the nexus of energy, food and water 
systems.
To better understand this nexus, Shell’s scenario team brought together 
academics and experts from industry, government and non-governmental 
organisations in 2011. Against this background, one of the authors, Maike, 
began to highlight within Shell the increasing strategic signif icance of 
water beyond the operational importance that had long been understood 
and addressed. Independently, the head of Shell scenarios, Jeremy Bentham, 
was considering how to refresh and stretch thinking about environmental 
matters in the company and was introduced by Johan Rockström to his work 
on Planetary Boundaries through a cross-sector workshop at the Tällberg 
Forum. Recognising that key features of the scientif ic planetary boundaries 
analysis could be expressed in terms of water security, energy security 
and food security that would be more compelling to a wider audience, 
the convergence of insights from Maike and Jeremy led to further Shell 
attention. In 2011 the Shell scenario team brought together academics and 
experts from industry, government and non-governmental organisations 
to consider the nexus collectively, and at this gathering the other author of 
this chapter, Norbert, recognised the immediate signif icance of the topic 
for the CEO. So, in 2011 Shell’s CEO Peter Voser also became a champion of 
this issue and launched a new phase of strategic thinking to broaden the 
company’s understanding of the Nexus of energy, food, and water systems. 
This included a large exercise to map the nexus, working with Dr Eric 
Berlow, an expert in complexity science at the University of California, 
Berkeley. The aim was to look at the complex relationships of the nexus to 
establish whether a subset of critical issues emerges – disproportionately 
strong levers that merit targeted efforts and investments.
The work highlighted two main levers: sustainable urban development 
and greenhouse gas emissions regulation and carbon pricing. For example, 
designing smarter, energy-eff icient cities could help reduce demand for 
energy and water. Such cities would integrate transport, energy, water and 
waste systems much more effectively than today’s cities.
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And greenhouse gas emissions regulation can spur more energy-efficient 
behaviours and technology deployment. Without such regulation, climate 
change could have a signif icant impact on dry regions becoming drier, 
agriculture being impacted and even more people moving into cities.
The Resilience Action Initiative
Clearly, these complex challenges cross boundaries between countries, 
industries and the public and private sectors and solving them will require 
a broad, holistic approach, an open mind and an understanding beyond our 
own areas of expertise.
This is why collaboration is so critical. It is the only way we can create 
new systems and approaches to foster growth in ways that mitigate these 
global stresses in a resource-constrained world.
In the context of the energy-water-food nexus, it means businesses, 
NGOs and governments joining forces to f ind comprehensive solutions. 
For instance, Shell currently has formal collaborative partnerships with 
select environmental NGOs at a strategic and operational level. Shell works 
with the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Wet-
lands International, Earthwatch and The Nature Conservancy to improve 
its energy projects in terms of reducing its environmental footprint and 
increase positive impact on communities.
In late 2011, Peter Voser convened a small group of business leaders from 
different sectors to f ind ways of working together to advance knowledge 
and increase experience with a view to making society more resilient in 
the face of growing resource and environmental strains. Letters went out 
and in January 2012, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, leaders of 
Dow, DuPont, Rio Tinto, McKinsey & Co., IBM, Unilever, Shell and Siemens 
came together to discuss the merits of cooperation. In the ensuing months, 
the Swiss re-insurer Swiss Re and the Norwegian fertiliser company Yara 
also joined.
The outcome of this meeting was an initiative later called the Resil-
ience Action Initiative (RAI) with the vision of supporting more resilient 
economies at the levels of regions, cities and industrial clusters. To achieve 
the vision, RAI would explore collaborative business models and open 
platforms that could measurably contribute to increased system resilience. 
Over the course of the next few months a number of work streams were 
created, some focused on enhancing methodology, others on driving action 
on the ground.
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This initiative differed from previous approaches in that it was strictly 
corporate, not imposed by law or triggered by stakeholder pressure. Voser 
and like-minded CEOs like Dow’s Andrew Liveris, and DuPont’s Ellen Kull-
man wanted to put some distance between their companies and a f inancial 
sector-induced crisis of confidence in the capitalist world, and reclaim the 
industrial sector’s rightful place at the heart of society.
Definition of resilience
With the dramatic increase in computing power at the back end of the 20th 
century a new f ield of knowledge emerged: complexity science. It explores 
how complex systems behave and how they respond to stresses. Resilience is 
a property of a complex system – it is the capacity to survive, adapt and grow 
in the face of change and uncertainty, particularly related to disturbances 
with a high impact and low probability. It is a property of any complex 
system, be it your body, a company, a sector, a city, a country.
Unlike sustainability, it has no normative connotation. A drug cartel or 
a nasty virus can be very resilient. More resilience therefore is not always 
a good thing. To achieve change, a (temporary) reduction of resilience may 
be needed. When considering resilience, it is necessary to always answer 
the question, “The resilience of what, against which stresses?”
Various resilience experts and commentators have noted that the RAI 
companies’ focus on resilience as a theme was relevant, timely and ambi-
tious, with answers to resilience questions far from obvious.
Indeed, RAI proved to be more a journey of discovery and learning, which 
continues today, than it was a readily implementable action plan. While the 
imperative to address the resilience of natural as well as socio-economic 
systems is beyond doubt, the way to go about it is only partially clear. Science 
is only starting to learn what determines system resilience.
One can define resilience as a concept in different ways. For RAI effort, 
the companies settled on: Resilience is the capacity of business, economic 
and social structures to survive, adapt and grow in the face of change and 
uncertainty related to disturbances, whether they be caused by resource 
stresses, societal stresses and/or acute events.
Thus far resilience had been relatively unexplored in the natural re-
sources and socio-economic domain. Over the last two years the theme has 
gained prominence in government, business and civil society – particularly 
in bringing the interests of different stakeholders closer together. It is a 
powerful lens for the contribution the private sector makes to society as well 
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as the environment society creates for thriving business. Furthermore, all 
resilient systems – be it an organisation, a city or a river basin – share certain 
characteristics. Resilience concepts are complementary to traditional risk 
management approaches and useful when thinking about adaptation and 
transformation in the face of change and uncertainty.
Resilience can be considered in relation to risk management. Risk 
management is traditionally a fairly linear process of listing the internal 
and external risks to achieving an objective, and identifying measures to 
eliminate the risk or mitigate the impact. The quality of risk management 
clearly depends heavily on the competencies of the people involved and 
may already have elements of resilience incorporated.
Resilience thinking and dialogue enhances risk management practices. 
It promotes an understanding of how risks are interlinked but moreover it 
is about understanding and enhancing those properties of a system that 
make it inherently more resilient, also to unidentif ied risks. A distinction is 
made between specific and generic resilience. Specific resilience is resilience 
against a particular known risk or stress, e.g. the capacity of New York City 
to deal with the next Superstorm Sandy. Generic resilience is the capacity 
of a system to deal with many different kinds of stresses, including those 
that are unknown.
The RAI approach
The RAI programme has consisted of different types of activities:
 – Knowledge projects
 – On-the-ground engagements and pilots, and bottom-up initiatives
 – Broader sharing and dialogue
The programme was coordinated by a global working group with repre-
sentatives from all RAI companies. The working group members engaged 
their own organisations and networks in the programme.
The approach agreed by RAI companies was to develop the methodology 
in parallel with the pilots, and not sequentially. In this way, the pilots’ 
experiences influenced the methodology development. At the same time, 
the engagements on the ground were able to use elements of the methodol-
ogy at various stages of its development.
The knowledge projects were aimed at understanding resilience, under-
standing how corporates and others contribute to resilience, what resilience 
means to an organisation, what different forms collaborations for resilience 
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can take, why collaborations for resilience can struggle and what can make 
them successful. They were typically led by one of the RAI members with 
other members contributing expertise and case studies from their own 
organisations and initiatives. Furthermore, a network of academics from 
around the world, all engaged in different sciences related to resilience, 
contributed their perspectives and a scientif ic view on the challenge.
Thinking about resilience is a challenge in itself, but working in practice 
is possibly as, if not more, diff icult. The on-the-ground engagements and 
pilots were meant to test and inform the thinking and give a real sense of the 
challenges. In the on-the-ground engagements we have worked on different 
complex systems – a city, an industrial cluster, a watershed, a country – to 
learn what resilience means in different geographies and scales. Also we 
have tried to focus on different subsystems – water, energy, food, transport, 
waste – to increase our shared understanding of resilience on different issues 
and their interdependencies. In the beginning these engagements were very 
exploratory, as the thinking had not matured. Often they felt uncomfortable as 
specific objectives and expectations were opaque. There was hesitation driven 
by a feeling of inadequacy because we did not really know what we were doing 
and a high risk of investing time and relationships for an uncertain return.
Inspired by a desire to complement the CEO-led approach, and to engage 
and inspire young people and leverage their different set of capabilities, an 
effort was made to facilitate young professionals from the RAI companies 
as well as public and civil society organisations to come together to have 
an impact on the ground through tangible actions. The appetite to work 
together, the passion with which these young professionals dedicated (often 
personal) time to the effort, and the hands-on creativity they brought were 
remarkable. Chapter 8 further details this approach and its initial results.
Broader sharing and dialogue is important to involve a critical mass 
of individuals and organisations in the thinking and inspire them to act 
together. We have found that the resilience frame of mind takes some time to 
adjust to, and requires some real experience to fully understand. To provide 
for an eff icient and fun introduction to the topic, the nexus and resilience 
knowledge work was translated into a board game. The game has been 
played with CEOs, mayors, scientists, members of NGOs and students. It is 
described in Chapter 7. Furthermore, various workshops were organised and 
attended by RAI members to do so. During the programme a broad network 
of individuals and organisations with an interest in resilience developed.
The two-year journey was intensive and required a great deal of personal 
resilience from all involved. Every few months existential challenges were 
raised and the scope, way of working and thinking would be updated after 
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working through our insecurities. The open challenge and collaboration de-
veloped a significant trust base between the individuals and teams involved.
Knowledge projects
The knowledge projects in 2011 focused on a ‘methodology and framework 
for improving resilience’ and ‘green infrastructure’. In 2012 further projects 
looked at the topics of ‘collaboration models and success factors’ and ‘resil-
ience in relation to (enterprise) risk management’.
The methodology work explored ways in which resilience can be ap-
proached, discussed and improved. Its aim has been to develop a process 
and toolkit. As resilience challenges are inherently complex it serves as 
a useful handrail for aligning stakeholders in a collaborative effort on a 
process and guiding the dialogue. It was developed in several stages and 
re-assessed with the lessons from the on-the-ground engagements and 
pilots. This work is described in the following chapter.
Green infrastructure solutions integrate value and risk assessment across 
different parts of the nexus. Biological systems, in contrast with engineered 
systems, are generally more compatible with a resilience perspective. The 
focus of the green infrastructure knowledge workstream was sharing 
best practices and identifying tools, approaches and barriers that would 
improve the ability of companies to consider, evaluate and implement 
‘green infrastructure’ options in addition to or instead of traditional ‘grey 
infrastructure’ choices. ‘Green infrastructure’ can be defined as the use of 
natural ecosystems to provide a service that is often provided by traditional 
‘grey infrastructure’ engineering solutions. For example, protection from 
floods and storms can often be accomplished by levees, but can also be 
accomplished via the use of wetlands and coastal marshes in place of and/
or in addition to levees. In many cases, ‘green infrastructure’ solutions 
can provide not only the same functionality as the ‘grey infrastructure’ 
alternative, but usually also provide valuable co-benef its to ecosystems 
and are more cost-effective. Chapter 6 lists a number of examples of green 
infrastructure and what the barriers are to scaling up such solutions.
In the RAI journey we discussed and re-evaluated the RAI operating 
model at many stages, which led to the realisation that different collabora-
tion models exist and are useful for different objectives. It also became clear 
that collaborations often struggle and there was a desire to understand 
better why that is the case and which ingredients can add to the success of 
collaborations. A broad review was done on multiple existing collaborative 
the resilience ac tion initiative: an introduc tion 31
projects and lessons on structure and critical enablers were extracted. The 
broadening of the RAI agenda to include multiple stakeholders culminated 
in a conference hosted at the Rockefeller Foundation’s Bellagio Centre, and 
organised by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). 
This work is elaborated on in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
What began as a translation of the resilience thinking in corporate terms, 
relating it to enterprise risk management, grew to become a framework 
for examining properties of any system which can increase its resilience, 
and where resilience properties require balancing or trade-offs with other 
organisational objectives. It furthermore explores the role of generic re-
silience, the resilience of a complex system to yet unknown stresses. This 
work is covered in Chapter 5.
The challenges of resilience in practice
The on-the-ground engagements and pilots have generated great interest 
among local government and other stakeholders to engage with the RAI 
partners on resilience. The focus in the pilots differs by location.
Da Nang, a major port city in Vietnam, was the f irst location where RAI 
engaged with a city government. The aim of the engagement was to explore 
options for the city to enhance its ability to adapt to and to recover success-
fully from acute threats such as floods and earthquakes, chronic threats such 
as constrained energy supplies and unanticipated threats such as political 
transitions and economic transformations. The pilot covered several issues 
like water, transportation, energy and economic development and produced 
recommendations on integrated water management and food safety.
In Rotterdam, the second-largest city in the Netherlands and one of the 
largest ports in the world, the resilience of the port and its relation with the 
city were subject of an ongoing dialogue between RAI and public stakeholders. 
Particularly the challenges of a delta-city and the interconnection between 
the municipality and the port were discussed. Subsequently, Rotterdam 
was selected as one of the 100 resilient cities in the Rockefeller Foundation 
programme and will continue to explore resilience as an opportunity.
To develop energy resilience, RAI members shared best practice as most had 
quite some experience with energy efficiency within their own operations, or 
working with suppliers and customers on their energy efficiency. From initial 
sharing of best practice it became clear that a relatively unexplored area of 
opportunity is improving the energy efficiency within a geographic industrial 
cluster and possibly with a neighbouring city. The impediments for integration 
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in an industrial cluster were identified not as lack of technology solutions but 
rather the lack of data sharing, agency issues (risk-reward balance) and the lack 
of proven business and financing models. The members decided to explore 
this opportunity for resilience through an energy resilience pilot at Jurong 
Island in Singapore. The McKinsey Green Campus (a small-scale ref inery 
turned into an energy-efficiency training facility on Jurong Island) served as 
the base for this exploration of the opportunity to improve the overall utility 
(power, heat, steam) efficiency and resilience on Jurong Island by improving 
the connections between neighbouring companies’ data, people and assets.
A multi-stakeholder dialogue in Houston has led to multiple collaborative 
efforts in the areas of waste-to-energy and lowering CO2 emissions from 
transport. For example ‘Houston Flows’ is a project seeks to help reduce the 
environmental footprint from the transportation of people, goods, and ser-
vices within and through the Greater Houston Area, which currently account 
for over 40% of the City of Houston’s GHG emissions. One component being 
explored is to drive behavioral changes that help create more sustainable 
mobility choices by Shell Houston employees within and across facilities.
In a multi-year programme in South Africa RAI members have brought 
together a broad group of global and national, public, private and civil 
society organisations to better understand the country’s nexus, resilience 
challenges and policy options. One of the topics is the collaboration between 
sectors to be more resilient to water stress and the policy environment that 
is a critical enabler for cross-sector collaboration. In an on-the-ground pilot 
in a watershed the insights from the national engagement are tested.
Bottom-up initiatives by young professionals from different organisations 
coming together have led to ‘real action’ and spin-off business in Rotterdam 
and South Africa on urban farming and ecosystem restoration. Further 
initiatives are underway in Manila, Groningen and Nigeria.
It is fair and important to note that some initiatives did not take off 
and many initiatives developed at a much slower pace than expected. 
A signif icant amount of time and effort was invested in building trust. 
Sometimes it was diff icult to identify shared interests that were a priority 
to the partners in the collaboration. Often it was a challenge to not let one’s 
own organisation’s short-term interests undermine the collaborative effort.
Broader sharing and dialogue
Some of the RAI knowledge work has also been captured in Nexus!, the RAI 
resilience game. This is a fast-paced, interactive resource development and 
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trading board game aimed at letting participants experience the linkages 
between resources in the nexus, resilience strategies and collaboration 
challenges. To date, the game has been played by over 2000 participants 
from students to executives, public authorities, NGO representatives and 
academics. Developing awareness and promoting systemic thinking is a 
critical part of the journey.
RAI members through organising and attending multiple conferences 
around the world have also promoted broader dialogue.
RAI has been a vehicle for exploring resilience, however, there are many 
more initiatives to improve resilience outside RAI, including ones that have 
emerged from business activities. To quote but two examples of many:
 – Canada’s Oil Sands Innovation Alliance (COSIA)5 is a collaborative 
effort between leading oil sands producers to rapidly accelerate envi-
ronmental performance. Sharing research, knowledge and expertise 
between 14 industry companies, COSIA minimises barriers and drives 
the discovery and development of environmental innovations, solutions 
and best practices throughout the oil sands. The COSIA model is being 
expanded to non-oil sands company members, in an ‘Associate Member-
ship Programme’. The intent of the programme is to harness the vast 
leveraging potential from a wide range of members from engineering 
f irms, to universities, governments etc. In just a year since startup, over 
440 technologies or innovations have been contributed by the member 
companies, with development costs over $700 million.
 – The Center for Sustainable Shale Development (CSSD)6 in Pennsylvania, 
USA, has developed performance standards for shale gas production 
development and a commitment to continuous improvement to ensure 
safe and environmentally responsible development of the abundant shale 
resources. CSSD is an unprecedented collaboration built on construc-
tive engagement among environmental organisations, philanthropic 
foundations and energy companies from across the Appalachian Basin.
Collaboration and leadership
While resilience is a concept people can intuitively relate to, it is also a 
mindset change. It needs an outside-in perspective, a systemic view on 
how the resilience of the environment in which you work impacts you, 
5 http://www.cosia.ca/
6 http://www.sustainableshale.org/
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and in turn, how you contribute to the resilience of the environment in 
which you operate. It demands a deep insight into the interdependencies of 
success. Resilience in the complex systems of society we work in cannot be 
achieved without collaboration as it always crosses organisational, sectoral 
and geographical boundaries.
When there is a shared understanding of our interdependencies, a 
dialogue about resilience of the broader system we all are a part of can 
facilitate bringing different stakeholders closer together and identifying 
where interests are aligned. This cannot be achieved without strong and 
authentic leadership, a leadership that fundamentally recognises and 
values interdependencies as core assets to protect and enhance value. Shell 
explored the role of leadership in collaborations at the energy-water-food 
nexus together with consulting f irm Xynteo.7
In all of these collaborations leadership is critical. Experience shows 
that collaborations of this kind tend to struggle for a number of reasons, 
including the fact that sectors are not used to working together. But if leaders 
put in place and follow a proper process, collaboration has the potential 
to unlock latent value that resides at the interface between the sectors, 
boosting growth and adapting to the challenges. Achieving this requires 
a new kind of leadership – one that brings people to the table and, despite 
the inevitable challenges, keeps them there. With no hierarchy, and people 
participating as peers, traditional ‘top-down’ styles of leadership are ill-
suited to collaboration.
Collaborative leaders are different. They instead inspire partners to 
commit to a common narrative, and then forge, promote and protect a 
collaborative process that catalyses action between the partners. They 
empower and enable collaborative partners to carry it out. This demands 
a distinct set of behaviours. First, collaborative leaders need to be able to 
move beyond a perspective of pure self-interest to putting the interests of 
the collaboration in front. Second, collaborative leaders, whose primary role 
is to serve the partners, need to involve others in the process to get their 
buy-in as well as ensuring that the best solution is tabled, while maintaining 
a decisive hand to keep partners within the process. To behave in such a 
way, collaborative leaders, unlike with a traditional leadership style, need 
to be comfortable with releasing control of the situation. This may require 
collaborative leaders to remove a number of personal barriers, such as 
ego, defensiveness and a desire for power, that are preventing them from 





2 A pragmatic frame to explore resilience
Marco Albani1 and Roland Kupers2
In a world faced with increasing volatility and turbulence, business leaders 
f ind the idea of working to bolster the resilience of the economic systems 
in which they operate both attractive and intuitive. Yet we found that 
operationalising this idea is quite diff icult, and it is especially diff icult 
to do so in a way that fully captures the richness of perspective that 
resilience and complexity sciences have developed over the last four 
decades.
The complexity stems from the fact that resilience is an emergent prop-
erty of complex systems that is revealed in the face of uncertain events, and 
as such is very hard to measure, especially ex ante. Adaptive capacity is the 
prime capability associated with resilience, encompassing the abilities to 
rapidly exploit new opportunities, manage complex and interconnected 
systems, and read and respond to signals of change.3 This adaptive capacity 
can appear either like change or stasis. In a corporate world, resilience 
can take the form of Shell still operating in the same main markets after 
a century or of IBM reinventing itself several times – both are successful, 
and hence resilient in their own right.
So while the concept is intuitive and appealing, and can be compellingly 
discussed at the conceptual level, there is a real challenge in moving from 
the conceptual to the practical without falling in the trap of reverting to 
traditional risk management approaches, which are certainly useful, but 
often do not capture the richness of insight that a resilience lens could 
bring to bear. For example, Value at Risk (VaR) calculations assume that risk 
distributions are normal, an assumption that is often invalid for the tightly 
coupled complex systems for which the resilience frame is developed. In 
fact, most systems for which we will be interested in their resilience, have 
non-normal risk distributions with fat tails (or black swans) that undermine 
the very essence of the standard risk management tools.
In our work with the Resilience Action Initiative (RAI), we found the 
need to develop a simple resilience frame that can be used to move from 
the conceptual to the practical, while retaining as much of the richness 
1 Senior Expert, Sustainability and Resource Productivity Practice of McKinsey & Company.
2 Associate Fellow, the Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, University of Oxford.
3 Reeves and Deimler (2011)
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of insight and approach developed through resilience science as possible. 
We developed this frame, which we will describe in the next section, to 
facilitate a structured conversation around the resilience of the systems we 
are interested in. The frame was tested in a variety of different situations 
– from industrial clusters, to cities, to large regions – and with different 
levels of analysis and data intensity, where it proved itself both useful to 
spur the right conversations, and to be robust to a variety of contexts and 
data richness.
Still, the frame is to be seen as primarily as an ‘on-ramp’ to a richer 
discussion of resilience. For the sake of simplicity, it leaves out a number 
of concepts that are important to access a full suite of resilience solu-
tions. In the second part of this chapter we take a guided tour of these 
additional concepts, aided by the interviews with resilience experts that 
we carried out as part of our work with the Resilience Action Initiative. 
These additional concepts, which often take the form of open questions 
or dilemmas, in part reflect the gulf that still exists between resilience 
thinking in the abstract, and resilience practice. Still we found them very 
important and thought provoking, even if sometimes they led to more 
questions than answers.
A diagnostic frame
We developed a framework with f ive dimensions that allows a team to 
capture their current understanding of the resilience issues of a system.
The dimensions consider external stresses to the system, their inter-
relatedness as well as capabilities for learning and foresight. The framework 
helps us understand how multiple actions relate to each other, and has been 
helpful in exploring resilience challenges. It has been tested for a number 
of different systems through a series of workshops. These ‘system elements’, 
represented in the exhibit below, enable, in a simple yet powerful way, a 
discussion of the most important dimensions of resilience.
The horizontal axis of the framework focuses on the exposure of the 
system to stresses, inventoried in three categories: resource, societal and 
acute events stresses. Two additional elements, represented on the verti-
cal axis, focus on how the system’s structure affects its response to these 
stresses, looking at, on the one hand, how the tight coupling of its exposure 
to different stresses can increase the impact of individual stresses, and, 
on the other hand, how the system is capable of increasing its resilience 
through foresight, learning and overall adaptive capacity.
a pragMatic fraMe to explore resilience 39
A structured approach to resilience assessment focuses on both 
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multipliers
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4 - Learning, foresight & 
self-organization
▪ System-level correlation and 
critical dependencies between 
resources and other stresses 
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8 - Transformative 
resilience
Resilience  elements
We now look in more detail at the three core resilience stresses described 
on the horizontal axis: (1) Resource stress, (2) Societal stress and (3) Acute 
events stress.
1. Resource stress relates to the exposure of the system to stresses on 
the energy-water-food nexus, but also its robustness against these 
stresses. Examples include increasing water scarcity or the depleting 
fossil reserves. Typical resilience actions include the increase of resource 
productivity (eff iciency increase), the increase of buffers and diversity 
(eff iciency reduction), the replacement of resources, or the reduction of 
volatility in resource consumption. In examining this dimension of a 
system’s exposure to stress, we found it useful to look at:
a. Demand-supply dynamics of the critical resources (e.g. water, 
energy, food, land). This can be done qualitatively, but also quanti-
tatively, building a perspective on the demand and supply growth of 
each resource under different scenarios, and examining what needs 
to happen to keep supply and demand balanced.
b. Supply quality. It is not enough to examine whether future resources 
demand can be met – it is important to ask whether it can be done 
sustainably, what kind of impact future supply sources have on the 
systems’ natural capital, or whether future demand can be met 
through high dependency on imports, or by a system with limited or 
no diversif ication, and with reliability or redundancy challenges.
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c. We f inally found it interesting to look at the resource productivity of 
the system: how resource eff icient it is today, what improvements on 
resource stresses can be achieved by improving resource efficiency, e.g. 
through measures like recycling, and how far the system is from the 
eff iciency versus resilience trade-off when resources are considered.
2. The dimension on societal stress relates to the social conditions that 
increase system vulnerability to chronic and acute event stress. Societal 
stress should not be limited to the social context of the two other stresses, 
but should consider social dynamics in a broad sense. The narrow defini-
tion includes stress through access to resources, distribution of risk (e.g. 
unplanned settlement of f lood-prone area that increases the exposure 
to flood risk) or emergent risks (e.g. high level of urban unemployment 
that increases the impact of food price fly-up on social order or extreme 
income inequality). Resilience actions include limiting unequal distribu-
tion of risk, increasing fairness in resource distribution or social planning
3. The acute event stress dimension deals with the exposure of the system 
to sudden stresses that may jeopardise or severely test its dynamics. Typi-
cal examples are natural hazards such as cyclones, f loods or droughts, 
but also sudden price spikes that make a resource economically nearly 
unavailable. Not all acute stresses are readily identifiable and some of the 
most powerful are endogenous risks such as the 2008 banking crisis or 
the Arab Spring. Resilience actions include measures to avoid such stress 
situations, to increase the absorption capacity, the speed of recovery and 
the ability to respond to stress. For a number of acute events, it is possible 
to take a risk management approach at f irst, to:
a. Enumerate the principal hazards the system is exposed to – from natu-
ral catastrophes to extreme price fly-ups on critical traded commodities, 
understanding their magnitude and past frequency. Scientists are 
f inding that certain changes in the statistical patterns may be early 
indicators of acute events.4
b. Develop a qualitative or quantitative risk perspective, by examining 
both the exposure and the vulnerability of the systems to these 
events, and the mitigation actions either in place or possible. A prag-
matic quantitative approach to do so with climate risk, for example, 
has been developed by the Economics of Climate Adaptation group.5 
Beware of implicit assumptions whether the relevant risks follow a 
normal distribution.
4 Scheffer (2009).
5 Economics of Climate Adaptation Working Group (2009)
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c. Finally it is helpful to think of the physical and financial recovery 
mechanisms the system has already in place, in the form of emergency 
preparedness and response plans, emergency response procedures, 
strategic reserves, etc.
The horizontal axis is helpful in guiding a discussion of the system stress in 
isolation, but the resilience of the system will be tested more severely where 
stresses are tightly coupled, as represented on the vertical axis.
4. The dimension on interdependency takes into consideration system-
level correlation and critical dependencies between resources and 
other stresses – e.g. the energy intensity of water resources and the 
water intensity of the energy system. This consideration is at the core 
of the ‘stress nexus’ concept, where cross-resource intensity accelerates 
the impact of single resource stresses on the system. In making these 
considerations it is important to be explicit also about the time scale of 
cross-resource demand – for example, whether cross-resource intensity 
tends to concentrate demand peaks, like a hydroelectric system feeding 
irrigation pumps, all relying on the same water; and also be explicit in 
considering any critical dependencies in the system that might create 
important cross-resource thresholds.
5. Finally, we found it extremely helpful to explicitly consider those ele-
ments of the system that increase its resilience by providing capacity 
for learning, foresight, and self-organisation. Because resilience is 
essentially about adaptive capacity, these dimensions provide a good 
approach to discussing how the system can adapt to foreseen and 
unforeseen challenges – what institutions and processes are in place 
to allow for foresight, e.g. through monitoring of important leading 
indicators; what is its ability to capture, store, and share lessons learned 
and best practices; and what processes and opportunities are in place 
for self-evaluation and change.
Especially in discussing this last element, we found it useful to think about 
three different levels or ‘elements of resilience’, as a parallel lens to use in 
diagnostic exercises: (6) structural resilience, (7) integrative resilience and 
(8) transformative resilience.
These lenses6 are treated in more detail in Chapter 5, but suff ice it to 
introduce them here:
6 The choice of these lenses owes a great debt to Walker and Salt (2006) and Walker and Salt 
(2012).
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6. Structural resilience focuses on the structural elements building resil-
ience of the system itself, with a view to improve system performance 
continuity: This includes redundancy or putting buffers or spares in 
the system, modularity to separate components and avoid a cascade of 
failures and requisite diversity in those dimensions that are relevant for 
this particular system at this particular time.
7. Integrative resilience emphasises the complex interconnections of the 
company with its environment. This includes multi-scale interaction 
as described above by mapping the feedback loops between scales, 
thresholds or discontinuities at which point the system goes through a 
step change and social capital describing the accumulated capacity for 
bottom-up self organization of a society to respond to stress.
8. Transformative resilience adds a longer time scale and thus opens the 
range even more, to ensure and enhance a company’s transformabil-
ity. This includes distributed governance in order to tap into the self-
organising capacity beyond straightforward top-down interventions, the 
foresight capacity to have a process to include irreducible uncertainties 
into the envisaged solutions, as well as innovation and experimentation 
as enablers through learning-by-doing.
Throughout the experience of the Resilience Action Initiative, we have 
used these lenses in a number of workshops to assemble perspectives on 
the resilience challenges that a system was facing, and to elicit potential 
interventions. We used them in situations as diverse as the development 
of new extractive resources in a water-constrained region, the challenges 
faced by a major industrial port city as it expands its industrial footprint, 
the resource efficiency challenges of an industrial cluster, and the resilience 
implication of the energy futures of a middle-income country. Not only did 
the frame prove itself to be helpful and robust to a different set of resilience 
challenges, but it also proved itself useful both in situations where the 
discussion was carried out with little or no prior analysis, which was then 
guided by the frame, as well as in applications where the frame was used 
to organise an extensive body of quantitative analysis.
Beyond a diagnostic frame
A framing tool cannot capture all the dimensions of resilience – and we 
found it doesn’t need to. It functions as an on-ramp to make visible the 
dynamics of the system under consideration, which can then be deepened 
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further through a facilitated discussion in order to determine an action 
plan. There are a few aspects that featured in those discussions, which are 
worth highlighting: the consequence of picking system boundaries, how 
eff iciency and resilience relate, the importance of considering multiple 
scales and making system assumptions explicit and f inally some open 
questions and dilemmas.
The boundary conundrum
In practical terms, analysing a system’s resilience requires picking a bound-
ary. Which boundary we choose has specific consequences as it may exclude 
important influences from outside the boundary. We must be attentive to 
interactions across the boundary – in particular for fat-tail events that may 
come from outside the system. In practice, keeping the boundary somewhat 
fuzzy helps to avoid missing critical interconnections. While this seems like 
an ambiguous recommendation, it is an inevitable consequence of taking a 
systemic view: considering too big a system is simply impractical and setting 
the boundaries too narrowly means we will exclude critical influences.
The difficult relationship between efficiency and resilience
Most people will consider higher eff iciency as an absolute good: more ef-
f icient is always better than less eff icient. As a consequence, the insight 
that sometimes eff iciency comes at the expense of resilience is often both 
a surprise and a diff icult idea to grasp. While the benefits of increasing 
eff iciency are undeniable, the cost of these measures to resilience is rarely 
assessed. The prize, of course, is having both.
When the tsunami hit Japan in March 2011, it showed that the confidence 
placed in the sea defenses protecting the Fukushima nuclear power plant 
was misplaced. The ensuing disruption of the highly eff icient just-in-time 
supply chains for automobile production was massive. Just-in-time produc-
tion is the ultimate eff iciency consideration, where buffers in the chain 
have been absolutely minimised through a tight coupling of IT systems 
between factory and suppliers. Windshield wipers are delivered in just 
the right quantities at just the right time to build them into the cars. The 
tsunami and accompanying earthquakes thoroughly disrupted this brittle 
supply chain and it took many months to return to full production. The 
just-in-time supply chain was an example of eff iciency at the expense of 
resilience. We’re not saying what the right trade-off is; a couple of months 
of lost production, compared to decades of lean manufacturing might well 
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have been the right balance. The point is that in the eff iciency frame, this 
trade-off was not explicitly part of the analysis; in the resilience frame it 
would be.7
This trade-off is linked to the choice of system boundary highlighted 
above: e.g. the natural world as a whole is eff icient, but when you increase 
the eff iciency of an isolated component (e.g. intensive farming), it impacts 
the resilience of the whole. Most of the time this erosion occurs through 
the reduction of diversity or the elimination of system buffers.
Weighing resilience and eff iciency is hard as eff iciency is mostly above 
dispute. Are buffers really redundant or are you starting to erode the func-
tional diversity that is required for resilience? In other words, to increase 
eff iciency, we reduce the options we have in choosing our responses by 
making things more homogenous. Much of what is considered redundant 
tends to be response diversity, i.e. the ability to have multiple strategies to 
react to something unexpected.
When trading off resilience and efficiency, this issue of the system bound-
ary is essential. Making companies highly eff icient may make them indi-
vidually less resilient, but together they can form a more resilient economy. 
Similarly, intensive agriculture is necessary to feed humanity – but, in 
addition, smart eff iciency in agriculture can lead to a dramatic reduction 
in fertiliser and water waste. This contributes to overall resilience by using 
resources eff iciently, in the process of scaling up of food production.
We next turn to the issue of scales.
Dealing with multiple scales
“Managing at a single scale is the single biggest mistake people make in 
dealing with resilience”, states Brian Walker, the head of the Resilience 
Alliance that connects academics with interest in the topic. With scale we 
mean, for example, time (short, medium and long term) or space (street, 
neighborhood, city, country). Inevitably when we consider an issue, we have 
a focal scale – i.e. the scale at which a solution is intended to be found. This 
can be a project, an industrial park or a whole ecosystem. Paying heed to 
the relationships between scales and to the influence that may come from 
other scales requires explicit focus.
Identifying feedback loops between scales is essential, and can be done by 
starting the examination with a focal scale, and going up and down a level to 
map the main feedback loops. In practice, the number of main loops will be 
7 The example is quoted from Colander and Kupers (2014).
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limited, typically around five (‘the rule of hand’). The reason is that a system 
with too many feedback loops would become unstable and rearrange itself 
with fewer dominant feedback loops. Unfortunately, knowing the right set 
of feedback loops is not always easy, or even possible. This is an essential 
difference from considering only feedback at a single system level. Often 
only feedback loops at the largest scale are considered,8 such as interac-
tion between the food production in a region with the available water. Yet 
individual f ields and wells may well have an influence at the macro scale. 
(In the next chapter, water management in the Subak agricultural region 
is described, which illustrates this point.)
The effect of connections between scales can be to create stress or in-
stabilities that arise seemingly out of thin air. These types of endogenous 
(emergent) stresses come about through the multi-scalar dynamics. In the 
2008 global f inancial crisis, much weight is put on the sub-prime mortgages 
as the ‘cause’ of the crisis. Yet the financial system has weathered much worse 
‘causes’ without such widespread consequences. Looking through a resilience 
lens would yield a different narrative, one whereby the feedback loops be-
tween the different banks, f inancial networks and regulatory frameworks 
led to an endogenous shock, plausibly triggered by the sub-prime mortgages.
A multi-scalar perspective is at the heart of resilience – and is much 
overlooked. It is well known from the science of complex (i.e. intercon-
nected) systems that feedback loops between various scales in a system 
are the essence of various kinds of emergent behaviours and properties.
Making system assumptions explicit
A widely held, but often hidden assumption, in dealing with socioeconomic 
issues is to postulate a closed system with a single equilibrium. In such a 
system a viable solution can be identif ied, which will be optimal over time. 
This assumption underlies much of standard macroeconomics and has 
spread widely as a thought pattern. A system with a single equilibrium has 
no resilience issues. In such a system, prices drive behaviour, and balances 
supply and demand. Modern insights in economics and system theory 
suggest that economies in fact have multiple equilibria. The resilience lens 
requires making explicit and challenging the assumptions: Is the system 
open or closed? Does it have a single or multiple optimal equilibria? Do we 
have a way of selecting an equilibrium?
8 Under influence of the Systems Dynamic approach popularised since the 1960s (MIT’s Jay 
Forrester, Club of Rome etc.).
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Open questions and dilemmas
“Resilience is always, perhaps maddeningly, provisional, and its insistence 
toward holism, longer-term thinking, and less-than-peak efficiency represent 
real … challenges.”9
While the frame presented above does not exhaustively describe the system, 
it has helped unearth new solutions and approaches when applied. A level 
of ‘resilience literacy’ is helpful to deepen the analysis, but not necessary 
for impact. In addition there are dilemmas that remain, in part because 
systems theory has not provided the answers, let alone articulated them 
in ways that practitioners f ind useful.
The f irst dilemma that is often raised is the understandable call for 
metrics: we strongly recommend resisting this. Resilience is not a parameter 
to optimise, either maximise or minimise – and it is value neutral. Buzz 
Holling,10 the early champion of resilience, has described the resilience 
cycle through a f igure-eight graph that describes the need for resilience 
to wane occasionally, to allow for change. When a system is stuck in a bad 
state, resilience must be reduced, to allow the transformation into a new, 
more adaptive state. But to reach successful transformational change, a 
very long-term perspective of the system is required. Transformation is not 
possible without a shared vision of the future to frame the actions in the 
present and hence it is important to envision system outcomes as separate 
from company outcomes. Resilience is only a means.
The tension between efficiency and resilience is challenging. Optimising 
and controlling a part of a system in isolation can result in the decline of 
the resilience of the broader system. This is a matter of understanding 
the impact of the choice of boundary, but also in assessing f it-for-purpose 
diversity and buffers. These will often come at a cost that will need to be 
justif iable within a resilience frame. How to value resilience in the context 
of investment constraints and customer requirements is a key challenge 
that remains unresolved.
This also raises the question of who is accountable for resilience. For 
example, in the run up to the f inancial crisis of 2008, the optimisation of 
the health of individual banks appears to have eroded the resilience of the 
overall f inancial system. In a resilience frame, should banks have been more 
concerned with the stability of the system? How does resilience affect the 
9 Zolli and Healy (2012)
10 Gunderson and Holling (2001)
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reach of corporate responsibility? What new types of collaborations are 
required to achieve resilience?
Solutions to resilience will be found in practical action and will likely 
not come in the form of blueprints, but in frames that are evolving and 
adapting. This shifting nature will create tension with the trend towards 
standardisation and reproduction that is at the heart of the scaling of 
industrial enterprise, but it opens the opportunity to discover solutions 
that deliver greater and more long-term value.

3 A resilience lens for enterprise risk 
management1
David N. Bresch,2 Jaap Berghuijs,3 Rainer Egloff 4 and Roland 
Kupers5
Enriching corporate risk management
What happens when a f ire strikes at the manufacturing plant of the sole 
supplier of semiconductors used in millions of cell phones? What can a 
food company do when the natural environment from which it draws its 
resources is increasingly degraded? And how can a company increase its 
f itness with respect to unforeseeable challenges? To survive and thrive 
in the face of stress and disruption, a company can seek for enterprise 
resilience, which we here def ine as the capacity of business to survive, suc-
cessfully adapt and prosper in the face of change and uncertainty related to 
disturbances with a high impact and a low probability.
Natural disasters, economic crises, political turmoil, terrorist attacks, 
environmental degradation and disruptive technologies are just a few 
examples of the many kinds of stresses and disruptions that can impact 
a company’s bottom line. In a global, interconnected world such shocks 
become more complex, have increasingly big consequences and leave 
less time to react. Seemingly harmless events, which arrive with little or 
no perceived warning, may turn out to have serious consequences. It is 
sometimes only in hindsight that the root causes become visible.
Striving for resilience requires a systemic approach – a strategic and 
operational perspective that treats the company as a system, and empha-
sises criteria applicable to any system. A resilience lens in enterprise risk 
management empowers a company’s structural ability to ‘bounce back’ after 
1 The authors would like to thank the RAI Working Group for its contributions and sup-
port, and expresses its gratitude to the participating companies and their risk management 
representatives for the willingness to share their thoughts and feedback on project drafts in 
bilateral telephone interviews: Dow, DuPont, IBM, McKinsey & Company, Shell, Siemens and 
Unilever.
2 Global Head Sustainability, Swiss Re.
3 Junior Strategy Analyst, Reinsurance Strategy, Swiss Re.
4 Senior Risk Manager in Swiss Re’s Emerging Risk Management unit.
5 Associate Fellow, Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, University of Oxford.
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a shock or disturbance. It also strengthens the f irm’s capacity to survive, 
continuously develop and transform to prosper in complex environments. It 
prominently does so through widening the system’s horizon, including social, 
environmental, economic and emergent factors that a company may not 
‘own’ and be unable to directly control. Finally, to foster the resilience of 
a company also means to build its long-term adaptive capacity. In short, a 
resilient company can absorb disruption, acknowledge its interconnected-
ness and proactively change.
Company boards recognise that both the speed with which risk events 
unfold and their impact on business appears to escalate. They express 
concerns that their current risk practice no longer adequately protects their 
company.6 ‘Black swans’7 or ‘fat tails’ have been recognised for some time 
now, yet much of risk management still heavily relies on traditional Value 
at Risk (VaR) analysis assuming normal risk distributions and to a large 
extent neglects uncertainty, i.e. risks with hard-to-def ine probability. A 
company that ignores fat tails underestimates its total risk exposure. On 
the other hand, the effective anticipation of rare high-impact disruption can 
lead to a competitive advantage, and thus should be viewed as a business 
opportunity.
Traditional enterprise risk management is optimised to assess and 
mitigate risks that follow normal statistical distributions, i.e. that are 
well def ined, linear and measurable. However, it does not account well 
for risks that are diff icult to model because of their non-linearity, multi-
dimensionality, propagation over multiple scales or by their mere rareness 
to actualise. A resilience perspective in enterprise risk management shares 
many traits with traditional Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) – it sup-
ports the survival and thriving of business. It enhances a more traditional 
focus by applying a systemic approach and by emphasising low probability, 
slowly accumulating, discrete or unknown risk, dynamic developments, 
feedback loops and thresholds. The main goal of enterprise resilience is to 
ensure the adaptability of a company – subjected to an acute or chronic 
stress, and with a long-term perspective.
We propose a set of resilience lenses grouped in three dimensions or 
levels: Structural resilience focuses on the systemic nature of the company 
itself, with a view to improve business continuity management. Redundancy, 
modularity and requisite diversity are important aspects to this. Integra-
tive resilience emphasises the complex interconnections of the company 
6 PwC (2011), 3
7 Taleb (2007)
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with its environment. We highlight multi-scale interaction, thresholds and 
social capital. Finally, transformative resilience adds a longer time scale 
and so opens the range even more, to ensure and enhance a company’s 
transformability. Here we discuss distributed governance, foresight capacity, 
and innovation and experimentation as enablers. One can also frame the 
presented lenses as different facets of the same prism providing different 
ways to look at the same thing: the resilience dynamics of an enterprise. The 
structuring in levels – from structural to transformative – allows shifting 
focal scale: from (1) the company through (2) its interconnections with its 
environments to (3) long-term adaptability.
The project documented here is part of the Resilience Action Initiative 
(RAI). Privately launched at WEF 2012, RAI was set up with the vision of 
business, by working and innovating together, making their value chains 
and local economic partners (i.e. at city and regional level) more resilient 
to stresses arising from the energy-water-food nexus, amplif ied by climate 
change risk factors. This chapter turns the focus of resilience to the compa-
nies themselves, going beyond a mere focus on the energy-water-food nexus. 
The chapter represents a pioneering effort, stressing the importance of put-
ting resilience on the enterprise risk management map. For the individual 
company, this chapter serves as a starting point to deal with resilience, 
from which its resilience approach can be ‘customised’ according to the 
specif ic environment and factors of importance for that company. Because 
specif ic resilience requirements may vary strongly between industries and 
companies, we here deliberately refrain from providing detailed practical 
advice on an individual company basis.
Similar type of disaster – different effects: Deepwater Horizon vs Exxon Valdez
the comparison of two equivalent high-impact low-probability events, the 1989 
exxon valdez and 2010 Deepwater horizon oil spills, illustrates how the risk land-
scape has changed in recent times. Both spills were the largest ever in american 
waters at their time, had a severe environmental impact and resulted in the 
pollution of vast stretches of us coastline. from an enterprise risk perspective, 
however, a strong contrast between the two disasters exists.
While the exxon valdez spill resulted in strong uproar amongst locals and 
environmentalists, other stakeholders largely ignored the incident. this gave 
exxon ample time, first to handle clean-up operations and subsequently to take 
a strictly legalistic hard line on claims and regulatory issues. News of the Deep-
water horizon catastrophe, on the other hand, instantly spread around the
52 DaviD N. Bresch, Jaap BerghuiJs, raiNer egloff aND rolaND Kupers 
world and produced an outcry from stakeholders and the general public 
through digital social media that did not yet exist 20 years before. extensive 
media coverage, including 24-hour webcam footage of oil spewing from the 
well, made the world’s eyes turn to the incident and lead to close scrutiny of Bp’s 
reaction to the event.
in contrast to exxon’s 1989 spill, in 2010 Bp only had a fraction of the time of 
its predecessor to react while the impact of the event was much more severe, 
both regarding environmental damage and from an enterprise risk point of 
view. the enterprise-wide reputational damage for Bp was enormous, and the 
event’s impacts have swept across the industry.
Source: Adapted from PwC (2011)
Structural resilience
The focus of structural resilience, which is also known as ‘engineering 
resilience’, lies on bouncing back faster after stress, enduring greater stresses, 
and being disturbed less by a given amount of stress.8 In other words, this f irst 
level of resilience is all about enhancing capacity to withstand disruption. It 
concentrates on resilience aspects that are internal to a given company, such 
as its strategy and organisational structure. Structural resilience aspects 
and measures are therefore easiest to implement and control, and form 
a fundamental step to increase resistance against disruption. Structural 
resilience comprises three different lenses – redundancy, modularity and 
requisite diversity – each of which will be discussed below.
Redundancy
Before September 11, 2001, many f inancial service f irms had a massive 
network of IT infrastructure in and around the World Trade Center, which 
formed an important connection to the US markets. When the terrorist 
attack on and subsequent collapse of the towers left Deutsche Bank’s New 
York’s facility in ruins, redundant IT systems in Ireland took over operations. 
On the very same day, the company was able to clear more than USD300 
billion with the Fed.9 Deutsche Bank used a conceptually simple and intui-
tive way of limiting the potential impact of disruption: the introduction 
of redundancy, i.e. putting in place buffers that can absorb the impact of 
8 Martin-Breen and Anderies (2011)
9 Sheff i (2007)
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a shock. Such buffers can be of many different kinds and generally come 
at a cost, such as the safety stock kept by a manufacturing company or 
redundant production capacity for a company’s most important product 
lines. Redundancy also comes with company size: a large multinational has 
more physical and f inancial capital to absorb shocks of a given size than 
a medium-sized enterprise. It provides overcapacity that protects against 
critical failure or, more plainly put, keeps the company running when it 
receives a blow.
While redundancy is a simple and effective measure to increase resil-
ience, it goes against the eff iciency push many companies established over 
the last decades. Cutting inventories and building leaner supply chains 
resulted in a very high efficiency and a strong increase in quality of products 
and services. Rather than reversing the gains of these efforts, companies 
need to critically assess the costs and benefits of redundancy in its different 
forms and independently determine their own position in the trade-off 
between resilience and eff iciency.
Modularity
In businesses that are internally strongly connected, shocks that initially 
only hit a small part of the company may propagate rapidly, causing ex-
tensive damage. Conversely, in an organisation with a modular internal 
structure, such shocks can be contained, and business is more easily 
restored. Modularity can be understood as a form of decentralisation, 
which has several additional advantages. Decentralised decision-making, 
such as in many franchises, empowers those who know the local business 
environment best. This ensures faster as well as more accurate and effective 
action than in a centrally governed organisation. Also, decentralised supply 
chains focusing on local suppliers are less vulnerable to shocks.
Another benef it of modularity is the exchangeability of individual 
components, which allows for dynamic reorganisation and more flexibility. 
Systems may appear complex from the outside but often have a surprisingly 
simple, modular internal structure consisting of components that plug into 
one another – much like Lego blocks – and, equally importantly, can be 
unplugged and reconfigured easily when necessary.10 This allows for a much 
faster and more dynamic reaction to changing circumstances.
Additionally, a modular structure allows for scaling up and scaling 
down – the ability to f lock or swarm – by increasing or decreasing the 
number of linkages between components or by breaking them, whichever 
10 Zolli and Healy (2012)
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a specif ic situation might call for. This ability to flock or swarm increases 
a company’s adaptive capacity – the ability to aptly react to a situational 
change. Cloud computing, for which linked, redundant servers are used to 
complete a specif ic task, forms a specif ic example.
A modular organisational structure, however, does have certain disad-
vantages. Increased independency of organisational modules can result in a 
loss of uniformity, which can cause problems with safety and risk tolerance. 
These disadvantages can be offset with a global governance framework 
based on principles, standards and a strong company culture. However, one 
should be aware of the danger in translating such global principles into local 
rules, as this can effectively annul the intended modularity. Introducing 
less visible links can make the modules act in concert. The 2008 f inancial 
crisis made it apparent that investment resilience through portfolio diver-
sif ication often failed, as other f inancial instruments had forged strong 
de facto connections between portfolio elements. Similarly, if companies 
adopt modularity as a resilience strategy, they should critically inspect the 
implicit interdependencies between the modules. On a USD70 trillion global 
annual economy, the $600 billion bankruptcy f iling of Lehman Brothers in 
mid-September 2008 was a relatively modest event. However, through an 
epidemic of fear and uncertainty it lead to a global collapse of the f inancial 
system. The crisis revealed that the system of f inancial companies and 
institutions, although modular, was (and remains) vulnerable because it 
was much more strongly connected than it was previously perceived.
Requisite diversity
Diversity is most often discussed and applied in the human resources. 
Workforce diversity often refers to the gender ratio in a company or in its 
upper management, to the ethnical background or age of employees, to 
the representation of cultural and language groups, etc. Such aspects of 
workforce diversity all contribute to diversity of thought and skills, which 
stimulates discussion, fosters wiser and more considered decisions, and en-
hances creativity and innovation. In other words, they enhance functional 
diversity and allow a company to operate more effectively.
More important in the context of enterprise resilience, however, is what 
is commonly referred to as responsive diversity11: Various ‘components’ (i.e. 
employees, systems, strategies, suppliers, production methods, services, 
etc.) within a functional group respond dissimilarly to different kinds of 
disturbances. This is most valuable when disaster strikes. For example, a 
11 Walker and Salt (2006)
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diversif ied supply chain enables a company to cope much better with any 
particular disruption within that chain; a diverse set of strategies allows 
an enterprise to react more effectively to a change in market conditions. 
Analogously to a portfolio of f inancial products and irrespective of whether 
disruption is anticipated, a company with a whole range of diversif ied 
components is less prone to company-wide shocks because its risk is spread 
through responsive diversity.
Diversity may be associated with reduced short-term eff iciency. Inho-
mogeneous subsystems (whether that is a workforce, supply chain, strategy 
or product portfolio) can demand more time and effort to manage because 
with diversity, certain advantages of economies of scale are lost. Diversity 
should not go unchallenged, and companies will be wise to ask what the 
appropriate focus and amount for diversity may be in particular circum-
stances. To increase its resilience, a company should constantly determine 
the right amount of diversity in all relevant components; it should strive 
for requisite diversity.
South Korean electronics giant Samsung believes it can leverage on 
its diversity range of products and strategies. While it is challenging to 
be successful in many businesses at the same time, it gives the company 
an advantage over its more specialised competitors in several ways. For 
example, Samsung adjusts more easily to the common trend of blurring 
lines between product segments – as, for example, is the case for mobile 
phones and tablets. Further, a diverse range of relatively similar products, 
combined with a high reaction speed to the market’s response, allows the 
company to discover and cater for new markets quickly. The successful 
combination of diversity and agility proves useful both to seize opportunity 
and to adjust to shocks – it adds to the company’s adaptive capacity and, 
therefore, to its resilience.12
Structural resilience: Rabobank’s unique organisation
rabobank ranks amongst the top-20 banks in the world by equity and is one 
of the few that remained relatively unscathed during the 2008 financial crisis. 
unlike many others, it did not require government support. can we pinpoint the 
origin of its higher resilience?
its origins in 1890 as a cooperative agricultural micro-finance bank endowed 
it a unique cooperative structure. today, it is a network of 140 member banks, 
12 Nisen (2013)
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which in turn have thousands of individual members. But the recognition of its 
importance waxed and waned, with a full-fledged effort to convert it into a con-
ventional structure with a stock market listing in the 1990s ultimately resulting in 
a recommitment to the membership structure in 1998. its strongest binding fac-
tor is the cross-guarantee, under which any individual rabobank guarantees the 
obligations of all other member banks. the power balance within the rabobank 
group is a delicate equilibrium between the local banks on the one hand and the 
central organisation on the other. although rabobank lost its rare aaa credit in 
2012, its unique structure is seen as a key resource for managing uncertainty in 
turbulent times and it has been ranked amongst the ten safest banks in the world.
in general cooperative banks with their distributed governance structures 
have had superior performance during the financial crisis. there are a number 
of explanations for their higher resilience, in which the corporate governance 
structure plays an important role in dealing with systemic risks. member owner-
ship entails a conservative banking approach with a longer-term perspective 
and a focus on retail banking. cooperative banks are characterised by relatively 
lower risks, lower volatility and more stable returns. ceo smits writes: “it is the 
task of the top-management to manage these multiple hierarchies and to keep 
them in a future-proof balance.”
Source: Adapted from Boonstra (2010) and Van Dijk (1999)
Integrative resilience
Any enterprise is embedded in a complex natural-social-economic system, 
which is constituted and influenced by many different factors and stakehold-
ers – such as competitors, the f inancial markets, the natural environment 
and the general public. Many f irms, in turn, possess the ability to influence 
this overall system. A company and its surrounding system are intercon-
nected in many different, often poorly understood ways. Integrative resil-
ience therefore requires an opening of focus from the individual company 
to the larger system it is embedded in or linked to. In order to become more 
resilient, a company needs to acknowledge this mutual dependency, and 
to understand its inherent risks and opportunities. Multi-scale interaction, 
thresholds and social capital are eminent concerns of integrative resilience.
Multi-scale interaction
Consider the 2007 ‘tortilla riots’ in Mexico – a series of public protests 
against the strong price rises of corn, the main ingredient of tortillas. The 
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corn price spike resulted from a strong dependence on American corn 
suppliers, which were able to sell their excess corn below production cost 
due to NAFTA. In the USA, corn prices went up as production was switched 
to fuel ethanol in many places, in response to a disruption in oil production 
in the Gulf of Mexico because of Hurricane Katrina, which hit the area in 
2005. This example shows that seemingly disconnected events, such as a 
rise in food prices, result from the complex interaction between multiple 
system scales, which include f inancial, political, social and environmental 
aspects that each move at different speeds.13
Systems thinking14 acknowledges that a natural-social-economic system 
consists of many different scales. It is the interaction between different 
scales that drives the emergent behaviour of the system in which a company 
is embedded. Changes on one of these scales influence the processes in others, 
which is why it is unhelpful to treat any of these scales or processes in isola-
tion. All too often, decisions are made without understanding their broader, 
long-term and systemic impact. A simple way to look at this is to establish the 
focal scale, take a step up and a step down in scale, and map the interactions.
Any publicly listed company faces the time-scale related conflict of 
ensuring sustainable, long-term company success with delivering immedi-
ate results to shareholders. Conflicts and trade-offs between short- and 
long-term targets naturally affect the quest for resilience itself. Many of the 
resilience aspects discussed here reduce rather than improve a company’s 
short-term eff iciency, yet prove very beneficial in the long run. A diff icult 
but necessary step towards resilience is the focus on diverse time scales 
for success.
In 2002 Anglo American, one of the world’s largest diversif ied mining 
companies, introduced a comprehensive AIDS prevention programme 
in the workplace that addressed the problem on multiple levels. On an 
individual employee basis, the company offered voluntary counselling and 
HIV testing. Awareness, education and prevention campaigns were run 
and AIDS drugs made available for the whole workforce as well as all their 
dependents. Addressing the issue on a wider community level initially was 
a huge f inancial leap of faith, but it paid off – the efforts had a very positive 
economic impact and enabled Anglo’s business to thrive and grow.15
13 Zolli and Healy (2012)
14 Attempts to formulate a transdisciplinary General System Theory go back to the interwar 
period. Since the 1960’s systems thinking became a recognised paradigm to integrate both 
natural and social sciences, but also other f ields like engineering, Systems thinking def ines 
unifying principles, valid for all systems across f ields. See von Bertalanffy (1968) or Senge (1990).
15 Voice of America (2010)
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Thresholds
Any system has boundaries. Once these are crossed, the system functions 
in fundamentally different ways. Although such system boundaries or 
thresholds can be approached both very slowly (e.g. climate change or 
fundamental shifts in consumer tastes) or very rapidly (2008 f inancial 
crisis), when the threshold is reached, change within the system occurs very 
rapidly in either case. Crucially, many thresholds can only be crossed in one 
direction – there is often no way back. In order to be resilient, a company 
must therefore identify its systemic position and trajectory, increase its own 
capacity to adapt, but it may as well strive to strengthen the surrounding 
system’s resistance against undesirable change.
A nautical chart does not help much navigating the ocean without any tools 
for determining a ship’s location. Similarly, for a company it is only of limited 
use to identify critical thresholds of its natural-social-economic environment 
without knowing where it is with respect to those thresholds. It is therefore 
essential that relevant, regular and reliable – in other words, appropriate 
– feedback loops (with appropriate sensors) are in place, through which 
essential information arrives and can be interpreted by the organisation.
Often, a company alone cannot influence the system suff iciently to pre-
vent it from adverse change (e.g. prevent climate change from happening) 
and in that sense does not have a real choice. In order to survive, adaptation 
is the only option. As a f irst step however, it is important to be aware of 
the system’s drivers and their respective thresholds. Effective adaptation 
and risk mitigation need time, which is why early detection, best-possible 
understanding and effective communication of risks are essential.
After decades of optimisation, farmers in the Goulburn-Broken Catch-
ment in Australia have become some of the world’s most efficient in produc-
ing high-quality, low-priced milk in large quantities. However, most of the 
dairying depends on the irrigation of pasture, which also flushes salt down 
that gets left behind as pastures take up water. While a decrease in irrigation 
would result in salt accumulation towards the top two metres of soil, an 
increase would result in a groundwater level rise that brings the salt up as 
well – which is currently only stopped by pumping. Clearly, the system is on 
a tight balance between two thresholds, and can only continue to function 
as long as no major shock occurs.16
16 Walter et al. (2009).
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Social capital
The importance of social capital reaches further than merely avoiding social 
unrest by being a good neighbour.17 Maintaining a good relationship with 
all stakeholders – not just with local residents but also with governments, 
customers and suppliers – is essential to a company’s business,18 whether to 
support its licence to operate, or to keep the local customer base satisfied. In 
the age of social media, local social problems can turn into global reputation 
risks at a speed that was unimaginable even ten years ago. However, most 
companies today also recognise that the potential benefits of investing in 
a good relationship with external stakeholders reach beyond downside 
risk mitigation. Customer advice and ideas help to improve products; en-
vironmental and safety issues may be discovered and reported by attentive 
local residents. Active collaboration with customers, suppliers and local 
communities can provide a great amount of added value, which is why 
the investment in social capital should also be considered an opportunity.
In a resilience context, it is important to realise that many external risks 
just cannot be mitigated by a company in isolation, but requires a reservoir 
of good will and the cooperation of multiple stakeholders across corporate 
boundaries. For example, a company can closely cooperate with its sup-
pliers in response to supply chain disruptions, as the intense cooperation 
between Philips and Nokia after a disruptive f ire in a production plant has 
proven. A recent study looking at climate impact to the US Gulf Coast calls 
for concerted action by the private sector, government and general public 
to f ight the consequences of climate change.19 The prior establishment of 
trust and strong networks – building bridges between stakeholders – are 
essential factors to enable such effective cooperation that is necessary for 
risk mitigation at a systemic level.
Coca-Cola has dedicated itself to global water neutrality, is tackling its 
packaging, recycling and global carbon footprint and tries to help its com-
munities wherever they are – not merely to fend off public scrutiny but, as 
CEO Muhtar Kent put it, because “the beauty of [such efforts] is that they’re 
actually very good for business, too”.20 Clean, accessible water obviously is 
essential for Coca-Cola’s beverage production but also connects the company 
to local ecosystems and the health and economic prosperity of communities 
that host the bottling plants. Coca-Cola recognises that these same com-
17 Turnbull et al. (2013)
18 Starr et al. (2003)
19 Entergy et al. (2010)
20 Ignatius (2011)
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munities also form its consumer base. It sells its products where they are 
made, which means that if communities stay strong, business stays strong.
Transformative resilience
Abruptly changing market conditions, climate change-induced environ-
mental conditions or disruptive social and cultural developments – compa-
nies become subject to sudden, drastic changes in operating circumstances. 
If a company does not anticipate and proactively respond to changes in 
the system it is embedded in, it will risk going out of business. To adapt 
to both abrupt and slow but critical changes therefore is the key to the 
ultimate level of enterprise resilience. We here refer to the ability of an 
enterprise to reorganise, restructure, and even reinvent when appropriate, 
both in response to and in anticipation of system changes, as transformative 
resilience. Evaluation of governance models, foresight capacity as well as 
innovation and experimentation each support in a specific way the proactive 
adaptation embodied in transformative resilience.
Governance models
According to its size, principal line of business, internal differentiation etc., 
a company may evaluate different models of governance – conventional and 
unconventional ones. Distributed governance e.g. implies management that is 
undertaken from multiple centres of authority at different levels, rather than 
from a single decision-making unit. This concept is also known as ‘polycentric 
governance’,21 which is well known in the public sector – for example, in the 
context of irrigation systems and forest management. Compared to classic, 
hierarchical governance, distributed decision-making can lead to better 
results for complex and ambiguous tasks: for simple linear tasks, top-down 
control is often most effective, particularly in the short term. In distributed 
governance, within clearly defined boundaries of authority, decisions can 
be made independently, immediately and can be implemented at their most 
effective level. The agility and flexibility of such a governance system as a 
whole allows it to cope very effectively with a diverse range of risk events, 
to adapt itself to change and even to evolve over time, in line with new 
problems that arise. In a continuously changing risk landscape, this capacity 
to dynamically reorganise22 is crucial in securing long-term resilience.
21 Ostrom (2010)
22 Zolli and Healy (2009)
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Distributed governance works if effective interconnections and align-
ments exist between the interest and behaviour of individual stakeholders 
and that of a system as a whole – and consequently for all stakeholders. 
A simple example can be drawn from resource management. Sustain-
able water usage in water-scarce regions requires the cooperation of all 
stakeholders from both within and outside the company. While it may be 
in the short-term interest of any individual stakeholder to use more than 
its fair share of water, in the long term, such behaviour will deplete the 
resource and cause the system to collapse. Multiple governing authorities 
at different scales enable holistic management of such issues, whether 
environmental, economic or social, but require trust and effective com-
munication between all stakeholders and decision-makers. An example 
for such multi-stakeholder partnership is the Cities for Climate Protection 
(CCP) programme, a transnational municipal network aimed at reducing 
urban greenhouse gas emissions that involves both state and non-state ac-
tors. The programme operates globally but is governed on national, regional 
and municipal levels that simultaneously address climate change issues on 
different scales.23
It is important to acknowledge that with governance models, one size 
does not f it all. Just as this is the case for other aspects of resilience, the fact 
that every organisation is different means that there is no single most ef-
fective governance system. Companies themselves should be purposeful in 
their governance and go beyond the simplicity of single point accountability 
as a panacea. Many different factors should be taken into consideration, 
such as the type of industry, business, or product of the company as well as 
the degree of dependency on the system it is embedded in.
Foresight capacity
Foresight refers to a company’s effort to actively engage itself with future 
events that are inherently uncertain and have an unquantifiable probability 
of occurrence. Foresight is fundamentally different from forecasting – the 
prediction of the future based on the extrapolation of data from the past. 
It is not only that there is not enough data to know the future, but many 
aspects are in fact unknowable. Although an effective foresight strategy 
can shape itself in different ways, it generally serves two purposes: foresight 
can decrease corporate risk exposure and helps to identify business 
opportunities. Describing multiple plausible futures and understanding 
23 For more information on the Cities for Climate Protection programme, go to: http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Cities_for_Climate_Protection_program#Decentralisation_of_the_CCP_program.
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their impacts on present decision-making, allows the company to integrate 
uncertainty into their planning and actions.
An effective foresight strategy may comprise scenario planning,24,25 
emerging risk detection, modelling, war-gaming26, visioning, reverse stress 
testing,27 red team simulations28, or any other means of engagement with 
the future, depending on the specific needs of a company and the character 
of the economic system it operates in. Irrespective of its exact form, such 
foresight activity increases resilience because it allows a company to adapt 
to and reduce vulnerability against potential disruptions and their common 
consequences before these actually occur. As the Shell Scenarios team has 
famously shown during the 1973 oil crisis29, even if no specif ic mitigation 
measures are taken, mere awareness enables a quicker reaction that can be 
enough to give the company a crucial edge over its competitors – that is, as 
long as challenges such as obtaining the sincere interest of upper management 
and dealing with too high expectations about taming the future are met.
Tackling a security threat, even before it becomes an issue to be dealt 
with – that is what Singapore’s Institute of Policy Studies aims to do with 
its Prism scenarios. The scenarios present a set of alternative stories of 
how the country may govern itself over the next ten years based on three 
driving forces – credibility of government, society’s def inition of success, 
and distribution of resources. Rather than a prediction of the future, the 
scenario-planning method is designed to help question assumptions and 
develop flexible mental models for operating in the future.30
Innovation & experimentation
In 1999, the chairman of home appliance market leader Whirlpool set out to 
make innovation a core competence at the company. Over a period of three 
years, the company involved roughly 10,000 employees in the search for 
innovation breakthroughs. Some 7,000 ideas where created, which spawned 
3,000 small-scale experiments and led to a whole stream of new products 
and businesses. The success of this focus on innovation transformed the 
company for good. Today, Whirlpool continues to be recognised for its 
24 Wilkinson and Kupers (2013)
25 Dunn Cavelty et al. (2011)
26 Starr et al. (2003)
27 PwC (2011)
28 Sheff i (2007)
29 Wilkinson and Kupers (2013)
30 IPS (2012)
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innovation. It actively manages a broad pipeline of ideas, experiments, and 
major projects from across the company.31
Any company that wants to survive in an uncertain future has to be ready 
to react swiftly to a wide range of possible scenarios. A resilient company 
therefore does not depend on a single product, strategy, technology or 
supplier but rather aims to create diversity in every aspect of business – 
analogous to a f inancial portfolio.32, 33 Under continuously changing circum-
stances, whether these comprise an abrupt shock such as a f inancial crisis 
or a slow system shift like climate change, previously successful activities 
of an enterprise may no longer be beneficial. In this regard, innovation and 
experimentation are crucial as they enable the creation of new ideas and 
options – they increase diversity in all aspects of the business portfolio. 
A resilient company has the capability to self-renew over time through 
innovation – aimed at invention, not optimisation – and experimentation, 
by reinventing business models as strategies and circumstances change.34
Long-term resilience: The Subak system of Bali
examples of successfully harnessing risk for long-term resilience are rare in the 
corporate world, but we may draw inspiration from the terraced rice field systems 
in southern Bali known as the subak. this millenary system manages known risks 
such as pests and water, but also unknown risks from internal warfare, colonisa-
tion, natural disasters, the green revolution and, increasingly, tourists.
traditional Balinese techniques for water control and terrace management 
are based on principles nearly opposite to those of the top-down control struc-
tures favoured by the planners. the Balinese manage things from the bottom-up, 
by means of nested hierarchies of water temples that cooperate in setting irriga-
tion schedules. these temples are ritual places where farmers make decisions on 
water flows and construction. since the whole system is deeply interconnected, 
both through the spread of pests and water; no decision stands in isolation.
the subak system has been simulated ‘in silico’ in order to understand its 
resilience to changing circumstance. Not only does it perform in the computer 
as in the rice fields, but more strikingly the simulation shows how governance 
system itself will co-evolve with the nature of the problems. as such the govern-
ance is not only multi-scalar and polycentric, but it is also itself adaptive to
31 Hamel & Välikangas (2003)
32 Välikangas (2004)
33 Zolli and Healy (2012)
34 Reinmoeller & van Baardwijk (2005)
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emerging risks. in June 2012, the subak has been designated a uNesco cultural 
landscape world heritage site, throwing a new problem – that of tourist hordes 
– at the adaptive capacity of the system. uNesco aims to identify and preserve 
such cases of resilient resource governance.
the risk management approach of the subak holds lessons and provides 
new science-based tools to be adapted in corporate structures for resilience to 
systemic risks.
Sources: Fox (2012), Lansing (2006), Lansing (1993), Schmuki (2009)
Conclusion
We have introduced a concept of enterprise resilience that builds on three 
pillars or levels. For each resilience level we described different relevant 
aspects or resilience lenses, and we gave examples of adaptation measures. 
Note that these measures should be considered as examples only, since 
their relevance and effectiveness strongly depends on the character of the 
specif ic company and the system in which it is embedded. However, this 
does not take away from the fact that the resilience lenses themselves are 
relevant for business across industries.
Structural resilience is about internal adaptation measures that a com-
pany can adopt to become more resistant to disruption. It includes the 
assessment of cost and benefits of redundancy and determines trade-offs 
between resilience and efficiency. It identif ies adequate modularity, such as 
the decentralising of service and production chains. Shocks reveal whether 
enough responsive diversity is in place, and they can be dealt with and 
avoided by cultivating functional or requisite diversity.
Integrative resilience acknowledges that companies are embedded in a 
social-environmental-economic system, with which they need to interact 
both to cope more effectively with disruption and be more agile when it 
comes to seizing opportunity. As companies are part of complex multi-scale 
interactions, effective enterprise resilience allows the establishment of an 
adequate focal scale (including time scales) for each and every problem, 
and the mapping of linkages ‘up/further’ and ‘down/closer’ from or to 
this scale. It is adopted to identify critical thresholds and closely looks 
into feedback loops, not least to monitor system status with respect to 
thresholds. Finally, it’s crucial to build public trust or social capital well 
in advance of crises, as it will be diff icult to impossible to develop these 
relationships under stress.
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Transformative resilience builds on the former lenses, but additionally 
calls for continuous adaptation and transformation needed to survive and 
thrive under new operating circumstances. Distributed governance allows 
for sustainably self-organised adaptation. Compared to classic, hierarchical 
governance, distributed decision-making leads to better results for complex 
and ambiguous tasks – and allows for emergent response in turbulent times. 
Resilient enterprise management creates and safeguards a safe space to 
explore options under various scenarios. Foresight capacity increases aware-
ness and alertness that reaches beyond specif ic mitigation measures. Last 
but not least, continuous innovation and experimentation allow a company 
to learn faster than its competitors – it increases adaptive capacity.

4 Multi-sector collaboration for resilience
Mark Smith1
Change is a challenge familiar to corporate leaders. Professor John Kotter 
of Harvard Business School, in his classic book Leading Change,2 set out an 
8-step process for successfully managing change in organisations. These 
build from creating a sense of urgency and convening a coalition of champi-
ons through to empowering people to take action and embedding change in 
new cultures. Kotter argued for strategies for managing change that are not 
trapped by top-down, command-and-control dominance. He made the case 
that organisational change will be more successful where efforts are made to 
help people to re-learn the expectations and norms within an organisation, 
supported by data, communications, empowerment and learning-by-doing. 
In the public realm, the language used may be different, but the ingredients 
for change are similar. Based on the Nobel Prize-winning work of Elinor 
Ostrom, adaptive governance of natural resources, for example, is more ef-
fective in achieving beneficial change where decentralised, self-organising 
institutions are rich in information and empowered to make decisions on 
collective action through dialogue and deliberation.3 Whether the aim is 
organisational change or adaptive governance, both represent processes of 
social change put to work to reshape and re-orient a system from within. 
Both provide some clues on how to tackle the broader challenge of change 
in complex systems that is needed to build resilience.
Johan Rockström and colleagues laid out an hypothesis in a 2009 paper 
in the journal Nature that the human population, through natural resource 
exploitation, is pushing against ‘planetary boundaries’ and losing its ‘safe 
operating space’. 4 This points to a world that is becoming riskier and, as 
Earth-system thresholds are approached and crossed, more prone to insta-
bility and surprise. Thomas Homer-Dixon wrote of f ive ‘tectonic stresses’ 
that link ecological, social and economic pressures and amplify risks:
Energy stress – especially from increasing scarcity of conventional oil,
Economic stress – from more instability in the global economy and a 
widening gap between rich and poor,
1 Director, Global Water Programme, International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN).
2 Kotter (1996) 
3 Dietz, Ostrom and Stern (2003)
4 Rockström et al. (2009)
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Demographic stress – from differences in population growth between 
rich and poor societies and from expansion of megacities,
Environmental stress – from worsening damage to land, water, forests 
and f isheries, and
Climate stress – from changes in the composition of Earth’s atmosphere.5
Both natural systems and the global economy are becoming more turbulent 
under these converging and interconnected stresses. There is, however, a 
competing narrative, as global GDP is projected to almost double by 2030 
(from a 2010 baseline), from $50 to $95 trillion, driving growth in demand for 
primary energy of 33%, food of 27% and water of 41%.6 There are contradic-
tions in these narratives. In a riskier, more turbulent world, reconciling 
them will need transformations that make communities, ecosystems, the 
economy and societies more resilient. Deep change is needed in the complex 
dynamics of the social and ecological systems that shape the future.
The private sector, governments and civil society have interests that 
align with changes needed to build resilience. Each sector needs effective 
strategies for building resilience that will help them succeed in achieving 
their goals in a more turbulent world. Just as leaders in each of these sectors 
need effective strategies for organisational change to ensure that their 
businesses, agencies or NGOs are dynamic, effective and adaptive, they need 
tools for creating the changes needed for societies to become more resilient. 
Just as Kotter understood organisational change as a social process, they 
will need to f ind avenues for collaboration, empowerment and learning 
needed to change complex systems from within.
Change for resilience
Resilience means being able to survive, adapt and improve in the face of 
stress and change, to be able to withstand shocks, but reorganise and rebuild 
when necessary. The capacity to bounce back, but ‘bounce forward’ to a 
better state if possible. Humanity’s response over millennia to new demo-
graphic, environmental or climatic stresses, or to energy constraints in the 
economy or natural resource scarcity, has been invention and innovation. 
New technologies have repeatedly emerged to deliver not only solutions, 
but also economic advancement that has created new employment and new 
5 Homer-Dixon (2006)
6 Dobbs et al. (2011) 
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national wealth, new entrepreneurship and new value for companies and 
their shareholders. In a world of converging stresses where there are Earth-
system thresholds and tipping points at play, a different path is needed.
Current technological pathways, while hugely successful historically, 
have favoured narrow optimisation of solutions to problems. Over time, 
unintended social and environmental consequences have accumulated 
– such as climate change, species extinctions, f isheries collapse or impover-
ishment downstream from hydropower dams. Seen through a systems lens, 
technological innovation has tended to help in optimising exploitation of 
individual natural resources, industrial sectors or enterprises, but caused 
broader ‘knock-on’ effects across social-ecological systems. These effects 
are typically poorly understood or unknown because of complexity. In re-
sponse, investment to improve knowledge of how social and environmental 
impacts unfold has increased. With the speed of technological advance 
and global interconnectedness, however, the unknown impacts of actions 
accumulate faster than knowledge of them. Requirements for innovation 
are hence accelerating as global stresses converge but knowledge cannot 
keep pace,7 creating an ‘ingenuity gap’ that technology alone cannot bridge.8 
The technological pathways we have relied on historically are not suited, 
by themselves, to the deeper changes needed to provide the building blocks 
for resilience to converging stresses.
Collaboration for systemic change
Innovation for resilience must influence the workings of complex systems, 
with uncertainties, unknowns and nonlinearities at play. It needs to help 
communities, companies or countries develop leverage they can use to 
bounce back or bounce forward – to survive, reorganise, learn and improve 
in a future more prone to instability and surprise. Innovation for resilience 
contributes to systems change, with social, economic and environmental 
dimensions. It needs to provoke and steer transformations beyond techno-
logical change, of management regimes, governance and the ways natural 
capital and social capital are built (or rebuilt) alongside economic value.
In a past era, there might have been an expectation that it was the job of 
governments alone to set such transformations in motion. Today, however, 
society’s toughest problems are increasingly being tackled by collaborations 
7 Westley et al. (2011)
8 Homer-Dixon (2000)
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that combine the capacities, talents, reach and resources of the public and 
private sectors and civil society. In The Solution Revolution, William Eggers 
and Paul MacMillan tell the stories of citizens, businesses and philanthro-
pists who are working together to solve problems rather than relying solely 
on the public sector.9 Cross-sector collaborations aim to leverage business 
and social entrepreneurship, social networks and new kinds of investment 
alongside platforms for negotiating consensus. Multi-sector collaboration is 
being used by governments, business and civil society to activate change.
Collaboration has in part grown out of the experience of conflicts between 
communities and companies. Public and NGO pressure in natural resource 
sectors (energy, mining, forestry, agriculture), for example, has undermined 
social ‘licence to operate’, increased costs and, ultimately, forced companies 
out of particular markets. Companies face costs; therefore, they shrink from 
societal change. Governments can help by putting in place rules to create sanc-
tions and incentives that encourage companies to invest in change and avoid 
social conflict. As standards and regulations have tightened, many companies 
have learned in response that the better path, instead of battling protestors 
in the courts, markets or even physically, is to work with stakeholders to 
avoid or mitigate environmental and social impacts of business operations. 
They work collaboratively with civil society and governments to ‘co-create’ 
solutions. Companies have learned, further, that possessing the skills needed 
for stakeholder engagement and co-creativity brings competitive advantage.10
Case 1 – Marine Stewardship Council
the global seafood industry was under intense public and consumer pressure 
in the 1990s because unsustainable fishing practices were blamed for severe 
degradation of marine ecosystems. With the collapse of the newfoundland cod 
fishery in the early 1990s, there were calls for urgent action to halt the overex-
ploitation of major fisheries around the world, to protect not only the marine 
environment, but also fishing livelihoods.
unilever, the largest fish retailer at the time, and the World Wide fund for 
nature (WWf) joined forces to respond. they jointly led and financed a two-year 
process to build consensus around the design for a sustainability standard for 
marine fisheries and to launch an organisation to develop and operate a certifi-
cation scheme. With effective leadership, resistance to a standard from many fish-
ing companies and some governments was overcome, and in 1999 the Marine
9 Eggers and MacMillan (2013)
10 Higginson and Vredenburg (2010)
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Stewardship council (MSc) was launched as an independent organisation. almost 
15 years later, 10% of global marine fish harvest is certified through MSc, with a 
value of $3 billion annually. the MSc operates as a non-profit, under governance 
that brings together civil society and business, including through a Stakeholder 
advisory council comprising representatives from nGos, academia, fishing 
companies and trawling industry associations. the MSc is contributing to pulling 
many fisheries back from the threat of collapse, or at least slowing the approach.
In the case of innovation for resilience, governments, civil society and 
the private sector have different motivations but they share interests in 
a more resilient future. Governments aim, for example, to f ind resilient 
pathways to creating prosperity in a riskier world. Civil society aims to use 
its networks and knowledge to champion solutions for resilience based on 
social justice or a reawakening to benefits from nature conservation. For 
business, resilience will help to build and protect long-term shareholder 
value under converging stresses, but transitions to resilience also offer op-
portunities, as customers will increasingly need expertise and services that 
strengthen resilience. Understanding among sectors of mutual advantage 
and opportunities in supporting greater public good through resilience 
will be key.8
Case 2 – Urban Resilience, New York City11
the new York metropolitan area is home to almost 20 million people and a 
large number of small- and medium-sized businesses as well as multinational 
corporations. Sitting at the hub of the global finance and trading systems, new 
York’s interconnectedness is deep and global, creating vulnerabilities worldwide 
to disaster in new York city. Superstorm Sandy caused an estimated $50 billion 
in damage in 2012. the frequency of such extreme climatic events – including 
flooding, heat waves and tornadoes – is expected to increase because of climate 
change. flood hazards that have occurred once every hundred years are pro-
jected to occur at a frequency of once every fifteen, for example. the resilience 
of new York city is a concern for citizens and public agencies, but also for busi-
ness, whether operating locally or globally.
11 The City of New York (2013)
72 Mark SMith 
in the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy, new York city worked with federal and 
state agencies and consulted with community organisations and businesses to 
produce a resilience plan for the city. the plan prioritises actions needed to build 
resilience in vulnerable parts of the city, including coastal protection actions, 
amendments to zoning and building codes, retrofitting of buildings for wind 
and flood resilience, insurance initiatives and changes to infrastructure and 
organisation for healthcare, telecommunications, electrical utilities, water and 
wastewater and transportation. assessments carried out by engineering com-
panies have identified how to build the resilience of critical infrastructure such 
as the electrical grid. they identify options for making the grid more robust, 
using technologies for flood-proofing but also programmes for reducing energy 
demand by voluntary means and eventually advanced energy management sys-
tems. at the same time, new York city’s plans call for a focus on strengthening 
individuals and groups able to organise and mobilise responses at local level, to 
help get people back to their homes quickly after disruptive events.
After the shock of Superstorm Sandy, New York City has begun making 
changes needed to strengthen resilience, by using a planning process to 
build a vision and engage communities and businesses. Citizen organisation 
is being combined with new government policies and regulations that 
create demand for services from companies that can help. New York City 
is contributing these lessons and others from their post-storm responses to 
the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities initiative, which provides 
city authorities access to a wide network of cities with a similar framing of 
the issues, with a view to developing and sharing new solutions.
In Wallowa County, Oregon, local innovation for resilience emerged from 
collaboration. Here, civil society and local government collaborated not 
only to restore a badly degraded ecosystem, but also to rebuild the business 
climate and the community’s social fabric, locally at least.
Case 3 – Timber Industry Reorganisation and Transformation, Wallowa 
County, Oregon, USA12
the listing of chinook salmon under the endangered Species act in north-east 
oregon led to near cessation of timber harvesting in the Wallowa-Whitman 
national forest (WWnf) in 1992. Sawmills closed and WWnf revenue declined 
by 98%. in addition to jobs lost in the timber industry, staffing of the WWnf was
12 Jones and Christoffersen (2013)
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cut by 50%, leading to removal of the forest management regime and a decline 
in forest health. Pest infestation and high-intensity fires caused extensive forest 
die-off.
to lead reorganisation and innovation for resilience, local government and 
local citizens formed Wallowa resources, a non-profit organisation, in 1996. the 
organisation implements programmes in watershed restoration and research 
and education on community stewardship, while running a for-profit company 
to provide capital and business development services for local forest-based 
companies. Wallowa resources restored the salmon and trout habitat and 
80,000 ha of watershed. it installed micro-hydro and biomass power generators. 
it also succeeded in restarting commercial timber operations through collabora-
tive agreements among the state, communities and local business.
Local governments, businesses and citizens have led an innovation process 
in Wallowa County and rescued a community. The scale of impact remains 
modest, however, relative to the potential of the forest resources available. 
Policy and law at higher levels, as well as environmental NGOs, are trapped 
in a use versus no-use debate that works against large-scale reorganisation 
and is a disincentive to corporate investment. Collaboration and empower-
ing people to take action were key to unlocking the processes of change at 
local scale, but their absence at higher scales may be blocking the ‘bounce 
forward’ needed for the region’s forest-based economy.
Applying collaboration to resilience
Working together, business, government and civil society can create changes 
in institutions, decision-making and investment that they cannot achieve 
alone, with results for conservation, community development and enter-
prise profitability. They can create conditions in which businesses that avoid 
environmental impacts and create broader social value are favoured – in 
the market, through regulations and incentives and in terms of legitimacy 
with stakeholders. In systems terms, by working in collaboration they build 
feedbacks that guide each sector in shaping change and innovation.
Does multi-sector collaboration provide leverage on change in complex 
systems that will help companies as well as communities and countries 
build resilience? The test comes in understanding how collaboration 
contributes to building blocks needed for resilience – including diversity, 
infrastructure and technologies, distributed governance and learning.
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Resilience benef its from diversity in, for example, value chains and 
markets, production methods and employees, as well as nature and infra-
structure. With diversity, an enterprise can switch to an alternate supply 
chain in case of disruption, while diverse teams foster innovation and 
creativity. The same logic applies outside a business, as diversity in, for 
example, energy supply or transportation systems buffer populations and 
the broader economy against disruption. Diversity in nature helps to sustain 
services from ecosystems – including water cycling, soil conservation or 
coastal stability – needed in supply chains, for food security or for reducing 
disaster risk.
Collaboration enhances diversity. It brings a variety of players together 
to work on problem solving and change. Working collectively they bring 
variation in resources, including f inancial, social and natural capital. 
Business can provide managerial expertise and f inancing streams, while 
civil society can mobilise communities quickly with grassroots knowledge. 
From collaboration, a wider range of options and ideas may emerge for 
responding to stresses and disruptions, including options that work at local 
level, closer to impacts, that may be alternatives to or coordinated with 
actions at higher scales.
Case 4 – Restoring Resilience in Shinyanga Region, Tanzania13
from the 1950s to the 1980s, woodlands were cleared in semi-arid Shinyanga 
region, north-west tanzania, to eradicate the tsetse fly and to open land for 
agricultural cash cropping. by 1985, the region was declared the ‘desert of tanza-
nia’ by President nyere, with the agro-pastoralist Sukuma people in the region 
vulnerable to water and fuel wood shortages and suffering declining productiv-
ity because of soil erosion and scarcity of dry season forage for livestock.
reversing its previous top-down policy, government introduced a landscape 
restoration programme that resurrected traditional local management institutions. 
Working with local people, district government and nGos, these mobilised local 
knowledge on woodland management through participatory planning to restore 
ngitili, or enclosed woodland reserves. by 2004, approximately 300,000 ha of ngitili 
had been restored. the multiplicity of goods (fuel, building timber, fruits, fodder, 
medicines) from the ngitili spread the risk of cash crop failure, and better water-
shed condition improved water availability using natural infrastructure. communi-
ties reorganised and rebuilt to become more food, energy and water secure.
13 Barrow (2013)
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Infrastructure and technologies contribute to resilience where, for example, 
they are sustainable and robust, with wide tolerances and incorporating 
ecosystem functioning, and that continue to operate in spite of climatic 
extremes or service outages. Transportation systems protected from flood-
ing, for example, electrical grids with extra capacity and redundancy, or 
water treatment facilities that can be restarted quickly after major storms. 
Infrastructure and technologies likewise need to be sustainable, not un-
dercutting adaptive capacity by contributing to social disruption or loss of 
system diversity or biodiversity.
Working together, governments, civil society and business may have 
more success in ensuring that technology choices are robust because they 
can have a deeper understanding through collaboration of the breadth 
of stresses that need to be taken into account and their impacts at dif-
ferent scales. Jointly, they may identify packages of infrastructure and 
technologies, including their operations and use of ecosystems as natural 
infrastructure, that avoid social disruption or environmental impacts and 
contribute to adaptive capacity.
Case 5 – Urban Drought Resilience, Gold Coast, Australia14
between the mid-1990s and 2010, australia contended with the ‘Millennium 
Drought’, said to be the driest period since european settlement. although 
australia is a country used to living with periodic water scarcity, this led austral-
ians and australian governments to rethink the way water is used and man-
aged. there is broad recognition that significant components of the australian 
economy are vulnerable to drought, certainly agriculture, but also the main 
urban centres. With climate change in mind, major steps are underway – in-
cluding many that are highly contested – to change how water allocations are 
prioritised, to introduce much greater flexibility in responding to drought, and 
to cut water demand. cities are leading the way by applying ‘water-sensitive 
urban design’ to reducing vulnerabilities to drought.
the city of Gold coast in south-east Queensland, has relied on the hinze Dam 
for its primary source of drinking water, but with the population in the region 
projected to grow from 400,000 to 1.1 million by 2050, climate-resilient alter-
natives are needed. as part of its response, the city council called for a ‘Water 
futures Master Plan’ for a new housing development at coomera Waters in the 
mid-2000s. the challenge was to transform conventional urban water systems
14 Davis and Farrelly (2009)
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in coomera Waters. the council put together a project team comprising a mix 
of council staff and seconded personnel from industry who worked together to 
build participation by stakeholders in the process, including housing developers, 
construction trades, resident associations, environmental groups and other parts 
of government. the final plan integrated rainwater harvesting, dual water supply 
to households (potable and recycled grey water), ‘smart’ storm water manage-
ment and sewerage, natural infrastructure (restored and artificial wetlands), 
demand management and community education. Serving 150,000 people over a 
7,000 ha site, the plan is projected to reduce use of potable water by 84%.
Participants in the project identified collaboration among both profession-
als and stakeholders as key to overcoming regulatory and approval barriers 
and to learning that led council staff to become catalysts for change in their 
organisation. the project created the space needed for a cross-disciplinary and 
inter-institutional collaborative team to innovate and experiment, not only with 
engineering, but also social and regulatory change. coomera Waters will as a 
result be less vulnerable to drought than older suburbs reliant on the dam.
Distributed governance, with decentralised decision-making at different 
levels connected through networks rather than a single, top-down centre 
of authority, aids resilience. Provided that responsibilities and boundaries 
of authority are clear and defined, responses to shocks and stresses can be 
identif ied independently and implemented rapidly at the most effective 
level, and coordinated and communicated through networks. Whether 
in a company or, for example, in a river basin trying to cope with water 
scarcity, decision-making is then agile and the governance system itself 
can adapt to change. Decentralisation and participation in decision-making 
generates the capacity to self-organise and dynamically reorganise, both 
critical to resilience.
Where business and governments collaborate with civil society organisa-
tions that work with stakeholders, they can increase participation, including 
participation in networks. Those closest to the impacts of stresses and 
disruptions can then shape and define solutions to vulnerabilities. They can 
also come to consensus on who is responsible for different types of decisions 
and at which levels, while using networks to communicate and coordinate.
Finally, learning and access to information and knowledge are funda-
mental to resilience. Companies, communities or public agencies can adjust 
their actions or redesign their operations more readily and in a more timely 
way if people are consistently learning and have the capacities to locate 
new data and information and then appropriately apply new knowledge. 
By using scenario planning, for example, they gain foresight capacity and 
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an improved chance of detecting and reducing emerging vulnerabilities. 
Adaptiveness and innovation is strengthened further with scope to experi-
ment, learn and adjust.
Working jointly, business, governments and civil society can develop 
new knowledge networks that provide more channels for learning and for 
acquiring and sharing data and information. They have more opportunities 
to experiment, learn collectively from success and failure and to then adjust 
or reorganise accordingly. Through collaboration and knowledge networks 
they can put in place feedback loops that enable faster responsiveness to 
new information that is then applied more effectively.
Conclusion: A collaborative agenda for resilience
This chapter is the result of a cross-sector reflection on the topic of col-
laboration. Under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, IUCN convened 
a group of individuals from business (the Resilience Action Initiative com-
panies), NGOs and government to discuss how the resilience lens impacts 
the collaboration agenda.
Business, government and civil society are increasingly recognising that 
they must learn to operate in a more turbulent world. Each is contemplat-
ing a future where planetary boundaries, global interconnectedness and 
converging stresses will make disruptions and instabilities more common. 
Each faces the same fundamental challenge – that to be resilient they will 
need adaptive capacities to survive, reorganise, learn and improve within 
the complex social and ecological systems in which they are embedded. 
Each sector therefore has a stake in innovation for resilience.
Innovation for resilience needs to provoke and steer transformations 
beyond technological change to address social change that will reinforce 
adaptive capacities and safeguard benef its from natural systems. There 
are echoes from organisational change in this challenge, as success is 
more apparent where change incorporates social processes that reshape 
norms. Collaboration, empowerment to take action and learning are key in 
organisational change, but they are also critical to influencing and leverag-
ing deeper change in social-ecological systems and to reinforcing building 
blocks for resilience.
There are contributions to be made by each of the private and public 
sectors and civil society to the building blocks of resilience. Knowledge of 
how to translate principles into either practical action or guiding strategies 
and policies is not well developed or widely shared. Lessons are, however, 
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emerging from a variety of cases in which change is demonstrated in re-
sponse to vulnerabilities or collapse that combines elements of, for example, 
community action, innovation in programmes of local or national govern-
ments, or new services and leadership from business. These contributions 
reflect the interests of each sector in resilience, but also the potential of 
using collaboration among sectors to more effectively achieve results.
Businesses, governments and civil society are just beginning to discover 
where there is mutual advantage in collaboration on resilience. A collabora-
tive resilience agenda that focuses on well-defined, practical problems will 
help to activate change and accelerate progress. Institutions and individuals 
who can act as brokers and facilitators to bring the sectors together are 
needed, not least to help build a common understanding of resilience and 
a common language that is shared by all sectors. They should work with 
leaders from the sectors to champion change needed for resilience and to 
promote learning from practical experiments with resilience that show 
results. Better metrics for resilience and diagnostics that will enable com-
parisons and monitoring of changes will help further. Finally, a collaborative 
resilience agenda should put in place networks that will share and elevate 
successful resilience practice for the scaling up of change, supported by 
partnerships that are able to leverage the needed knowledge, resources 
and f inancing.
5 Building resilience through teamwork
Seven tips to make it work1
Marco Albani2 and Kimberly Henderson3
Resilience often challenges cross-jurisdictional boundaries and require 
systemic changes beyond the capabilities of individual companies or 
even of an entire industry. In these cases, the best approach for business 
can be to partner up – with governments, investors, local communities, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and other companies. Think of 
these partnerships as distinctive and complicated joint ventures, often 
with multiple parties.
Such collaborations often go through phases – good, bad, and sometimes 
ugly, particularly in the early days. In its first few years, the Marine Stewardship 
Council, a partnership that sets standards for the fishing industry, struggled 
with high staff turnover and unstable funding. In the past decade, however, it 
has become a force. Its certification standards cover 10 per cent of the global 
seafood harvest and almost a quarter of global shoppers recognise the MSC 
label. This covers more than 20,000 products, sold in over 100 countries.
To understand how to make these collaborations work, McKinsey & Co. 
has interviewed dozens of business, government, and NGO leaders. From 
this research, we have identif ied seven essential principles of success.
1. Identify clear reasons to collaborate
“The effort needs to help each partner organisation achieve something signif i-
cant. Incentives such as, ‘we’ll do this for good publicity,’ or ‘we don’t want to be 
left out’, are not suff icient.”
Nigel Twose, director of the Development Impact Department, International 
Finance Corporation, World Bank Group
1 A version of this chapter appears in the summer 2014 issue of McKinsey on Sustainability 
and Resource Productivity.
2 Senior Expert in the Sustainability and Resource Productivity Practice of McKinsey & 
Company
3 Consultant in McKinsey & Company’s London off ice.
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When organisations sign up for a sustainability partnership simply because 
they don’t want to say no or be left out, commitment can be weak. Founders 
of a nascent partnership must instead identify strong incentives, such as 
maintaining a licence to operate, or ensuring the long-term endurance of 
a profitable resource or input, such as f ish stocks, clean water, or forests. 
If participants cannot pinpoint such motivations, that may be a sign that 
the mission is ill-def ined.
Any collaboration must make sense for all parties, whether their primary 
interests are commercial, environmental, or social. Enlightened self-interest 
is the only genuinely sustainable motive. That was certainly true for the 
f irms that set up COSIA, the Canada Oil Sands’ Innovation Alliance. This 
is an alliance of companies that mine oil out of Canada’s bituminous 
sands; their goal is to share R&D in order to improve the environmental 
performance of an industry that is the subject of signif icant public debate.
Sometimes external events can force different players to acknowledge 
that change is necessary. The collapse of the North Atlantic’s Grand Banks 
cod f isheries in the early 1990s made commercial f isheries much more 
interested in sustainable harvesting practices, laying the ground for the 
birth of the Marine Stewardship Council.
A small problem can be more difficult to collaborate around than a big one, 
because the reward for solving it does not excite people or justify the effort 
involved. It also helps to stay in the limelight. Although no one should join a 
collaboration just for PR reasons, publicity and progress can go hand-in-hand. 
Attention can bring more support, add credibility, and generate momentum.
A partnership to improve agriculture practices in Africa seems to be off to a 
good start in this regard. In 2011, the World Economic Forum worked with the 
African Union to create Grow Africa, a public-private partnership platform 
focused on increasing private investment in African agriculture. And in 2012, 
US President Barack Obama threw the G8’s weight behind this partnership 
approach for African agriculture by announcing the New Alliance for Food 
Security and Nutrition. By the end of 2012, the G8’s New Alliance and Grow 
Africa worked closely to secure over 3 billion dollars in private-sector invest-
ment commitments from nearly 50 local and global companies.
2. Identify a ‘fairy godmother’
“It is important to have a core of totally committed, knowledgeable people who 
would die in a ditch for what the organisation is trying to achieve.”
Environmental NGO campaign head
building resilience tHrougH teaMworK 81
Behind most successful collaborations are one or more organisations that 
are willing to invest more than their share of f inancial, human, and political 
capital to make the effort a success. Coordinated action can be diff icult 
because f irst-movers take the biggest risks, while later entrants can benefit 
without much investment at all. So the temptation is to come in late. But 
someone has to start, or nothing will happen. ‘Fairy godmothers’ stop that 
from happening. They take on much of the risk and provide the generosity 
and sheer force of will that helps to build trust.
Any high-performing, credible institution may be a fairy godmother, as 
long as it is passionate, credible, and courageous. GE’s CEO, Jeff Immelt, 
took on this role for the US Climate Action Partnership in 2007, driving the 
start-up phase and recruiting other companies to join.
3. Set simple, credible goals
“They [the NGO and the private sector] had different motives, but the same 
objective: Ensure sustainable f ish stocks.”
Antony Burgmans, former chairman and CEO of Unilever; co-founder of the Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC)
One certain way for a collaboration to stall is when the partners have dif-
ferent agendas. To guard against this, set an aspirational goal that everyone 
agrees on—and, preferably, one that could f it neatly on a bumper sticker. 
The collaboration should be anchored on an exciting, big idea, and create 
a vision that others will mobilise behind. Don’t be afraid that it could also 
mobilise opposition; if there is no pushback, that may be a sign that the 
goal is not ambitious enough.
The MSC shows how this can work. The MSC started as a collaboration 
between Unilever and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in 1997; at the time, 
Unilever was the world’s largest f ish retailer. Each organisation faced chal-
lenges in starting the partnership. Some non-profits criticised the WWF 
for, in their opinion, compromising itself by working with a multinational. 
Unilever’s leadership was divided on whether this was a good idea. Many 
f ishing companies, and some governments, opposed developing marine 
sustainability standards.
Still, with leaders from both the WWF and Unilever committed to a clear 
goal of encouraging sustainable f ishing practices, the project went ahead. 
The partners, using the successful Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) as 
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an example, started by consulting with stakeholders, such as commercial 
f ishermen, governments, and environmental organisations. Only then did 
they design the standards for what constituted sustainable f ishing practices 
and seafood traceability; these are reviewed on a regular basis. In 1999, the 
MSC began operating as an independent non-profit, free of Unilever’s and 
WWF’s control.
4. Get professional help
“It is very important to have an honest broker. The facilitator must be neutral 
and very structured and keep people moving along at a brutal pace. You need 
someone who can bring things to a close.”
Darrel Webber, Secretary General, RSPO
Most collaborations need a facilitator to get started. When organisa-
tions come together, they each have their own incentives, biases, and 
organisational cultures. These can clash. Odds of conf lict are highest 
when the organisations are either competitors or when they are from 
completely different sectors and cultures. The f irst few months tend to 
be particularly rough. Members are often slow to commit staff, and the 
tendency is to wait for others to offer resources f irst. By pooling funds 
for a facilitator, the collaboration can progress, even when staff ing is still 
under negotiation.
In establishing the certif ication standard for palm oil, for example, the 
Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) needed to create a consen-
sus among seven distinct interest groups, ranging from environmental 
non-prof its to palm growers. It took two years of negotiation to develop 
RSPO’s f irst standard. In reflecting on the arduous process, RSPO ’s chief 
executive credited the independent, third-party facilitator with keep-
ing the discussions (even heated ones) going until the parties could f ind 
common ground.
Over time, as trust and conf idence builds and as the group moves 
from design to institutionalisation, a successful collaboration can and 
should phase out the facilitator. Ideally, individuals who started out as 
representatives of companies with competing interests become a cohesive 
group working toward a common goal.
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5. Dedicate good people to the cause
“If a company like ours believes something is strategic, 
then we resource it like it is strategic.”
Neil Hawkins, corporate vice president of sustainability, Dow Chemical
If member organisations decline to dedicate qualif ied staff, check those 
organizations against point 1, and ask why they are in the collaboration. If 
good people are not volunteering, then check against points 2 and 3. Point 
2 gives people security: They have a fairy godmother. Point 3 gives people 
clarity: They know what they’re meant to do, and that it’s worth doing. 
Working on a major collaboration should be an exciting career-builder, 
not a dead end. The collaboration’s vision is particularly important at the 
beginning, when the effort is like a start-up. Talented individuals will 
give their all when they believe in the goals. As one of the participants of 
the US Climate Action Partnership said, “If I were to put anything on my 
tombstone, it would be this effort.”
Internally, it’s important to dedicate senior leadership. Without leader-
ship, middle management often lack the incentive to take action, as well as 
the necessary decision-making power. Instead, they tend to favour business 
as usual. Cross-sector collaborations are inherently ‘business as unusual’. 
Successful collaborations, at least at the start, are led by senior leaders from 
the founding organisations. When Yara, a Norwegian fertilizer company, 
agreed to become co-chair of Grow Africa, it dedicated a senior vice president 
to the role, and supported it with the sustained public engagement of its CEO.
6. Be flexible in defining success
“Partners think that collaboration will change the world. Then it doesn’t, and 
they think that it failed. But often the collaboration changed something – the 
way some part of the system works and delivers outcomes. It is a matter of under-
standing the nature of change itself.”
Simon Zadek, visiting fellow, Tsinghua School of Economics and Management, 
Beijing
Success may come from unexpected directions. Be ready to embrace, and 
build on it.
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The US Climate Action Partnership (CAP) set out to pass national cap-
and-trade legislation. While that did not happen, 11 US states have instituted 
such systems, and many other countries are implementing or considering 
them. Is any of this directly attributable to US CAP? No. Did US CAP help to 
pave the way, through developing a business-friendly approach? Quite likely.
Similarly, the MSC is changing the f ishing industry beyond the 10% of 
f isheries that have signed up. A multitude of NGOs and other actors are 
working with f isheries that may never achieve the gold standard of MSC 
certif ication, but are nonetheless improving their practices.
So remember, while your collaboration may not change the world in 
precisely the way you intend, it can still change the rules of the game in a 
positive way.
7. Prepare to let go
“I’ve been absent from the FSC since 1997. The organisation had been born and 
was a teenager and needed to go off and f ind a job and do its own work.”
NGO campaign head during the formation of the Forest Stewardship Council
At some point, the partnership will either wind down, or become an inde-
pendent entity. That process should be planned for.
Some collaborations are designed to achieve a certain objective. Once 
that objective has been achieved, or once the window for achieving it has 
closed, it’s time to shut the doors. No collaboration should be kept alive 
beyond its useful lifetime.
Others evolve into permanent, self-sustaining, and independent institu-
tions, such as the Forest Stewardship Council. In these cases, founders 
typically move out of the picture once both a long-term funding model is 
in place and there is a capable leader on the job. Like good parenting, you 
know you’ve succeeded when you are a welcome visitor, but you are clearly 




6 The case for green infrastructure
Neil C. Hawkins1 and Glenn Prickett2
Green infrastructure (GI) was investigated as part of a joint-industry pro-
gramme that aimed to f ind ways to increase business resilience to external 
economic and environmental stressors. For the purposes of this study, GI 
solutions are def ined as planned and managed natural and semi-natural 
systems that can provide more categories of benefits, when compared to 
traditional gray infrastructure. Experts from the Dow Chemical Company, 
Shell, Swiss Re and Unilever, working with The Nature Conservancy and 
a resilience expert,3 evaluated a number of business case studies, and de-
veloped recommendations that green and hybrid infrastructure solutions 
should become part of the standard toolkit for modern engineers.
Green infrastructure employs elements of natural systems, while tradi-
tional gray infrastructure is man-made. Examples of green infrastructure 
include creating oyster reefs for coastal protection, and reed beds that treat 
industrial waste water, and restoring natural riparian habitat to enhance 
water provision.
The research team evaluated the assumption that green infrastructure 
can provide more opportunities than gray infrastructure to increase the 
resilience of industrial business operations against disruptive events such 
as mechanical failure, power interruption, raw material price increases, 
and floods. The evaluation concluded that hybrid approaches, utilizing a 
combination of green and gray infrastructure, may provide an optimum 
solution to a variety of shocks and improve the overall business resilience.
The case studies gathered to support this research encompass a wide array 
of possible applications of green infrastructure. They range from planting 
trees that cost-effectively remediate contaminated soil (phytoremediation), 
to constructing wetlands that naturally treat industrial wastewater, to 
mitigating air pollution through innovative forest-management approaches. 
The hope is this work will influence fellow companies and organisations to 
pursue green and/or hybrid solutions when f inancially appropriate.
1 Corporate Vice President Sustainability, Dow Chemical Company
2 Chief External Affairs Off icer, The Nature Conservancy
3 Roland Kupers was an advisor to the green infrastructure work.
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Introduction and objective
The global economy is a tightly wound system, extremely interconnected 
and eff icient, with increasing risks to organisations due to the rapid 
propagation of disruptive events. Ecosystem services, the goods and services 
humans receive from nature, underpin the global economy and provide 
tremendous value to people and organisations. Receiving services from 
nature is often more cost-effective and sustainable than generating them 
with man-made materials like steel and concrete. The assumption that the 
research team sought to test is that working together with natural systems, 
and hence green infrastructure, enables organisations to better manage 
disruptive events, such as power interruption, raw material price increases 
and mechanical failure which often impair traditional gray solutions.
The focus of this study was to evaluate the ability of GI solutions to in-
crease the resilience of industrial business operations to external stressors, 
to enhance the economic protection of business assets and infrastructure 
and to reduce the resource intensity in the context of the globally applicable 
energy-water-food nexus.
The GI team evaluated a number of business case studies from their 
respective organisations and from literature where GI solutions have been or 
may be implemented. The team interviewed 14 project leaders to assess the 
level of resilience each project had to acute, chronic and social stressors as 
well as a comparison to the traditional gray alternative. Where data was not 
available for direct comparison, informed judgments from subject matter 
experts were used. The team published a joint-industry White Paper entitled 
The Case for Green Infrastructure, which includes distilled f indings from the 
interviews and subsequent evaluation of the assumption as stated above.4
The key business case studies that the team evaluated were based on 
interviews with project leaders and are listed below. More detailed informa-
tion can be found on each case study in the appendix.
1. Dow: Phytoremediation for Groundwater Decontamination, Ontario, 
Canada
2. Dow: Constructed Wetlands for Waste Water Treatment, Texas, USA
3. Dow & TNC: Air Pollution Mitigation via Reforestation, Texas, USA
4. Shell: Produced Water Treatment Using Reed Beds, Nimr, Oman
5. Shell: Natural Reclamation and Erosion Control for Onshore Pipelines, 
NE British Columbia, Canada
4 http://www.nature.org/about-us/working-with-companies/companies-we-work-with/
building-a-case-for-green-infrastructure.xml
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6. Shell & TNC: Coastal Pipeline Erosion Control Using Oyster Reefs, 
Louisiana, USA
7. TNC: Cauca Valley Water Fund, Cali, Colombia
8. TNC: Integrated Reservoir Floodplain Management, Georgia and South 
Carolina, USA
9. TNC: Managing Storm Water Runoff with Wetlands, Philadelphia, PA, 
USA
10. TNC: Oyster Reef Building & Restoration for Coastal Protection, Louisi-
ana, Mississippi and Alabama, USA
The remainder of the chapter highlights the pros and cons of green (natural) 
and gray (man-made) solutions and proposes innovative approaches to 
balance the different trade-offs involved when designing resilient infra-
structure.
Green infrastructure: Concept and definition
GI solutions are defined, for the purpose of this study, as planned and man-
aged natural and semi-natural systems which can provide more categories 
of benefits, when compared to traditional gray infrastructure. GI solutions 
can enhance or even replace a functionality that is traditionally provided 
by man-made structures.
GI solutions aim to build upon the success that nature has had in evolving 
systems that are inherently sustainable and resilient. GI solutions employ 
ecosystem services to create more resource-eff icient systems involving 
water, air and land use. GI solutions are designed to fulf il a specif ic need, 
such as water purif ication or carbon sequestration, while often offering 
location-specif ic and valuable co-benefits, such as enhanced habitat for 
wildlife.
Green infrastructure: Solution examples
The business case studies varied from a private entity solving a water 
treatment challenge within its fence line to a multi-stakeholder organisa-
tion working together with a city to create a storm water management 
programme, to a conservation organisation working with governments and 
communities on coastal erosion control. Four GI solutions, describing the 
recurring benefits and challenges inherent to GI solutions are described 
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below. They set the stage for subsequent discussions on the trade-offs 
involved when designing green or hybrid infrastructure solutions.
Union Carbide Corporation, subsidiary of the Dow Chemical Company 
Seadrift, TX, Wetlands for Wastewater Treatment
Project description: 110-acre engineered wetlands in lieu of an industrial 
wastewater treatment plant
In 1995, the Seadrift water treatment facility was seeking a solution to con-
sistently meet regulatory requirements for water discharge. An innovative 
GI solution consisting of a constructed wetlands was installed and has been 
successfully operating upon startup and for the last 15 years. The constructed 
wetlands design offered the following advantages and disadvantages:
Advantages:
 – Capital expense savings: $1.2-1.4 million versus $40 million for the gray 
infrastructure alternative proposed
 – Operating expense savings: No energy, additives, or oxygen; no biosolids 
disposal; minimal maintenance
 – Lower environmental footprint: Eliminated the need for the construc-
tion and operation of an energy-intensive wastewater treatment facility
 – Labour reduction: Operational support drastically different; a wetland 
requires minimal support from operations and maintenance as opposed 
to the gray alternative requiring 24/7 support
 – Operational performance: 100% compliant upon startup and for over 
15 years
 – Construction benefits: Project implementation time reduced by half 
(fully operational in 18 months)
 – Other benefits: Provides habitat for deer, bobcats, and birds; educational 
opportunities for local schools
Disadvantages:
 – On-site large project land footprint: 110 acres as opposed to 4-5 acres 
for a gray infrastructure alternative
 – 1-2 year pilot period: Required to de-risk the GI technology and f ind the 
optimum design
 – Criteria for application of this solution: Compliance with applicable 
regulations related to water quality
 – Biotic stresses: Relatively minor disturbances that the system had to 
overcome (nutria invasion, alligators, etc.)
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Petroleum Development Oman LLC (PDO): Constructed Wetlands for 
Produced Water Treatment, Oman
Project description: More than 360 ha engineered wetland in lieu of disposing 
water in deep aquifers
The need to manage large amounts of produced water created a major 
limiting factor for the oil production from the Nimr f ields, in which the 
Shell Petroleum Company Ltd is a joint venture partner. These large volumes 
would normally require an extensive water processing infrastructure to 
treat and inject the water into a deep disposal well. Man-made infrastruc-
ture would thus result in a high cost facility requiring large amounts of 
electric power and producing greenhouse gas emissions.
The PDO team investigated alternative, low-cost solutions to treat and 
dispose of the water. The world’s largest commercial wetlands treats more 
than 30 vol% (95,000 m3 per day) of the total produced water from the Nimr 
oilf ields in Oman. The four-tier gravity-based wetlands design offered the 
following advantages and disadvantages:
Advantages:
 – Capital expense savings: Signif icant capital cost savings compared to 
the man-made water treatment and injection facility
 – Operating expense savings: Power consumption reduced by approxi-
mately 98% due to the elimination of electric-powered water treatment 
and injection equipment
 – Operational performance: Satisfactory water treatment performance 
ever since the start of the wetlands operation (December 2010). The oil 
content in the produced water is consistently reduced from 400 mg/l to 
less than 0.5 mg/l when leaving the wetlands system
 – Significantly reduced carbon footprint: CO2 emissions reduced by 
approximately 98% due to the elimination of electric-powered water 
treatment and injection equipment
 – Other benefits: The wetlands provide habitat for f ish and hundreds 
of species of migratory birds. Also, the wetlands offer potential for in-
novative customer value propositions that could provide a variety of 
socio-political benefits, e.g. through byproduct optimisation (fresh water, 
biomass, etc.)
Disadvantages:
 – Large required land footprint: More than 360 ha to treat 95,000 m3 per 
day of produced water
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 – Long pilot period (>2 years): Required to de-risk the constructed wet-
lands technology and f ind the optimum wetlands design
 – Operational risk of the wetlands: Potential risk of not meeting the per-
formance requirements due to external factors (e.g. seasonal temperature 
swings, biotic stresses)
The Dow Chemical Company: Phytoremediation for Groundwater Decon-
tamination, Sarnia, Ontario, Canada
Project description: Trees mitigating groundwater contamination
Phytoremediation is the engineered use of green plants to remove, contain, 
stabilise or destroy contaminants in the soil and groundwater. The uptake 
of groundwater by the plants can achieve containment of the groundwater 
and contamination (trees are basically acting as a solar pumps). Engineered 
planted systems can degrade, extract and control the groundwater con-
tamination.
One specif ic installation was completed at the Dow Sarnia facility. 
This large industrial complex contained several manufacturing units that 
operated for more than 60 years. The effort in ceasing operations included 
transitioning the existing traditional pump and treat groundwater treat-
ment system. The traditional system consisted of pumping groundwater via 
carbon beds prior to transferring the recovered groundwater to an external 
water treatment facility.
While still operating the pump and treat facility, the site was prepared 
by minimising external inf iltration and planting 1,300 trees (poplar and 
willows) on an area of roughly two acres to handle the uptake of the ground-
water. As the trees grow along with site hydrology adaptation, some of the 
water still needs to be pumped and treated during this transition period. 
This technology does require ongoing site maintenance such as sampling 
and analysis of ground water, hydrology testing to ensure ground water is 
contained, and tree management over the life of the project.
Advantages:
 – No wastewater needing to be transported off site in trucks
 – No electricity required
 – Elimination of the carbon f iltration system and expense related to its 
operation and disposal of spent carbon
 – No need for 24/7 hour operation (from an operation to a management 
activity)
 – Signif icant reduction in maintenance costs compared to pump and treat
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Disadvantages:
 – Higher level of uncertainty at the onset of the project since dealing with 
a biological system, local geology, contaminants, site hydrology
 – Larger physical footprint than the gray alternative
 – Requires a period of growth to come to full operation
 – Try to limit interaction with biota since concerns with creating a wildlife 
habitat within a remediation site
 – Different set of challenges to deal with requiring different set of skills 
such as dealing with main disturbance (e.g. rabbits eating tree bark)
 – Ensure that tight feedback and monitoring systems are in place to allevi-
ate any environmental concern (e.g. leaves/pollen off the trees)
Shell Canada Limited: Natural Reclamation and Erosion Control for 
Onshore Pipelines
Project description: Reclamation along pipelines in British Columbia
Shell’s projects often involve the construction of pipeline corridors in eco-
logically diverse areas on previously undeveloped lands called ‘greenfield’ 
development. The pipeline is routed along what is known as a ‘right of way’.
When building a pipeline, the construction activities not only cover the 
civil works to lay the pipeline and build the pump/compressor stations, 
but also the reclamation work to return disturbed land to an equivalent 
land capability with minimal impact on the environment. There is height-
ened recognition and popularity of natural reclamation and soil erosion 
abatement techniques as these ancient techniques address the shortfalls 
related to man-made pipeline-protection techniques, particularly in terms 
of reduced installation and maintenance costs.
The technique of using living plant materials to create structures 
that perform some soil-related engineering function is referred to as soil 
‘bioengineering’. Often, soil bioengineering is used to treat sites where 
surface stability and erosion problems exist. Bioengineering solutions can 
be applied to a wide variety of sites disturbed by construction activities. 
These solutions use natural components of pioneering plant communities 
and thus align well with ecological restoration strategies.
It is preferred to use local plant species to construct soil bioengineering 
solutions for naturally disturbed sites. Some recent innovations in recla-
mation approaches include the use of willows and other tree/shrub/plant 
species to control soil erosion and establish a re-naturalisation path. In the 
past 15 years, Shell has proven success in willow staking in several upstream 
projects. Poplars and willows are highly valued for erosion control and 
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eff icient control of groundwater due to their rapid growth, high rooting 
capacity, extensive root systems and high water use.
Pipeline projects involve many stakeholders with specif ic interests and 
concerns. The pipeline right of way often traverses lands with rights of use 
belonging to multiple indigenous communities. The indigenous communi-
ties are often concerned with the fragmentation of the land and its impacts 
on the local ecosystem. Therefore, all solutions are strictly reviewed with 
these local concerns in mind.
Advantages:
 – Lower overall environmental impact, potentially including CO2 offsets
 – Solutions are known to be superior over time compared to the more 
traditional stabilisation methods
 – Hands-on work can be structured as a team-building/educational activity 
for Shell employees
 – Job creation for local labour
 – The solution can be designed to be sensitive to the local environment 
(e.g. allow access to local wildlife)
 – These green solutions do not require regular maintenance as compared 
to gray solutions that often require mechanical intervention (e.g. for the 
excavation of existing banks or transport of materials)
 – Low operating and maintenance cost
Disadvantages:
 – Not a one-stop solution, but very much site specif ic (dependent on soil 
types, moisture level, light, etc.)
 – Requires a different skill set for the design and implementation phase
 – Time constraints: any project would need to be started as early in the 
winter as possible
 – Survivability of the planting sites is an important requirement to estab-
lish long-term success
Identifying areas of opportunity
The key differences between green and gray infrastructure are summarised 
in Table 1 and illustrate the trade-offs involved when evaluating green 
versus gray solutions. These trade-offs help identify the specif ic areas of 
opportunity for optimum resilient infrastructure which are often com-
binations of new GI solutions integrated into existing facilities, creating 
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so-called hybrid solutions. This evaluation and opportunity assessment was 
conducted during a meeting of the participating organisations.5
Evaluation criteria Green infrastructure Gray infrastructure 
Stakeholder 
involvement 
extended stakeholders are 
often required to support the 
project and may have an active 
and ongoing role in the project 
design and operation 
stakeholders are often engaged 
with the aim to create local sup-
port for the project, but without 
active involvement in the 
project design and operation 
Engineering 
approach 
Gi solutions require a custom-
made, location-specific design 
and do not lend themselves to 
standardisation and replication 
traditional engineering 
solutions enable standardization 
and replication which can 
significantly reduce project 
costs and delivery times 
Physical footprint a large physical footprint is 
often required due to low 
energy density 
usually, only a small physical 




often reduced environmental 
footprint due to Gi solutions 
being nature-based and 
self-regenerating 
often increased environmental 
footprint due to material and 
energy intensive processes 
(manufacturing, distribution, 
operation) 
Speed of delivering 
the functionality 
Gi solutions may take time 
(years) to grow to provide a 
certain service and capacity 
traditional engineering 
solutions provide a certain 




Gi solutions are susceptible to 
extreme weather conditions, 
seasonal changes in tempera-
ture or rainfall and disease 
Gray infrastructure is susceptible 
to power loss, mechanical failure 




operating and maintenance 
costs are often significantly 
lower (only monitoring and 
feedback is required) 
operating costs are often sig-
nificantly higher due to power 
consumption, operational and 
maintenance requirements 
Risk of price 
volatility 
Gi solutions are relatively 
insensitive to fluctuations in the 
cost of raw materials, oil, gas and 
power 
traditional engineering 
solutions are sensitive to 
fluctuations in the cost of raw 
materials, oil, gas and power 
Approach to system 
monitoring and 
control 
Gi solutions are living and 
complex systems that can be 
monitored and effectively man-
aged by a deep understanding 
of the key control variables 
traditional engineering solu-
tions are man-made systems 
that are typically designed 
with established monitoring 
techniques to effectively 
manage and control system 
performance 
5 Hawthorne, New York, October 2012
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Evaluation criteria Green infrastructure Gray infrastructure 
Required operating 
personnel 
No need for 24/7 operational 
supervision 
Complex control and safeguard-
ing systems typically require 




relatively inexpensive to extend 
the capacity of the Gi solution, 
provided there is physical 
footprint available 
extension of capacity could be 
relatively inexpensive as long 
as significant modification or 
redesign is not required 
Need for recapitali-
sation 
recapitalisation during the 
life of the Gi solution is usually 
not significant. the end-of-life 
replacement/decommissioning 
will vary greatly depending on 
the Gi technology selected but 
is usually not necessary as Gi 
solutions are self-sustaining and 
do not depreciate 
Gray solutions are depreciating 
assets with a finite performance 
capacity and usually require 
significant replacement/decom-
missioning at end of life 
Key conclusions
Assessments of a range of examples, some operating over more than a 
decade, have clearly demonstrated the role that green infrastructure can 
play within a portfolio of technology options. GI solutions form an essential 
element in a portfolio of solutions to increase the resilience of industrial 
business operations, but do not provide resilience against every potential 
stressor and therefore benefit from thorough site investigation and manage-
ment of location specif ic risks. This is an important caveat when assessing 
the preferred option or combination of options for a specif ic situation.
The research team found that GI solutions often demonstrate f inancial 
advantages compared to gray infrastructure due to a reduction of both ini-
tial capital expenses and ongoing operational and maintenance expenses. 
GI solutions can also be used to strategically recapitalise aging assets.
While one might expect that these f inancial advantages would drive and 
reinforce use of GI technologies, our research indicates that this is often 
not the case. The lack of integration into technology capabilities, capital 
reviews or assessments, champions are required in today’s organisations 
to investigate and drive these non-traditional, cost-advantaged solutions. 
Engineers build what they know. “It’s hard to sell a swamp to an engineer”, 
was a key message from one of the project team. GI solutions offer op-
portunities, often overlooked in current project assessments, to effectively 
manage socio-political risks through innovative collaboration with key 
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stakeholders. Yet evaluation of the business case studies showed that a lack 
of expertise, lack of practical experience and other cultural barriers have 
hindered the full adoption of GI options with a variety of organisations. 
This is a critical dimension to address when integrating GI into evaluations 
of options and technologies. Failure to address this will result in missed 
opportunities and sub-optimal designs.
GI solutions often leverage existing natural resources. For example, as 
part of Shell’s Natural Reclamation and Erosion Control for Onshore Pipe-
lines project, local plant species are used to construct soil bioengineering 
solutions. Further, the regenerative processes of GI solutions consume less 
energy and are thus less sensitive to power loss and fluctuations in the cost 
of energy, as compared to gray infrastructure. This inherently adaptive 
capability of GI solutions can be very attractive to reduce ongoing opera-
tions and maintenance costs. While this might seem to confer an inherent 
resilience to GI options, it is not necessarily the case since both green and 
gray infrastructure resist shocks, but in different ways. Hybrid approaches, 
utilising a combination of green and gray infrastructure, may provide an 
optimum solution to improve the overall business resilience. Expertise 
and experience with both green and gray infrastructure options should 
be most likely to lead to the more resilient approach for any given project.
Organisations which hope to make the most of green infrastructure 
would be well served by the following considerations. They should employ 
a more comprehensive economic and environmental footprint analysis 
relative to traditional models and techniques to more accurately compare 
green versus gray infrastructure and to investigate, and when relevant, 
appropriately assess the co-benef its of GI solutions. GI solutions benef it 
from pilot projects and engagement of external partners to glean expertise, 
experiences and innovative approaches that can de-risk the GI solution and 
accelerate implementation. GI solutions invariably require organisations 
to engage in multi-stakeholder discussions. This is particularly true when 
building acceptance and consensus with regulators and local stakeholders 
who may benefit, or be impacted by, a GI project. Since organisations are 
currently not staffed with the requisite skills nor supported by the culture 
necessary to bring GI solutions to scale, this needs to be accounted for by 
either building capability in-house or leveraging others, including NGOs, 
who have the requisite expertise and experience. Leadership emphasis and 
change management is required for successful implementation. Through 
whatever combination of resources and expertise, organisations are advised 
to build a f it-for-purpose set of capabilities integrating the areas of strategy, 
innovation, new business development, project economics, engineering and 
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environmental sustainability. Green infrastructure, as an underutilised 
capability, stands to enhance an organisation’s resilience and provide 
f inancial benefits as well.
Moving forward
Dow has undertaken signif icant efforts to further the use of GI solutions 
within their operations. A concrete example is Dow’s effort, as a f irst step 
in realising the business potential for green infrastructure, in ensuring 
that the proper tools are available to assess projects. A full retrospective 
analysis of the Seadrift constructed wetlands (CW) discussed above was 
performed using two conventional Dow tools, a replacement cost meth-
odology for f inancial assessment and a life cycle assessment (LCA) for 
environmental impacts was completed and published in April 2014 in the 
Journal of Industrial Ecology. The Seadrift cost-benef it analysis yielded 
a net present value on the order of $200 million. The LCA showed clear 
advantages for the CW, based on its much lower use of electricity, chemicals, 
and capital.6 Based on the success of this project, Dow has dedicated staff 
resources to evaluate opportunities to deploy green infrastructure solutions 
at sites around the globe, integrate GI solutions as part of its global project 
management process and create both an internal and external network of 
GI practitioners building knowledge and experience in this emerging f ield.
Additionally, Dow is working with The Nature Conservancy to continue 
to explore specif ic green infrastructure opportunities along with develop-
ing and testing methods for businesses to evaluate green infrastructure 
solutions alongside gray infrastructure solutions. The most promising 
result to date involves the progress made on the case study mentioned 
previously dealing with air pollution mitigation via reforestation in Texas, 
USA. The collaboration team is working with key stakeholders to seek ap-
proval of reforestation as a compliance measure for inclusion in the Texas 
State Implementation Plan (SIP) for ground-level ozone. Letters requesting 
consideration of the inclusion of reforestation in the Texas SIP have been 
submitted to the US EPA and the Texas Commission on Environmental 
Quality. If approval is granted, this could provide Dow and other companies 
based in Texas with the ability to consider large-scale reforestation as a 
method to help reduce components that form ozone. The evaluation tools 
6 DiMuro et al. (2014)
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developed to accomplish this pilot study should also be useful to other 
businesses.7
TNC is working to advance the current science and tools for incorporating 
GI into coastal hazard mitigation, inland flood risk reduction, urban water 
supply, as well as for improving water and air quality. TNC scientists, corpo-
rate practices and external affairs staff are working with engineering f irms, 
reinsurers and other corporate partners to understand the opportunities 
as well as barriers to incorporating GI into corporations’ plans for coastal 
and riverine natural hazard mitigation. As TNC and partners advance 
the science, tools, processes, policies, and market conditions needed to 
realise these opportunities, the results from such collaborations will enable 
corporations to enhance the resilience of their facilities by incorporating GI.
As a result of this study, RAI organisations have recognised the strategic 
importance of green infrastructure solutions and the need to include them 
among the suite of most effective technology options available to engineers.
7 Further details on this specif ic effort along with a complete summary of other efforts 
initiated by the collaboration between Dow and the Nature Conservancy can be found in The 
Nature Conservancy and Dow (2013).

7 Nexus! Resilience in a pressure cooker
Herman van der Meyden1
Nexus! is a board game simulation of an economy that faces energy, water 
and food stresses. The Resilience Action Initiative developed Nexus! to create 
an environment for experiential learning. The game energises participants 
ahead of discussions and allows an easy on-ramp to the somewhat abstract 
concept of resilience. It is a fun and interactive way to start engagements on 
the energy, water and food challenge for groups that are new to the topic. For 
experienced decision-makers, it provides good anchor points for reflection 
on cooperative behaviours. In a two-hour workshop, participants get to 
experience tough choices from the interconnections between resources, the 
resilience of growth strategies, as well as the challenges and opportunities 
of collaboration.
Nexus! has been designed to confront its players with a number of dilem-
mas that are at the heart of resilience, and give them a direct experience of 
dealing with the associated ambiguities:
 – Resilience versus eff iciency – Do I buy new assets as fast as I can or do I 
f irst build some buffers to guard against unforeseen events?
 – Local suff iciency versus global trading – Do I try to produce all the 
resources I need within the boundaries of my own country or do I rely 
on the global market?
 – Cooperation – Do I monopolise the available water to maximise my own 
use in the short term or do I cooperate to ensure a sustainable division 
of the available resource between all players?
 – What is success? Players are told the winner will be the one with the 
most money at the end of the game, which players are free to interpret 
as maximising their personal wealth, or that of their game table.
The game development process
The developers of Nexus! have used a rapid-prototyping approach. The 
idea for the game was f irst conceived in January 2013. The f inal product 
was available in May of that year. In only four months, f ive different 
prototypes were built, tested and adjusted. Weekly tests were followed 
1 Commercial advisor for Royal Dutch Shell in the Netherlands, and designer of Nexus!
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by a fast evaluation of lessons learned and redesign. This approach 
combined rapid progress with the incorporation of views from many 
different stakeholders within the Resilience Action Initiative, who acted 
as test players.
Nexus! has drawn upon experience with the design of the Perspectivity 
Game,2 a simulation of climate change dynamics. The team further took 
inspiration from games like Carcassonne, Settlers of Catan and Risk to 
design the fun factor into the game. In addition, it applied key concepts 
from the valuable game development guidebook “A Theory of Fun”.3 The 
element of simultaneous player decision-making, different from most turn-
based games, was taken from Diplomacy. Lessons on social gaming were 
learned from the games Ökolopoly4 and the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer 
for Adaptation (HARITA) project.5 None of these existing games, however, 
combined the theme of energy, water and food resources with a design 
focused on resilience strategies and collaboration.
The game mechanics
In order to explain how resource interlinkages, resilience strategies and 
collaboration feature in Nexus!, let’s start with the basic rule set. The game 
objective is simple: to make your economy grow. The participants play 
on a board with six teams, which ideally consist of two people each. An 
independent game leader acts as banker and runs the administration of 
the game economy.
The rules of Nexus! are quite simple and can be explained in less than 
ten minutes. Three of the teams play the governments of the imaginary 
countries Twengea, Miristan and Praland. The other three teams direct 
the games’ companies. The countries are responsible for building and 
maintaining cities. The companies build farms, power plants and other 
infrastructure. The economic activities are interconnected through units 
of energy, water and food.
2 Perspectivity Game (www.perspectivity.org/game)
3 Koster (2005) 
4 On Ökolopoly (Ecopoly – A Cybernetic Environment Game) and its author, Frederic 
Vester, a German biochemist and an expert in the f ield of ecology, see http://de.wikipedia.org/
wiki/%C3%96kolopoly (in German). 
5 IRI (2010)
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While the rules are not very complicated, the game leader purposefully 
presents them at brisk pace during the 10-minute introduction. Most players 
really struggle to grasp them and are forced to start playing with a very 
limited understanding. In addition, the rules are not fixed and evolve during 
the game. These design elements put the players in a position where they 
need to deal with uncertainty. It makes applying simple tactics based on 
forecasting future developments next to impossible. This simulates the 
turbulent behaviour of systems at the energy-water-food nexus, and the 
often ambiguous ‘rules of the game’ in the real world.
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A typical Nexus! player experience
introduction: the game leader presents the set of rules at a rapid pace. all play-
ers struggle to keep up.
round 1: most players are frantically reading the rule card to find out what 
should be done. The first resources get traded. The players don’t understand 
relative importance of resources. They just discover how the basic rules work.
round 2: The plant virus disaster gets introduced to the game. The amount of 
rainwater that falls in the lake every round is announced. The quickest players 
already start formulating a deliberate strategy.
round 3: most players now grasp how trading works and what assets are avail-
able at the bank. The first resource scarcity appears. one country has now got 
full control over the lake water through pumps.
round 4: most players understand what’s happening and have made a strategy. 
a water conference is organised, yet few players feel an urgency to negotiate 
about water.
round 5: The first countries are falling behind on income. The game leader re-
moves the first undersupplied city from the game board. negotiations get more 
emotional.
round 6: most players now have fixed trading partners. There is very little of 
either energy or food in the entire game board. players are bidding up the prices 
multiple times. There is short-term focus; strategising is very hard.
round 7: The players hold a trade conference. many proposals for multilateral 
collaboration are launched, but they cannot come to agreement.
round 8: one country and one company are sensing that they are losing the 
game and start to get disillusioned. The leading players need the land and 
economies of the losers to grow further. The round information card announces 
the end of the game.
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round-up: While counting the scores: players start to reflect on the decisions 
made and start to grasp how their actions have shaped the outcome of the 
game. some players start to justify their behaviour.
debrief: The game leader links the game experience to resilience theory. players 
reflect on alternative game results scenarios and what they could or perhaps 
should have done to achieve those.
Simulating aspects of resilience
The game concept and rules are further illustrated below in the context 
of the resilience frames introduced in Chapters 2 and 3. Additionally, the 
game highlights the essential value and importance of cross-sector col-
laboration. Nexus! incorporates aspects of f ive out of the nine lenses that 
were introduced in those chapters:





1. Innovation through research cards
Innovation is represented in Nexus! through research cards. The game 
leader explains during the introduction of the rules that research cards “may 
lead to asset improvements”. As in the real world, the outcome of research 
is uncertain. When a player invests in research, she obtains a card with the 
research outcome, consisting of three variants: (1) dead-end, (2) biodiversity 
research success and (3) water eff iciency research success.
If the player gets the ‘dead-end’ card, then the money spent on research 
has not been productive. With the biodiversity card type, players can protect 
farms from a plant virus outbreak. The third card type allows participants 
to increase water-eff iciency in farms, energy plants or cities. Because of 
the constrained amount of rainwater in the game, this obviously boosts 
the overall growth prospects.
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2-3. Resilience through redundancy and diversity
The game features a disastrous event in the form of the plant virus plague 
that causes harvests to fail. The occurrence of the plant virus represents a 
‘fat-tail event’, rare but calamitous. Every round the participants need to 
spin the ‘plant disease wheel’ in the middle of the game board. This wheel 
hits one of the countries with a virus outbreak, which means that its farms 
will not produce anything in that round.
Companies can apply two measures to become resilient to the plant virus. 
The f irst measure involves ‘innovation and experimentation’ described 
above. The other option is to diversify their assets, by placing farms in 
different countries so that in any single round the impact of the plant virus 
is limited. The ability to realise this strategy depends on the willingness of 
the country players to allow investment in their territory.
The countries do not own farms themselves, since farming is solely the do-
main of the companies. The countries therefore have two different strategic 
options to improve the resilience against the plant virus. The first option is to 
create a small buffer of food, which is equivalent to redundancy in resilience 
terms. This buffer allows the country to always provide its cities with the 
food they need to survive, even when the virus strikes. Maintaining these 
buffers is clearly not the most eff icient strategy, since the buffer can also 
be used to feed another city and generate higher returns. This introduces 
a trade-off in the game between eff iciency and resilience. Countries can 
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also become more resilient by striving for diversity in their supply chain by 
buying food from all three companies, instead of just their national supplier.
4. Resilience through building social capital
One of the asset types that countries can build is a water pump. The function 
of the water pump is that it gives the country preferential control over the 
‘lake’, the shared water resource in the middle of the game board. A pump 
needs energy in every round of the game in order to be active, just like a 
real pump requires electricity. The country that has the largest number of 
running water pumps has priority in extracting water from the lake. This 
country now has the power to extract all available water. It can then use 
its own share and sell back the remainder to other players. In other words, 
the country has the power to monopolise the water. Merely exercising this 
power once, normally triggers a race for other countries to also invest in 
water pumps and take over this monopoly.
After a number of game rounds, a new type of asset is introduced to the 
game: the desalination plant. When reasoned from an individual player’s 
perspective, the water pump is a cheaper way to get access to water than 
this desalination plant. Collectively, however, the construction of water 
pumps follows the model of a classic arms race: The collective investment 
in water pump assets can easily go beyond the value of the water that is 
disputed; it becomes a zero-sum game.
The water in the lake is visually drawn in the centre of the game board 
and is naturally perceived as a public good. Its monopolisation invariably 
creates a hostile climate in the ‘international relations’ of the game. A 
country that monopolises the water and gets into trouble later, has seriously 
damaged goodwill from its fellow players. This brings in another aspect of 
resilience: transformative resilience through social capital. In the face of 
uncertainty about the game future, it is inherently valuable to maintain 
good relations with one’s neighbours, which means sharing the lake water 
even when one has the power to monopolise it. This behaviour of being a 
responsible citizen fosters a cooperative climate where a country is much 
more likely to receive help when it is hit by unexpected negative events.
5. Thresholds: Losing the last city
The cities in the game need to receive in every round at least a minimum 
amount of food and water to survive. When a country loses its second, 
third or fourth city, then it faces a ‘linear’ setback in the growth profile of 
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its game economy. The player may afterwards save some resources or seek 
help from a company and invest in a new city. It is a loss, but the economic 
system boundaries within which the country operates do not really change.
On the contrary, when the country fails to provide minimum supply to 
its last city, an irreversible threshold is crossed. The country has now lost its 
value-creation potential. If left to its own devices, the country is doomed to 
end the game as a marginal player. The only way to get back into the game 
is foreign altruism, which is rare.
Awareness of systemic thresholds is an important step towards resilience. 
Country players in Nexus! generally identify the tipping point of losing the last 
city. When they get close, they try to influence corporate players to support 
them, to avoid passing the threshold. It is certainly in the rational interest of 
the company to support its home country, since also the company ultimately 
needs the money produced by cities. In the messy trading process, however, 
countries can really struggle to get this message of interdependence across.
Collaboration
Early in the game, time-outs are called for a water conference and then a 
trade conference. These conferences are designed into the game to provide 
players with an opportunity for collaboration. Experience shows that in 
most cases these opportunities are not utilised. It turns out to be diff icult 
to centralise the attention of all 12 people around the game board. Mostly 
some players are distracted from the group discussion because they are 
working on their individual strategies.
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On the other hand, player groups that do achieve a collective high-growth 
scenario typically lay a solid foundation during the conferences. Sometimes 
there is one participant with natural leadership who launches a proposal 
that immediately gets adopted by all parties. Other times, a coalition of 
three or four teams start with an agreement on water use, for example, 
and then coerce the remaining teams into compliance by threatening to 
stop trading with them.
Insights from a year of Nexus! sessions
The previous paragraphs describe f ive concepts of resilience that have 
been embedded in Nexus!. All of these concepts have been translated in 
very simple systems and logic, in order to make the game playable in an 
hour. Obviously, resilience strategies in real life are a lot more complex, 
with many more stakeholders involved, far larger asymmetries between 
them, as well as multi-scalar complexities. But modelling the real world is 
not the point of the game. The point is to provide an easy on-ramp to the 
concept of resilience, which for many is somewhat abstract and diff icult 
to connect with. The debrief is therefore an integral part of the game. It is 
the moment where players see the relevance of their game experience for 
real life. The game leader’s role is to help the players reach a higher level of 
understanding of what the resilience lens implies.
By early 2014, Nexus! had been played with a wide range of players, close 
to 2,000 participants in total, from students to executives, from public 
authorities to NGO representatives and academics.
Although the way the game is played varies a lot, some qualitative 
observations can be made from the behaviour of players across these ses-
sions: The pressure from the speed of the game and the volatile business 
environment causes players to focus in a small circle. Most struggled to 
develop partnerships beyond their own local government or company. 
Often short-term considerations trumped the strategic view, with players 
ignoring innovation, not managing diversity and forgetting to keep buffers. 
Organisational culture matters: One group of NGO staff collectively opted 
for a maximum collaboration strategy; a group of young consultants on 
the other hand did the opposite by picking a take-no-prisoners strategy 
for maximum competition. Women were generally more inclined to spend 
time on a fair distribution of the common water resource. The tragedy of the 
commons, in this case the hoarding of the central water supply, typically 
needs only a single short-term focused player to materialise. Such action had 
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a strong knock-on effect as collaboration on other issues also deteriorated 
rapidly thereafter. Finally it appears that success in the game is not much 
correlated to the level of education or professional development of the 
participants.
More important than the game outcomes, most participants have left 
the Nexus! sessions with a better appreciation of resource linkages, a 
deeper insight into resilience dynamics and richer reflections on how their 
individual behaviour can help shape systemic cooperation. It proves to do 
an excellent job in providing the intended fun on-ramp into the world of 
resilience theory.
8 Getting to resilience from the bottom-up
Thekla Teunis1
Some people see the world as it is and ask: What can I do?
 Young people see the world as it could be and say: Together we can.
– Paul Polman, CEO of Unilever, paraphrasing George Bernard Shaw2
Corporations as centrally governed structures themselves, have a tendency 
to view the world as being composed of large chunks. These chunks are in 
turn governed by authorities who establish policies and fund projects. When 
reflecting on resilience, the natural tendency is to focus on large projects 
that would enable a particular city or region to cope better with the stresses 
it may be exposed to. To complement this reflex towards top-down change, 
a project was initiated to explore how bottom-up projects might contribute 
as well. Young professionals from the Resilience Action Initiative (RAI) 
companies were invited to design and implement solutions to increase the 
resilience of the areas they are living and working in.
The project worked. As we have seen in several large cities in 2013, 
bottom-up initiatives can help corporates to f ind new business models for 
collaboration. The Resilience Action Initiative has sparked a movement 
of young professionals who act as local changemakers all over the world 
across company fence lines. Connecting people from different backgrounds 
and jointly generating action can help to build trust-based relationships 
locally. The skills, passion and expertise of young professionals can be 
leveraged to start and scale new collaborative business models addressing 
the energy-water-food challenges.
In Rotterdam young professionals f inalised business cases and presented 
and launched three pilot projects, on the subjects of ‘edible walls’, a ‘floating 
greenhouse’ and ‘clean driving’. The edible wall pilot has led to a spin-off 
company that will scale the concept, starting in Rotterdam. This success led 
to initiatives from young professionals elsewhere to set up similar projects. 
1 Business developer at the Ecosystem Return Foundation in South Africa and Director Africa 
for the Land Life Company. Previously Thekla Teunis worked for Shell in Group Strategy, where 
she co-developed the RAI bottom-up programme.
2 Polman (2013)
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Initiatives are underway in South Africa, the Philippines, and other cities 
in the Netherlands.
Next to selecting and identifying projects to increase resilience from the 
top, corporates can invite individuals from within companies to incubate 
a solution when there is a need and enthusiasm. This can become a bridge 
to move from global issues to real action on the ground, provided there is 
suff icient training and support. The focus should be on leadership develop-
ment, building local trust by co-designing projects with local players and 
by generating chains of local joint success/actions rather than solving the 
entire issue at once. This way small solutions can be replicated rapidly, to 
get the action where the opportunities are.
The f irst section of this chapter describes a broader trend of bottom-up 
initiatives. In the next section, the specif ic developments of social in-
novation, which were sparked from the Resilience Action Initiative, are 
described. Finally, I give a perspective on how corporates can use bottom-up 
innovation to create a competitive advantage, while also touching upon 
some of the key intrinsic challenges of bottom-up innovation.
Fading boundaries and stronger horizontal and local networks
Young people are less reliant on traditional institutions like governments, 
NGOs, corporates or political parties to create impact. This could be 
witnessed with the Arab Spring and the Occupy Wall Street movement. 
Bottom-up initiatives develop against a backdrop of increased responsibil-
ity, fading corporate boundaries and stronger horizontal and local networks.
We are becoming increasingly aware that solutions to our global challenges 
must purposefully engage youth, at all levels – locally, regionally, nationally and 
globally. This generation has the passion, dynamism and entrepreneurial spirit 
to shape the future.
– Professor Klaus Schwab, World Economic Forum Founder and Executive 
Chairman
Several factors have led to an increased sense of responsibility from people 
within existing institutions, and in particular corporates, to act for the 
better and improve the state of the world. These are the visibility of nega-
tive effects of the way we manage resources; the increased empowerment 
mainly driven by f inancial independence for individuals to react to this 
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and mobilise their peers via social network sites to protest against existing 
policies and institutions; as well as the inability of existing institutions to 
address these challenges alone.
If we all act together, business, governments, NGOs and citizens – and especially 
the young – just imagine the good we could create. We not only need the help 
the young can give us but their enthusiasm, ambition, drive and ideas, too. Today 
over half the world’s population is under 30. […] There is a new, more entrepre-
neurial spirit among today’s young people. Young people have the opportunity, 
the responsibility and duty to be the catalysts for change. They all have the 
potential to be leaders and changemakers.
– Paul Polman, CEO Unilever
CEOs like Paul Polman of Unilever are front-runners in showing what is 
possible – and show that these changes can go hand-in-hand with direct 
business interests. At all levels individuals are responding. Within cor-
porates social intrapreneurship is the new buzzword – intrapreneurs are 
people who act as social changemakers from within existing corporates.
At the same time, corporate boundaries are fading. Challenges are in-
creasingly interconnected. By solving an energy shortage, a water shortage 
can be created – because most forms of energy production require water. 
When producing ‘clean energy’ from biofuels, large amounts of arable land 
have to be planted with energy crops – land which otherwise could have 
been used to produce food. Therefore, companies can take a competitive 
advantage when they operate across their traditional vertical boundaries. 
Shell is growing reed beds in Oman to green the desert, using wastewater 
from its oilf ield operations. Utilities in Europe and the USA develop apps for 
their customers to be able to bring down their energy demand. Coca-Cola 
invests in ecosystem restoration to improve water catchment in areas where 
they bottle their drinks.
An important driver for bottom-up innovation is the development 
of stronger horizontal and local networks. Most of these networks are 
enabled through the Internet. The demonstrations at Tahrir Square in 
Cairo were not organised by one single leader, but by the local community 
as a whole. And they were supported by the global community – through 
social media. These events showed the world that many small initiatives, 
organised by individuals who feel responsible and act across traditional 
institutional boundaries, can have a tremendous impact – and are very 
diff icult to manage from within the traditional response framework. 
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How to engage with a movement, when you don’t know whom their 
spokesperson is?
Local and horizontal networks create an entirely new way of doing busi-
ness with a focus on sharing rather than having. A prime example is Airbnb, 
which is becoming a threat to the hotel industry by offering low-price 
accommodation within large cities by people renting out their own home.3 
Also car sharing is becoming increasingly popular.4 The sharing economy 
is based on local and horizontal networks, operating in the absence of large 
head off ices and associated vertical structures, based on trust between 
individuals. In this world it doesn’t matter which company you work for 
and which title is on your business card – it matters what you do with it.
Against these trends, the development of bottom-up initiatives to 
increase resilience is a natural phenomenon. It sparks from the increased 
sense of responsibility of employees working for large corporates, who feel 
their own responsibility to make their local communities more resilient 
to energy-water-food stress. It also sparks from the interconnectedness 
of these challenges and the realisation that it is impossible to tackle these 
challenges in isolation. Lastly, the existing horizontal networks support 
informal local collaboration to address these challenges in unconventional, 
bottom-up structures.
What would a world look like if networked, horizontal, local initiatives 
become the standard rather than the exception? If individuals take more 
responsibility for their environment? If corporate boundaries are fading 
such that a person’s skills and expertise for a certain job become more 
important than their rank or seniority?
This is a world in which corporates (and governments) are structures 
along which knowledge, resources and networks are shared and in which 
society’s challenges are addressed. Every company and every country is 
managed through the lens of social enterprise – aiming to minimise the 
costs of social and environmental externalities, and to have a net positive 
impact. There are billions of self-employed, highly skilled and f lexible 
workers, who deliver on a demand basis, locally embedded but globally 
connected. A sense of meaning and trust-based relationships, more than 
a sense of status and f inancial reward for performance, will attract the 
3 Airbnb has served 9 million guests since it was founded 5 years ago (in 2009), and has 
doubled the number of guests from 2012 to 2013. Techcrunch.com 
4 The number of carsharing members in the US and Europe has grown from 1 million in 2009 
to 3 million in 2012 and is expected to grow to 10 million in 2016 (Rocky Mountain Institute 
[2010]).
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highest talent to deliver a certain job. Talent will search for the most chal-
lenging issues, with the highest societal relevance (meaning a positive 
environmental and social impact). They will seek institutions that stand out 
as taking the responsibility to act – because there they f ind a match with 
their values. The millennials leverage their own networks. All they need is 
space and the freedom to decide how best to spend their time, with whom 
to connect and where to do work.5
The bottom-up perspective signif icantly challenges existing corporate 
business models. It requires a shift from upscaling towards downscaling: 
rather than looking for a country-wide solution to address all challenges 
at once, start small and replicate successful approaches quickly. It needs a 
shift from short-term thinking to meet this quarter’s targets to longer term 
thinking to serve the consumer’s needs 20 years on. It also needs a shifting 
perspective: rather than looking forward, looking around. What solutions 
and opportunities are already available? But most of all it needs a shift in 
the way the company is managed. Creating space for social innovation 
means creating time for employees to work on this, making this an integral 
part of their job. This implies creating the right incentives, as well as a high 
level of trust.
Initial results
Under the Resilience Action Initiative, a programme of bottom-up innova-
tions has been rolled out in multiple locations. In the programme, Shell 
young professionals mobilise their peers from other multinationals, NGOs 
and city government as well as local entrepreneurs. Together they make a 
plan to increase the resilience of the community in which they are living 
and working, and realise it. The approach is highly action-oriented. The 
projects need to have tangible results within one year, results that you can 
touch and feel, while at the same time they need to have a sustainable and 
scalable business case.
The teams design their own urban projects from scratch, based on the de-
mand from the city and their most critical issues with respect to the nexus, 
their own capabilities and the passions of the individual team members.
Pilots are run by local project leaders on a voluntary basis. They chair a 
cross-functional team with other young professionals from different com-
panies and government/civil society to run the projects. Funding require-
5 PwC, University of Southern California and London Business School (2013) 
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ments are small in the f irst year (€5 to €50k per project) – funding is the 
responsibility of local project teams and can be organised from companies, 
government and/or other investors. Once the projects achieve scale, they 
can lead to start-ups or can be incorporated in existing businesses.
A central programme manager provides support to local project team 
leaders. This support involves a link to strategy, knowledge on resilience/
nexus and process such as how to manage a bottom-up project. The 
programme manager facilitates peer-to-peer connections and knowledge 
sharing between different projects worldwide.
Example: Edible walls
Young professionals from Shell, Yara, McKinsey & Co and IBM helped schools to 
build ‘edible walls’ to make children aware of their own role in local sustainable food 
production and to make them see the connection between food production and use 
of energy and water.
Innovative?
On 27 September 2013, 20 children from Rotterdam opened an edible wall at the 
Klimop school in the north of Rotterdam. Since then, kids at the Klimop can eat from 
the walls of their school.
“Everywhere around the world you find vertical gardens, but producing food verti-
cally is still unexisting. Except for now, at these two schools in Rotterdam”, says Charlie 
Minter, local project leader from the National Thinktank. “We should be proud of this!”
Getting started
The schools were happy to collaborate on this initiative. Kids design and plant their 
own vertical vegetable and fruit garden with strawberries, herbs and berries. They 
learn to take care of the wall and the crops, how to prune and harvest, and thereby 
they become more aware of how fruit and vegetables are being produced.
Thekla Teunis from Shell explains: “With this project we want to make children 
and young professionals aware of the fact that they can contribute to increasing the 
resilience of the food supply chain, with a tangible local project. To realise this initia-
tive, Shell worked together with young professionals from Yara, McKinsey & Co., IBM, 
Stichting Move, the National Thinktank, the Rotterdam Climate Initiative and STEK 
urban garden shop in Rotterdam. All organisations care about making children and 
young professionals aware of their own role in local and resilient food production. 
The interlinkages between energy, water and food production play an important role 
in the project. Edible vertical walls are water-efficient and you need less energy to get 
the food on your plate than when you transport it from the other side of the world.”
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The founders of the initiative are seeking to expand it to other schools, individu-
als and public spaces in the city. To be able to expand the initiative, the costs need to 
be reduced. Therefore the team is working on developing a low-cost system for the 
walls. The final ambition is to make vertical urban gardens and food production in 
large cities worldwide possible.
The following criteria were defined to determine what constitutes a suc-
cessful bottom-up project under the Resilience Action Initiative:
 – The project contributes to increased resilience in terms of energy-water-
food issues.
 – The project is tangible and doable: it is designed and executed by young 
professionals from within multinationals, linked with local entrepreneurs.
 – The business model is replicable.
 – It leads to a spinoff business and/or is incorporated in a government or 
multinational. The participating institutions are seed funders/sharehold-
ers in the initiative locally.
 – It is a collaborative effort; preferably there is a mix between public and 
private sector investors.
 – The young professionals consider their experience in the project useful and 
indicate they have learnt new ways of collaborating across the fence line.
The objective is to generate sustainable and scalable business models. This 
is done by developing a funnel of ideas through a stage-gated type of funnel. 
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After the small but inspiring project in Rotterdam, young professionals 
started similar initiatives in other locations.
In South Africa, concrete project ideas were developed for designing 
more resilient housing, creating a movie to raise awareness around energy, 
water and food stress and a creating a market where farmers can not only 
exchange products but also knowledge on sustainable farming practices.
One of the projects is being executed. It focuses on collaborative busi-
ness models for restoration of degraded land. Around 20% of the world’s 
ecosystems are threatened and this situation is worsening with an alarming 
speed. Healthy ecosystems are critical to increase the resilience of local 
communities, and ecosystem services like agriculture, carbon capture 
and water are highly valuable for businesses as well as government. The 
good news is that this degradation can be reversed by actively restoring 
landscapes.
This pilot aims to make the match between the local business community 
(including the young professionals from the RAI companies) and an existing 
initiative on ecosystem restoration in South Africa. The purpose of the 
project is to actively create an innovative sustainable business case for 
ecosystem restoration and sustainable agriculture in the area, in partner-
ship with the academic, NGO and business communities, and to explore 
the potential for collaboration in other areas.
Key to the approach is to start creating action on the ground and learn 
from what has already been done locally. If successful, the approach can 
be scaled and rolled out to many other areas in which the participating 
companies have critical business interests.
In Groningen in the Netherlands, young professionals from Shell are 
working with a team made up of all kinds of backgrounds and industries. 
The project focuses on consumer energy eff iciency for disadvantaged com-
munities, energy-eff icient lighting and reducing food waste. Existing food 
box initiatives, supplying organic food on a weekly basis to customers, will 
be linked to available food waste in the city. The project team has identi-
f ied new customers segments for these boxes in socially disadvantaged 
communities, but also via employees of the corporates. The leaders of the 
initiative state: “We set up this initiative after an inspiring story from our 
colleagues in Rotterdam, on stage during the Shell Ecomarathon. The idea 
that they had been able to achieve tangible results within one year to actu-
ally increase the resilience of Rotterdam in a collaborative effort inspired 
us to set up a similar initiative here. The experience has contributed to our 
leadership skills in the following ways:
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 – Contact with a very diverse group of stakeholders from the city where 
we live and work.
 – Having a broad perspective for tackling complex issues and creating 
connections between existing initiatives.
 – Generating enthusiasm and supporting a group of young professionals 
with a wide variety of backgrounds and interests.”
The ultimate goal of this programme will be to build a movement of change-
makers. The ambition is to scale up to 50 successful projects in 2016. In one 
location, several projects can run in parallel. To strengthen the collaborative 
character of the initiative, young professionals from other multinationals 
are invited to become project managers as well.
Main lessons
What went well
Young professionals in corporations respond with great energy to being 
given the opportunity to create and execute innovative ideas. Selecting 
people on enthusiasm, and empowering them to get on with the job, 
accelerates the process and deepens motivation. Basic project manage-
ment competence always matters, including being clear about timelines, 
responsibility and deliverables. External stakeholders, in this case from the 
city administration, were involved from the very beginning and the team 
worked with others with diverse perspectives, such as impact investors.
Barriers to overcome
Inevitably there was a large attrition rate amongst projects, with about one 
in f ive projects making it from kickoff to realisation. This was due to a wide 
range of causes, including lack of support from the line managers, poorly 
articulated goals, inability to attract funding or simply not enough time and 
energy. The most promising initiatives were chaired by the project leaders 
themselves, with a strong commitment to achieving impact.
A few recommendations
Addressing differences in company culture and way of working upfront 
during one of the first meetings helps. Seed funding is always a challenge 
for entrepreneurs, but in this case arranging some funding upfront from 
existing budgets within the corporates helps. These funds can be used as 
matching funds to accelerate piloting of potentially successful ideas. Only 
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€5,000 to €10,000 was typically needed for this to be effective. Support is 
essential, since typically young professionals have little experience with 
local entrepreneurship and need some support to find their way in a city. An 
experienced facilitator and social entrepreneur can help the teams to remain 
focused and push for implementation. Finally support from line managers 
and senior management is critical to give employees the feeling that they 
are rewarded for their efforts. Innovation, so also bottom-up innovation, 
comes with failure. It is critical to acknowledge this and to actively applaud 
risk-taking by the employees.
I don’t see myself working for any organisation and climbing the corporate ca-
reer ladder. I just want to develop my own talents as much as possible, and do the 
best I can to make the world a better place. I will organise my own work – I trust 
that will work.
– Member of the Global Shapers community of the World Economic Forum, 
Amsterdam
Barriers for breakthrough bottom-up innovation
For bottom-up initiatives to be successful and have impact, traditional 
business scaling is not the way to go, it is replication. It is about copying 
small successes, rather than scaling them. There’s a subtle difference in that. 
Rather than having one big multinational company building edible walls, 
the goal is to create several hubs connected in a networked organisation or 
cooperation, which deliver edible walls worldwide – in their own way and 
matching local needs. However, if replicability is a key criterion, it means 
impact is determined by the replication speed, or in network terms the 
contagion rate.
To increase the contagion rate, an innovation should be sustainable, size-
able and self-organised.6 Sustainable means it might need some funding to get 
started, but once they passed pilot stage the services or products can sustain 
themselves without continuous public hand-outs or having to go to cap-in-
hand foundations and donors,7 including the corporates. The fund-seeking 
activities take time and they limit flexibility. Sizeable means the innovations 
“are designed from scratch to scale”. So they apply at a very local level and an 
individual school like the edible walls, but they can reach millions of custom-
6 Jankel (2011)
7 Ibidem
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ers living in large cities with vertical surfaces worldwide. The last criterion is 
that the innovation needs to be self-organised. This means it “leverages the 
capacity of grassroots, decentralised, localised and in-culture individuals 
and communities to co-create and co-deliver the services themselves”.8 For 
the edible walls, this would mean a toolkit developing through which every 
single individual can build an edible wall using local products themselves.
Business value
Bottom-up innovation provides the opportunity for corporates to engage 
in new ways of collaborating. It provides an opportunity to broaden the 
funnel of future investment opportunities. It can be a low-key step-up 
towards building trust-based relationships with key stakeholders in country. 
It provides an opportunity to develop the most talented young professionals 
and let them experience f irst-hand new ways of working together with dif-
ferent players in society. All of this will lead to increased resilience locally.
It is impossible to solve all nexus issues at once, but if we start building a 
chain of local actions, we can trigger a movement of change. A small-scale 
approach will allow rapid scaling, to get the action where the opportunities 
and ‘demand’ are. Collaboration is about trust, and trust is about relation-
ships between people, at an individual level. In the projects, strong focus 
is put on building local trust by co-designing projects with local players at 
a small scale and by generating small success quickly. A joint success will 
increase the level of trust between the participants. The project is designed 
from scratch by the participants to ensure ownership and responsibility for 
the end result and increase local impact. Senior stakeholders are asked to set 
the project boundaries, but not determine the shape and form of the project 
itself. The projects like the edible walls are small and in an experimental 
stage, but if successful, they can be rolled out rapidly all over the world, 
using the global outreach of the corporates involved.
It is in the enlightened self-interest of the corporate world to enable young 
talent to generate actions connecting with local communities everywhere, 
to build local trust and increase resilience of local systems – and corporate 
structures as well.




9 Corporations and Resilience
Simone Arizzi,1 Maximilian Egger,2 Dawn Rittenhouse3 and 
Peter Williams4
The Resilience Action Initiative
The Resilience Action Initiative (RAI) described in this book is not only 
unique for the resilience approach it took to address pervasive stresses 
at the water-energy-food nexus, but also for the broad and diverse set of 
competencies, capabilities and cultures the different participating compa-
nies brought to bear on the issue. In this chapter we take a look at the RAI 
experience over the past two years as a global collaborative effort among 
private sector partners, attempting to derive some broader lessons from 
the experience. We hope that what we learned in this period – among 
private sector companies only – might also extend to the public-private 
partnerships that will ultimately be required to solve resilience challenges 
at the energy, food and water nexus.
When the initiative started in 2012, resilience was a relatively novel 
concept for large private sector companies. The genuine interest in join-
ing forces and developing a set of new tools and collaborative business 
models that could contribute to the systemic resilience of cities, regions and 
countries rapidly evolved into a discussion on the best approach. Should 
we develop a set of general recommendations and best practices based on 
the individual or collective experience of some of the member companies 
having faced similar challenges? Or should we be focusing on a set of real 
situations where the power of the collaborative approach could be applied 
and validated in its capability to improve the resilience of that specif ic 
system? This later approach was chosen, def ining from the very beginning 
a key characteristic of the initiative which is to learn by doing, demonstrat-
ing the impact of the collaborative approach on specif ic pilot projects. 
As described in Chapter 1, a pilot project is focused on a city, industrial 
setting or other geographic location where the companies might test a 
resilience approach, collaborating with local authorities and stakeholders, 
1 Technology & Innovation Director, EMEA, at DuPont
2 Senior Consultant, Energy Sector, Siemens
3 Director Sustainability for the DuPont Company
4 Chief Technology Officer, Big Green Innovations, at IBM, and an IBM Distinguished Engineer
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to minimise system stresses at the water-energy-food nexus. This approach 
has several advantages:
 – It is focused. The geographic location is clearly defined, simplifying both 
the identif ication of the challenges and the quantif ication of the impact 
of the collaborative approach.
 – It is inclusive. Participation in a pilot project is voluntary, driven by the 
willingness to contribute competencies and technologies toward the 
solution of those specif ic resilience issues in which each member has 
the most experience.
 – It can be used again. All pilot projects target real-world situations where 
the lessons from each project can be applied to similar settings in other 
parts of the world, making future iterations simpler and faster in their 
implementation.
In the period 2012-2013 about a dozen pilot projects were proposed and 
assessed within the RAI framework across all regions. Below we distill what 
worked well and what could have been done better:
Lesson 1. Collaborative behaviour and a diversity of skills are essential
RAI was designed to include companies from across many sectors, in order 
to have a diversity of skills and competences to apply.
One specif ic example comes from the collaborative efforts in Da Nang in 
Vietnam where, in a precursor project to RAI, IBM and Shell representatives 
worked together to address water management and transportation issues 
for the city government. The combination of Shell’s civil, mechanical and 
production engineering skills (and habits of mind) with IBM’s information 
systems engineering skills and thought processes proved constructive.
Lesson 2. Combine thinking and doing
The primary focus of RAI was on action in the form of projects on the 
ground. However, it was clear from the start that developing a shared and 
tested methodology would be essential to looking through a resilience lens, 
contributing to creating a shared language and ultimately making clear 
choices. With the engagement of all RAI members, signif icant effort was 
put in providing practical guidance to each pilot using prior experiences. 
In turn the progress of each pilot also offered opportunities drawn from 
real situations to further refine the originally established methodology. The 
time it takes to develop a new shared frame should not be underestimated, 
and although there is much literature on resilience, transposing it so that 
it is helpful in a corporate context takes substantial effort and investment.
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Lesson 3. Business cannot do this alone
RAI was originally created as a private sector initiative in order to share 
and build a corporate perspective. However it became progressively clearer 
during the implementation phase of the individual pilots that resilience 
has to be tackled in a partnership between public and private sectors – 
neither side can ‘go it alone’ as neither has all the resources, connections 
and insights needed. As the maker of policy, the public sector has a broad 
role and impact. For example its policies inf luence land use practice, 
def ine public infrastructure, and its convening power is often needed to 
engage and align stakeholders. The private sector can contribute its skills, 
project management capacity, a different way of framing the issues, and 
sophisticated supply chains. The importance of cross sector collaboration 
has of course been emphasised elsewhere. For a more resilient outcome to 
come about, it is a necessary but not suff icient condition.
Collaboration is an imperative, but it alone does not guarantee a resil-
ience approach. Not only must there be collaboration between sectors, 
there must also be a joint application of the resilience lens to come up with 
the kind of innovative and adaptive solutions that will meet the challenge.
This was also in evidence on Singapore’s Jurong Island where several RAI 
partners joined forces to investigate how the energy eff iciency of such an 
industrial cluster might be improved. In particular, the sharing of steam 
among tenants may hold the potential to contribute to the resilience of 
Singapore by further reducing dependence on imported fuels and underpin-
ning the competitiveness of the cluster. While doing the assessment was a 
big effort, realising the benefit could not occur without deep engagement of 
the authorities, to look at adapting the rules and regulations for this to occur.
Lesson 4. Resilience is relevant to many corporate functions, but does not 
yet have a natural “home”
RAI was initiated by the CEOs of the companies, but f inding an organi-
sational home for operationalising the initiative was not obvious. Some 
companies delegated it to sustainability off icers, others to strategy, tech-
nology, regulatory, corporate strategy or communication staff. Resilience 
being a relatively new concept for most private companies it is certainly not 
surprising that its home, if it even exists, is assigned across many corporate 
functions.
Mirroring the debates on the organisational home of sustainability a 
decade ago, there is no obvious right answer. The Rockefeller Foundation’s 
100 Resilient Cities initiative resolves this issue for cities by providing 
funding for dedicated chief resilience off icers in the participating cities. 
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These can then act as catalysts for resilience thinking, which hopefully 
over time becomes integrated into the organisation. For the RAI companies, 
def ining the organisational anchors for resilience is very much work in 
progress, and will require different solutions depending on the respective 
organisational structure and culture. Whichever organisational home is 
found for resilience, there is also a risk that without collaboration across 
the organisation such an approach may also confine resilience to its own 
organisational ‘ghetto’ with no real influence over day-to-day activities.
Lesson 5. Traditional business metrics do not capture resilience
Businesses like metrics. They help focus and measure progress. However as 
we’ve seen in previous chapters, resilience is not easily captured in simple 
metrics, particularly as the desirable level of resilience should vary with 
time and context. In some cases a purposeful decrease in resilience may be 
necessary, such as when change is needed and rigid structures should be 
dismantled to allow for renewal. Advisors to RAI guarded against an early 
and hurried adoption of metrics, as potentially being counter productive. 
Still, the lack of clear resilience metrics is a problem for businesses, who need 
metrics to focus management and effort. The challenge in establishing clear 
resilience metrics then translate in a diff iculty for businesses in engaging 
on the topic at the operational level.
The tools described in Chapters 2 and 3 will lead to identifying solutions 
and actions to address the resilience of the particular system under consid-
eration. Once a project is defined, one may revert to more traditional metrics 
to drive to results. Too narrow a focus on those results holds the danger 
that the project misses its target, as interactions and external factors may 
well require adjustment. For example, Chapter 6 describes the challenge of 
realising and scaling ‘green’ infrastructure projects, as these require more 
adaptation to an evolving context than the ‘grey’ infrastructure projects 
they aim to replace.
Businesses need to be aware that traditional metrics do not capture 
resilience, and that a set of appropriate metrics for it will evolve naturally 
over time, based on a more sophisticated appreciation of risk and mitigation. 
However by applying the appropriate resilience tools, the required practical 
project priorities can still be set.
Lesson 6. Companies struggle to take the required long-term perspective
Private companies are constantly under pressure to deliver short-term 
performance, while keeping an eye on the long term. Both direct risks to 
themselves, and the broader risks of losing alignment with the concerns 
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of society should worry them. The resilience lens helps to shine a light on 
both these threats. With some notable exceptions, the private sector has 
a tendency to ignore risks that it f inds too uncomfortable, at least until 
some event forces an even more uncomfortable confrontation with reality. 
That is however starting to change. The SEC now requires publicly listed 
companies to report material environmental risks; the 2010 f looding in 
Thailand seems to have had a salutary impact in showing what can happen, 
especially to JIT supply chains that have been denuded of buffer stocks in 
the interests of eff iciency; and the compilations of data from the insurance 
industry, EM-DAT and others, showing the trend in natural disasters are 
also having an impact. RAI itself is an example of companies engaging with 
the longer-term issues of society and how they can add value by providing 
new types of solutions.
Lesson 7. Financing resilience requires new business models
The benefits and costs of resilience actions accrue in different patterns over 
time – and to different stakeholders. This makes f inancing more resilient 
solutions diff icult. It is perhaps a truism that governments’ propensity to 
invest seems to be directly related to how recent and how severe the last 
extreme event was. To a certain extent this is true of companies as well. 
When looking to increase the resilience of socio-economic systems, all 
these challenges are compounded: It requires a longer-term perspective, it 
requires a way of considering risk distributions that do not follow normal 
patterns as described in Chapter 3 and it requires a way to transfer value 
over time. These challenges have no simple solutions, but acknowledging 
them and making them an element of collaboration for resilience is helpful.
Companies themselves can act by expanding their risk management 
frames, as some are already doing with the advent of supply chain problems. 
The Center for Resilience at Ohio State University is one example where 
tools are being developed to help companies execute this better.5
It became clear in several pilot projects that addressing resilience will 
require new business models and in particular new f inancing approaches 
that help address these shifting benefits and costs.
Lesson 8. Resilience requires a systemic perspective – and that is not easy 
for the modern business organisation
During RAI implementation work it was apparent that people from various 
walks of life – once introduced to the resilience topic – would readily see 
5 Fiksel (2010)
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the negative consequences of its absence and would spot different effects 
depending on their background or aspects important to their situation. On 
the other hand it is much harder to act for the prevention of the negative 
impacts of unforeseen, unusual or unscheduled events.
Much of the diff iculty stems from the fact that resilience requires taking 
a systemic perspective. Companies are often successful because they have 
perfected the art of adequately resolving a specif ic and diff icult problem 
in a consistent and predictable fashion, treating it in relative isolation. Yet 
taking into account all the factors that can influence the problem, and 
collaboratively delivering solutions that are also adaptable over time, is 
a very big change, both in capability and also in mindset. Resilience will 
require a stronger capacity to recognise the impact of the broader systems 
perspective.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have described some lessons that we offer to future 
actors and stakeholders who will work in the implementation of resilience 
approaches to mitigate various stresses. By and large these were the result 
of hands-on experimentation carried out by motivated individuals from 
about a dozen multinational companies over two years, in the form of 
pilot projects.
For companies themselves, resilience must be a matter for shareholders, 
supervisory boards and top management. It is the chairmen and chair-
women, the CEOs and the CFOs together with shareholder representatives 
who must all take a resilience lens, to look into the future of the companies 
they are responsible for. As we’ve seen, this requires familiarity with the 
new lens of resilience, the adoption of new tools and an expansion of risk 
management frameworks. Doing so will not only be helpful to the compa-
nies, but will also be the platform for being able to engage with customers 
and stakeholders to address societal resilience issues. Companies that adopt 
a resilience lens internally, will not only be doing their f iduciary duty of 
safeguarding the companies’ interests, but they will also be more attuned 
to emerging societal and customer needs and opportunities.
Our world has become complex, multi-faceted, globalised, fast as well 
as interdependent. Manufacturing and trade, education and prosperity, 
f inance and administration, politics and business, urbanisation and en-
vironment, welfare and demographic change, and another endless list of 
aspects bind us together or make us struggle with each other across the 
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globe like never before in history. It is clear that increasingly we face similar 
problems. It is also obvious that one can’t solve these challenges alone. 
This complexity needs an equally sophisticated approach to solutions – a 
common approach.
Therefore – and again, we refer to the extreme events of recent years – 
and to the experiences during our RAI implementation work – to strongly 
advocate more collaboration and joint action of private and public stake-
holders. Company owners and managers and state and local government 
off icials need to form a new joint vision and implement coordinated 
resilience strategies to safeguard welfare and prosperity in the face of the 
energy-water-food nexus.
What our experience has shown is that implementing resilience also 
requires openness to novel formats of collaboration for solutions to be 
successful. In the future we may well f irst see working platforms that evolve 
on bilateral or local level. National awareness, regulation and facilitation 
could come from heads of state and business leaders, ministerial off ices 
and business associations. In its magnitude and quality what we advocate 
may well represent a new era of broader collective action between private 
and public stakeholders, and make a signif icant contribution to prosperity 




The Resilience Action Initiative is an example from the corporate world of 
developing an adaptive approach to a diff icult complex systems problem. 
It does not adopt a f ixed policy approach; it assumes that learning by doing 
is necessary and that policies and management must change. It is therefore 
very much in line with resilience thinking and – for those involved in 
developing resilience ideas and theory – it is a very welcome initiative. 
What kinds of things does a ‘resilience approach’ call for? The best way to 
answer this is with an example, and so I’ll start by using one with which I’m 
familiar. But f irst let me be clear about how resilience is def ined and used 
by scientists, because it differs somewhat from those used by practition-
ers earlier in this book. The formal def inition is “the capacity to absorb 
disturbance and reorganise so as to retain essentially the same function, 
structure and feedbacks – to have the same identity”. More informally, a 
usable definition is “the ability to cope with shocks and to keep functioning 
in much the same kind of way”.
The example I’ll use to illustrate a resilience approach is how best to use 
the resources in the Murray-Darling Basin (MDB), Australia’s most impor-
tant agricultural region. With 60,000 farms, 15,000 of them using irrigation, 
lots of towns and villages and three big rivers flowing through four states, 
the MDB is a self-organising, social-ecological system that functions at 
multiple scales, with strong connections and feedback effects across scales.
In its early development, before a proper assessment of the river flows had 
been made, water rights were over-allocated, and now in drier years there 
simply isn’t enough water to allocate farmers’ full rights; and if those water 
off-take levels were to continue the rivers and their f loodplains would die.
This led the states and the federal government to form the Murray 
Darling Basin Commission, to manage the water and determine how 
much ‘environmental water’ should be taken back. It produced a ‘plan’ 
that unfortunately dealt separately with environmental and socio-economic 
issues. The commission was then replaced by a new MDB Authority (MDBA), 
which has produced a revised Basin Plan, now accepted by the states and 
the federal government, addressing how best to achieve necessary levels 
of diversion of water from irrigation back to the environment. It considers 
1 Chairman, The Resilience Alliance
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the environmental, social and economic interactions arising from proposed 
changes in water allocations, in a resilience context. The approach it is 
adopting is a work-in-progress, but involves the following:
It begins with developing an agreed, explicit description - a ‘conceptual 
model’ - of the ‘system’. This is not trivial, because different players and 
stakeholders have very different understandings of what is really important, 
what is ‘in’ and ‘out’ of the system, how it works, and what is really important.
Developing such an explicit mental model emphasises things that are 
often ignored or not appreciated, like who are the key players/stakeholders? 
What are the critical scales at which the system functions? What time scales 
are important to everyone? What do people value – the resilience of what? 
Working through this develops an awareness of issues such as:
 – You cannot understand or manage the system at one scale; a common 
mistake. Like all complex systems, the MDB is a multi-scale, linked 
social-ecological system and the connections across scales are mostly 
what cause both social and ecological problems. Everyone needs to 
appreciate this.
 – Resilience, per se, is neither ‘good’ nor ‘bad’. Undesirable states of systems 
can be very resilient (dictatorships, saline landscapes). Sometimes it’s 
necessary to reduce resilience, in order to effect a positive change.
 – Making a system very resilient in one way can cause it to lose resilience 
in other ways, at other scales; there is often a trade-off in managing for 
resilience.
 – The ‘rule of hand’: At any one scale there are no more than three to f ive 
critical controlling variables – the things that really matter.
As the evolving description of the system proceeds (there will never be a 
f inal, complete version), three components of resilience are considered. 
They are presented briefly below, but a fuller account is given in Walker 
and Salt (2012):
1. The existence of thresholds (discontinuities) in the behaviour of a system.
2. The capacity to deal with disturbances and to manage and change, 
or to avoid, thresholds. This is known as adaptive capacity, or general 
resilience.
3. Transformation capacity – the capacity to transform parts of the system 
into a different kind of system when continuation of the existing one is 
no longer possible.
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I’ll briefly consider each in turn:
1. Thresholds. Two solutions to the over-allocation of water problem are 
being pursued – buying back water, and becoming more eff icient in using 
it, including reducing losses in canals, and so forth. Putting a resilience 
lens over this introduces a focus on thresholds. Are there any known or 
likely discontinuities in regard to levels/supplies of water that would have 
signif icant consequences, either ecologically or socio-economically?
For example, if a river needs a minimum of X giga-litres of f low for it to 
retain its biodiversity and avoid becoming eutrophic, there’s little point in 
buying back water that achieves less than X. That is so obvious that people 
are already working on it. But there are many other kinds of thresholds 
that are not so obvious.
Some water for irrigation, and increasingly for mining, is pumped from 
aquifers and in some aquifers, if the amount of water drops below a critical 
level it results in a resorting of the aquifer bed such that its capacity to hold 
water is permanently reduced (so don’t exceed that threshold).
And there are threshold effects in the industry part of the system. In one 
of the irrigation regions there used to be three dairy processing plants. As 
the number of dairy farms declined, milk supply dropped below a threshold 
for business viability and one of the plants has closed down. Threshold 
effects also occur in the socio-economic system, such in the debt : income 
ratio, and in levels of labour supply, so thresholds need to be considered in 
all aspects of the dynamics of complex systems.
A resilience approach, therefore, asks the question: “What and where are 
possible thresholds?” and “What feedback processes are involved?”
How to go about answering this is a large topic, but in essence it in-
volves a focus on the controlling feedback processes that determine the 
self-organising dynamics. Negative feedbacks have a dampening effect 
and positive feedbacks amplify any changes. Studies of resilience repeat-
edly show that thresholds occur where there is a signif icant change in an 
important feedback. It can be a change from being small to big, or negative 
to positive, as critical parts of the system change. In the MDB the feedback 
changes that have caused most problems have been those between the 
biophysical and the socio-economic parts of the system; a change in the 
agro-ecological part of the system leads to a change in the behaviour of 
people, often elsewhere in the system, and their changed actions then feed 
back to further changes in the agro-ecological part, and so forth.
In working with catchment managers I have found that a useful way of 
getting engaged has been through developing what are called ‘state-and-
134 Brian Walker 
transition’ (S&T) models; conceptual models that describe the possible 
states the system can be in (fertile soil vs salinised; floodplains with healthy 
regenerating redgums vs without redgums), etc. It starts by asking “What 
state is the system in now?” and then, “What other possible states could 
it be in?” Then, for each possible transition between pairs of states, ask 
the question “Are there any likely thresholds? If so, what is causing them 
– what feedbacks are involved?” These simple conceptual S&T models can 
be developed further into quantitative, analytical models for thresholds 
that are clearly important.
2. Adaptive capacity (managing and avoiding thresholds). Attributes 
that contribute to resilience, in general, that have thus far emerged from 
resilience analyses in various parts of the world include:
 – High functional diversity – units/groups/species that perform different, 
complementary functions that together keep the whole system function-
ing well.
 – High response diversity – different units/species that perform the same 
function but in different ways, or at different scales. This warns against 
blind pursuit of increasing eff iciency by removing what are perceived 
as redundancies.
 – Being modular in structure – avoiding the dangers of over-connectedness 
(rapid transmission of diseases, malfunctions), and of lack of connections.
 – Having tight feedbacks – being able to detect and respond quickly to 
changes as their effects feed back to other parts of the system.
 – Being ‘open’ – allowing and enabling movement (i.e. emigration and 
immigration).
 – Having reserves – biophysical (like seed banks in ecosystems), f inancial 
and social (like memory).
 – Fostering innovation, novelty and continuous learning.
 – High social capital – especially trust, leadership, social networks.
 – Equality/equity – high inequity is associated with a range of negative, 
costly social features (prison rates, obesity, teenage births, etc.) that 
together lower response capacity and resilience.2
 – Adaptive governance – especially overlapping institutions and polycen-
tric governance, and flexible distributive governance.
I conclude this emerging list of attributes with a comment on an important 
misconception about resilience: It is not about not changing. Trying to 
2 Wilkinson and Pickett (2010)
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prevent disturbance and keep a system constant reduces its resilience. A 
forest in which f ire is always prevented eventually loses the species capable 
of withstanding f ire; the only way for a forest to remain resilient to f ire is 
for it to be burned every now and then. Probing the boundaries of resilience 
is necessary for maintaining and building resilience.
To help in thinking through these resilience attributes, and which of 
them might be important, it is useful to do it in parallel with the attempts 
to develop the set of possible threshold effects.
3. Transformation. Transformation and resilience are not opposites; they 
work together across scales. For the MDB to continue into the future as an 
agricultural system delivering high levels of human wellbeing, not all the 
parts of it can continue doing what they are doing now. Some parts of the 
Basin will have to transform. Some farms will have to change from being 
irrigation farms to some other kind of enterprise.
Transformability, the capacity to transform, involves three steps: First, 
getting beyond the state of denial (people hate fundamental change, and 
they resist it – sometimes until it is too late for other options). Second, iden-
tifying and creating new options, new trajectories for the system. This puts 
a focus on experiments and novelty, trying new things knowing that many 
will fail, and it emphasises the need for the next step. Third, developing 
the capacity to change, which depends on the levels of all the f ive capitals 
(natural, human, social, built and f inancial) and, especially, on governance 
and support from higher levels (like government). My experience with 
regional groups attempting to undergo real change suggests that under 
the diff icult conditions when transformation is called for, government 
assistance is very often in the form of help not to change, rather than help 
to change. Transformation failure seems mostly due to inappropriate or 
poor governance.
Conclusion
I conclude with an evolving set of lessons about how to build resilience, 
and an observation.
The lessons
 – Don’t try to aim for some ‘optimal’ state; learn to ride the system piggy-
back (‘guided self-organisation’, adaptive management and governance)
 – Learn about thresholds, to avoid unwanted states
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 – Restrict control of environmental/ecological variability
 – Identify the main scales at which the system functions
 – Think about feedbacks and secondary effects, especially cross-scale and 
cross-domain (beware of partial solutions!)
 – Maintain general resilience and embrace change
 – Promote and sustain diversity, of all kinds (don’t confuse ‘redundancy’ 
and ‘response diversity’)
 – Encourage learning, innovation and experiments
 – Be ready for and capable of transformational change
An observation
In confronting the question “How might the corporate world engage with 
resilience?”, most businesses will ask: what’s in it for us? And the problem 
is that when adopting a resilience approach acts against the immediate 
interests of the business, denial sets in; as summed up nicely in the well-
known quote: It is very hard to get someone to understand something when 
his salary depends on him not understanding it.
A single company focused on its own success is unlikely to contribute 
signif icantly to the resilience of the whole system in which it functions; the 
business world is too competitive. And hence the value of the RAI, as the 
harbinger of a shift in the philosophy of corporate development. If major 
business groups in the world, covering the spectrum of their resource activi-
ties (as both sources and sinks), could assess and then act to enhance the 
resilience of their collective environment and hence the resilience of their 
own collective system, they would greatly contribute to sustainability – not 
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 Dow: phytoremediation for 
groundwater decontamination
Source/organisation: The Dow 
Chemical Company
Scale: Large – Dow Sarnia installation is 
roughly 2 acres with 1,300 trees within 
the fence line of the chemical complex 
site which is no longer in operation
Key stakeholder(s): Dow/regulatory 
body
Project phase: Fully implemented for 
2 years
Geographical location: Sarnia, On­
tario, Canada
Sarnia Site, the Dow Chemical Company
Project overview
Phytoremediation is the engineered use of green plants to remove, contain, 
stabilise or destroy contaminants in the soil and groundwater. The uptake of 
groundwater by the plants can achieve containment of the groundwater and 
contamination (tree is basically acting as a solar pump). Engineered planted 
systems can degrade, extract and control the groundwater contamina-
tion. Dow has several f ield pilot demonstration projects in place and fully 
operational projects using phytoremediation to draw experience from.
One specific installation was completed at the Dow Sarnia facility. This 
large industrial complex contained several manufacturing units that operated 
for more than 60 years. The effort in ceasing operations included transitioning 
the existing traditional pump and treat groundwater treatment system. The 
traditional system consisted of pumping groundwater via carbon beds prior to 
transferring the recovered groundwater to an external water treatment facility.
The goal of phytoremediation was to replace this existing groundwater 
recovery and treatment system with a cost-effective, passive remediation 
system that fully complied with environmental requirements while mini-
mising the long-term cost of managing the site.
While still operating the pump and treat facility, the site was prepared 
by minimising external inf iltration and planting 1,300 trees (poplar and 
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willows) on an area of roughly 2 acres to handle the uptake of the ground-
water. As the trees grow along with site hydrology adaptation, some of the 
water still needs to be pumped and treated during this transition period. 
This technology does require ongoing site maintenance such as sampling 
and analysis of ground water, hydrology testing to ensure ground water is 
contained, and tree management over the life of the project.
Technology maturity
Mature; a minimum of four growing seasons is necessary to prove the 
capability of the system. Ongoing pilot studies since 2005; Dow has over 15 
sites in operation as pilots or full-scale systems.
Investment/Costs/Time
 – Although the initial project cost and short-term maintenance costs for 
phytoremediation are significant, the NPV of the project is positive about 
the long-term timeline associated with this type of project.
Project management considerations
 – Use of this technology depends on site characteristics, source and extent 
of contamination.
 – Best to have pilot study since this technology is highly dependent on 
site-specif ic conditions and still considered a novel approach.
 – Minimisation of long-term cost while meeting Dow and government 
regulations.
 – Champion played an instrumental role in making this project a reality.
 – Project-selection criteria: capital expenditures/ease of implementation/
ease of operation/carbon footprint.
 – Maximise chance of success by partnering with a consultant holding 
key expertise.
 – Technology requires signif icant time to be fully operational; can be 
considered for non-time critical remediation projects.
 – If a regulatory body is involved, need a strong and mutually respectful 
relationship with regulators to implement green infrastructure.
 – A different technical skill set is needed to be successful with green 
infrastructure projects.
 – Long-term project requiring multi-generational oversight.
Benefits
 – No wastewater needing to be transported off site in trucks.
 – No electricity required.
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 – Elimination of the carbon f iltration system and expense related to its 
operation and disposal of spent carbon.
 – No need for 24/7 hour operation (from an operation to a management 
activity).
 – Significant reduction in maintenance costs compared to pump and treat.
Risks/challenges
 – Higher level of uncertainty at the onset of the project since dealing with 
a biological system, local geology, contaminants, site hydrology.
 – Larger physical footprint than the gray alternative.
 – Requires a period of growth to come to full operation.
 – Try to limit interaction with biota since concerns with creating a wildlife 
habitat within a remediation site.
 – Different set of challenges to deal with requiring different set of skills 
such as dealing with main disturbance (e.g. rabbits eating tree bark).
 – Ensure that tight feedback and monitoring system in place to alleviate 
any environmental concern (e.g. leaves/pollen off the trees).
Resilience Aspects
 – Resilience is dependent on specif ic application, perspective and bounda-
ries of project (How far upstream and downstream in process do you 
include? ‘Green’ and ‘gray’ both resist shocks, but in different ways. Gray 
infrastructure can be more resilient in the face of an acute stress if that 
stress can specif ically destroy the trees; it can be rebuilt and operational 
in a shorter time frame. Green may be more robust in response to certain 
stresses such as power loss and mechanical failure.)
 – Phytoremediation is multifunctional: can meet the needs of a traditional 
pump and treat system
 – Criticality – if a quick solution has to be found – gray is the obvious 
choice. Green infrastructure (phytoremediation) is a longer-term option 
because trees take time to grow.
 – Innovation – working with variety of key research bodies to increase the 
number of tree species being used and tested for phytoremediation po-
tential; recognising a higher resilience in having variety of plant species.
 – Modular: easy to increase capacity but still needs time to grow.
 – Higher level of remediation likely over the long haul since root systems 
can reach everywhere – not limited to system design as in the traditional 
gray system.




 – The gray solution appears easier to control and manage but the long-
term economic and environmental benefits of the green solution makes 
phytoremediation a technology that needs to be added to the portfolio 
of solutions when dealing with groundwater contamination.
 Dow: constructed wetland for waste 
water treatment
Source/organisation: union Carbide 
Corporation, subsidiary of the Dow 
Chemical Company
Scale: Large – 110 acres within the 
fence line of union Carbide Corpora­
tion’s Seadrift Operations
Key stakeholder(s): union Carbide 
Corporation; The Dow Chemical Com­
pany; regulatory body: Texas Commis­
sion on environmental Quality (TCeQ); 
Dow ‘near neighbours’ Community
Project phase: Fully operational (in 
operation for 15 years)
Geographical location: north Sea­
drift, Texas, uSA
Project overview
Seadrift is a large industrial complex containing several manufacturing units 
involved in the production of plastic resins and other organic chemicals. Waste 
water from the facility and storm water captured in containment areas are 
routed through the wastewater treatment system. The original water treatment 
system consisted of primary/secondary (anaerobic/aerobic biological) treat-
ment ponds and a shallow tertiary pond which is approximately 267 acres with 
water depth ranging from 1 to 4 feet. The tertiary pond is basically operated 
as a solar stabilisation pond (no active mixing). Lower organic loads and long 
detention time within the aerobic section and tertiary pond resulted in ideal 
conditions for phytoplankton (floating algae bloom). This resulted in exceed-
ance of the plant’s discharge permit criteria (40 mg/l) for total suspended 
solids (TSS) and required extensive pH adjustments. This project was driven by 
the necessity to meet EPA Effluent Guidelines for OCPSF (organic chemicals, 
plastics and synthetic fibres; 40 CFR 414) facilities with regards to TSS.
Several alternative treatment options were investigated. A pilot-scale 
constructed wetland project was successfully completed onsite (roughly one 
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year of data prior to launching the full-scale project). The conversion of part 
of the tertiary pond into a constructed wetland was implemented in roughly 
18 months and has been in full operation since then, meeting all discharge 
requirements for TSS, eliminating the algal bloom issues and additionally 




 – 1-2 year pilot study; small constructed wetland in operation in a sister 
plant in Mexico City.
 – Fully operational 18 months after the contract was awarded.
 – Initial capital investment $1.2 to $1.4 million with maintenance/opera-
tion costs dramatically reduced.
Project management considerations
 – Driver: reduce operational and maintenance cost while ensuring long-
term compliance with EPA effluent guidelines (OCPSF).
 – Upper management champion played an instrumental role in making 
this project a reality; data speaks for itself, therefore pilot study a good 
approach (“selling a swamp is not an easy task”).
 – Project selection criteria: capital expenditures/time to install/ease of 
implementation/ease of operation.
Benefits
 – 100% compliant from day zero for over 15 years while eliminating the 
need to adjust pH.
 – Low initial and operational capital required ($1.2 to 1.4 million as opposed 
to $40 million for gray alternative).
 – Low energy and resource requirements with the corresponding envi-
ronmental benefits – minimal equipment, no pumps, no additives, no 
oxygen system, no added water, no bio solids to handle or dispose.
 – Operational support drastically different as a wetland requires minimal 
support from operations and maintenance, while the gray alternative 
requires 24/7 support.
 – Construction and implementation time reduced.
 – Co-benef its identif ied but not valued: positive impact on ecosystem 
(provides habitat for wildlife/educational opportunity and other soft 
benefits to Dow personnel and local community).
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Risks/challenges
 – Potential new regulations (such as coliform bacteria).
 – Criteria for application of this technology: compliance with applicable 
regulations, water quality, salinity and large on-site physical footprint 
(this system would require 50 acres as opposed to 4 to 5 acres for gray 
alternative).
 – Biotic stresses (nutria/alligators/bobcats, etc.) are the main disturbances 
that the system has to manage.
 – There is always the potential risk that a threatened or endangered species 
might be found in the wetland. In the case of Seadrift, this is unlikely 
as none of the 46 threatened or endangered species listed by the State 
of Texas in the vicinity of the constructed wetland would be expected 
to occupy this habitat.
Resilience aspects
 – Self-organising process – the wetland does not look like what was built. 
Now a diversif ied biota from plants to micro-organisms increasing the 
built-in stability of the mini-ecosystem to respond to fluctuations. Biodi-
versity is much greater in the constructed wetland than the microbiology 
found in conventional waste water treatment plants.
 – Innovation: looking to recycle the water to attain zero discharge.
 – Building understanding and management practices of ecosystems dynam-
ics (learn to switch from operate to manage mode and to leave it alone).
Key learning
 – A win in all aspects (no waste; no energy; no 24/7 operation; no landfill; 
safer; meets permit 100% of time at a fraction of the cost).
 – Must expand the project boundaries to fully account for all benefits such 
as ecosystem services (life cycle costing).
 – Green infrastructure projects require different technical skills than the 
traditional gray alternative.
 – Since green infrastructure solutions were not widely accepted when 
this was adopted, it required someone with passion to really drive and 
support the project. Upper management buy-in was a must.
 – Need to have data to support a green infrastructure – this may point to 
needing more pilot-scale work in the general area of green infrastructure.
 – The proper assessment of the ‘full value’ of the green infrastructure may 
help in the alternative assessment process and push green infrastructure 
project over gray ones.
 Dow/TNC: air pollution mitigation via 
reforestation
Source/organisation: The Dow 
Chemical Company and The nature 
Conservancy
Scale: Local, regional
Key stakeholder(s): Dow plant man­
agement, environmental protection 
Agency (epA), Texas Commission on 
environmental Quality (TCeQ), conser­
vation community
Project phase: research and evalua­
tion stage
Geographical location: houston­gal­
veston­Brazoria (hgB) area near Dow’s 
Freeport Texas Operations
The Dow Chemical Company
Project overview
This project will produce a methodology for the use of reforestation for air 
quality maintenance or enhancement instead of, or in addition to, reducing 
emissions through end-of-pipe control technology or changes in operations. 
Forests could be part of the solution by modifying the environment and 
removing pollutants from the air.
Dow Texas Operations is located in the US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA)-designated Houston-Galveston-Brazoria (HGB) non-attain-
ment area for ground-level ozone. The HGB region has been in violation 
of National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ozone since the 
establishment of those standards in 1979. The HGB area failed to meet the 
revised 1997 NAAQS for ozone by the 2007 deadline, which has resulted 
in the mandatory imposition of Clean Air Act (CAA) penalty fees ($5,000/
ton) on all large sources in the HGB area that exceed their allowed emission 
limits.
Technology maturity
Early: research and pilot stage.
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Investment/costs/time
 – 2-4 year pilot study.
 – Reforestation and other costs TBD.
Project management considerations
 – Identify suitable planting sites and tree species that also yield conserva-
tion benefits.
 – Estimate removal of ozone and NO2 by the reforestation project to 
estimate total NOx credits the project could claim under the State 
Implementation Plan (SIP).
 – Estimate the cost-effectiveness of the proposed green infrastructure 
solution (reforestation for NOx control) to allow for comparison with 
alternative gray control methods. The analysis estimated NOx abatement 
by a hypothetical planted forest, and found it was cost-competitive with 
the evaluated next round of ‘gray’ technology options that might be 
deployed should further NOx controls be needed.
 – Identify and estimate the value of additional benefits green infrastruc-
ture options offer.
 – Need to get reforestation approved as an ozone precursor control strategy 
in ozone SIP (for the HGB area in this case).
 – Work with appropriate federal and state regulators to increase likelihood of 
acceptance of and then ensure compliance with the proposed methodology.
Benefits
Anticipated:
 – Reduced costs of additional ozone precursor abatement, if additional 
control efforts are deemed necessary to achieve compliance with Na-
tional Ambient Air Quality Standards for ozone.
 – Improved public services such as recreational opportunities for local 
residents and visitors and habitat for rare species.
 – Air quality improvements which could lead to improved human and 
environmental health such as:
•	 Carbon sequestration by the forest helps mitigates greenhouse gas 
emissions contributing to efforts to manage atmospheric concentra-
tions of carbon and possibly creating value from pollution offsets or 
credits.
•	 Reduced ground-level ozone formation (a smog-related pollutant) by 
mediating the urban heat island effect, leading to reduced energy 




 – Reforestation still needs to be approved by agencies as a strategy for air 
quality compliance. This requires that emission reductions be quantif i-
able, additional, enforceable and permanent. This requires verif ication of 
approaches, validation of the complex models involved and a thorough 
risk assessment analysis.
 – Trees naturally emit volatile organic compounds (VOCs), which may 
lead to increased formation of ozone. This can be avoided if reforestation 
projects are sited in areas where ozone formation is NOx-limited.
 – Emissions from tree maintenance activities can also contribute to 
air pollution, so reforestation projects must be planned to minimise 
maintenance needs. This is achieved by designing such projects to be 
self-sustaining early on, using ecologically appropriate species, and 
planting forests rather than street or neighbourhood trees.
 – If ex-post verif ication of estimated pollution removal reveals that actual 
removal is less than originally estimated, offset quantities would be 
reduced and the cost-effectiveness of reforestation as a control strategy 
would be less than originally estimated, and possibly may fall below that 
of conventional control approaches.
Resilience aspects
 – Adding another option to the solution set increases f lexibility while 
potentially reducing marginal costs.
 – Stronger collaboration links with regulators increase social and govern-
mental participation and thereby societal resilience.
 – Forests damaged by extreme weather events or f ire require more time 
to replace than gray solutions.
 – Gray solutions are susceptible to events such as power loss and mechani-
cal failure.
Key learning
 – This proposal deals with a novel GI solution requiring testing and by 
in from a multitude of stakeholders and will therefore require a long 
period of study.
 – Early stage – to be determined later in pilot, implementation, integration 
phases.
 – Using reforestation for ozone abatement has broad relevance: a high 
share of the total area of ozone non-attainment and maintenance in the 
US is NOx-limited and thus may be suitable for ozone removal through 
reforestation.
 Shell: produced water treatment using 
reed beds
Source/organisation: petroleum 
Development Oman LLC (pDO): joint 
venture with The Shell petroleum 
Company Ltd and the government of 
Oman (majority)
Scale: Large – world’s largest commer­
cial wetland covering more than 360 
ha and treats more than 95,000 m3 of 
produced water per day
Key stakeholder(s): government 
of Oman, BAuer nimr LLC, Oman (a 
subsidiary of BAuer resources gmbh 
in germany).
Project phase: The plant came online 
in late 2010.
Geographical location: nimr, Oman 
(nimr is located inland in south­west 
Oman)
Project overview
At the PDO Nimr oil f ields, a tenth of the total production is crude oil. The 
remaining production, around 330,000 m³ per day, is water that is brought 
to the surface together with the oil. This water used to be disposed of by 
injection into a deep disposal well. To reduce the high costs of treating and 
re-injecting the produced water, PDO together with BAUER, developed a 
project proposal that would reduce or eliminate the power consumption 
and CO2 emissions associated with the operation of equipment for deep 
well disposal. The solution was a four-tier gravity-based wetland design.
As gravity pulls the water downhill, the reeds act as f ilters, removing oil 
from the water. The oil is eaten by microbes that naturally feed on hydro-
carbons underground. Locally grown Phragmites australis plants are used 
for the purif ication of produced water. The composition of the produced 
water from the Nimr oilf ield is brackish; with total dissolved solids (TDS) 
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ranging between 7,000 mg/l and 8,000 mg/l, and the oil in water content 
varies between 100 to 500 mg/l. The plant layout includes a pipeline, which 
enters the NWTP system and leads to an oil/water separator. The water is 
then distributed into a wetland facility where it is channelled through four 
wetland terraces by gravity feed. Finally, evaporation ponds are used to 
recover the salt while the biomass is land filled. Alternative uses of the water 
and biomass that could offer a variety of environmental and socio-political 
benefits are being explored.
The constructed wetland is designed to treat 95,000 m³ per day (30% 
of the daily volume of water produced by the oilf ield). The facility was 
constructed under a build-own-operate contract and as such, BAUER 
designed and built the facility and is now operating it for a 20-year period.
As with every eff luent treatment plant, the subsoil must be properly 
sealed. In selecting suitable sealants, synthetic materials were rejected in 
favour of a natural product. The surrounding desert areas were searched 
for suitable clay until an appropriate sealant mixture was found.
A pilot study was used to evaluate and optimise reed bed eff iciency. 
The reed beds have proven to be capable of eff iciently, and cost-effectively, 
handling the treatment of the produced water from the Nimr oilf ields.
Technology maturity
Proven; fully operational since late 2010.
Investment/costs/time
 – The project required a pilot study of more than 2 years.
 – The wetland was fully operational 2 years after the contract was awarded.
Project management considerations
 – Project selection criteria: capital and operational cost reductions, lower-
ing the carbon footprint.
 – Construction time of the wetland was roughly half of the traditional, 
gray infrastructure.
 – Pilot studies involved recording and determining temperature, evapora-
tion and evapo-transpiration rates as these can highly influence the 
performance of the constructed wetland.
 – Pilot studies also investigated throughput parameters like retention time 
and hydraulic load for winter and summer seasons.
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Benefits
 – Signif icant capital cost savings compared to the man-made produced 
water treatment and injection facility.
 – The gravity-based wetland design requires close to zero energy for water 
treatment, thus reducing power consumption by approximately 98% 
(for the 30 vol% of water treatment) due to the elimination of electric 
powered water treatment and injection equipment. Also, the new facility 
enables an additional crude oil recovery of 200 barrels per day.
 – Satisfactory water treatment performance ever since the start of the 
wetland operation (December 2010). The oil content in the produced 
water is consistently reduced from 400 mg/l to less than 0.5 mg/l when 
leaving the wetland system.
 – CO2 emissions reduced by approximately 98% (for the 30 vol% of water 
treatment) due to the elimination of electric powered water treatment 
and injection equipment.
 – The wetlands provide habitat for f ish and hundreds of species of migra-
tory birds. Also, the wetlands offer potential for innovative customer 
value propositions that could provide a variety of socio-political benefits 
e.g. through by-product optimisation (fresh water, biomass etc.).
Risks/challenges
 – Large required land footprint: more than 360 ha to treat 95,000 m3/d of 
produced water.
 – Long pilot period (>2 years) required to de-risk the constructed wetland 
technology and f ind the optimum wetland design.
 – Operational risk of the wetland: potential risk of not meeting the perfor-
mance requirements due to external factors (e.g. seasonal temperature 
swings, biotic stresses).
Resilience aspects
 – This system is modular and the capacity can be increased stepwise.
 – Potential for achieving improved system resilience by increasing biodi-
versity (using various types of reeds).
 – The facility makes use of feedback loops for monitoring the health and 
eff icacy of the wetland system.
Key learning
 – Climate data and local soil conditions are essential design parameters.
 – A champion was required to push this project even with positive results 
from the pilot study.
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 – It’s important to involve other key stakeholders in the project (e.g. 
universities).
 – It’s recommended to use a non-biased project evaluation process to select 
the best available solution.
 Shell: natural reclamation and erosion 
control for onshore pipelines
Source/organisation: Shell Canada 
Limited
Scale: Large – several reclamation 
plots are located in the Deep Basin 
Ojay project site. The Ojay pipeline has 
eight reclamation research sites each 
approximately 20 metres wide by 100 
metres long.
Key stakeholder(s): British Colum­
bia government (Oil and gas Com­
mission), First nation communities, 
reClaimit Ltd (execution contractor)
Project phase: Fully implemented, 
has been operational for three years; 
optimisation studies ongoing
Geographical location: ne British 
Columbia, Canada
Project overview
Shell’s projects often involve the construction of pipeline corridors in eco-
logically diverse areas on previously undeveloped lands called ‘greenfield’ 
development. The pipeline is routed along what is known as a ‘right of way’.
When building a pipeline, the construction activities not only cover the 
civil works to lay the pipeline and build the pump/compressor stations, 
but also the reclamation work to return disturbed land to an equivalent 
land capability with minimal impact on the environment. There is height-
ened recognition and popularity of natural reclamation and soil erosion 
abatement techniques as these ancient techniques address the shortfalls 
related to man-made pipeline protection techniques, particularly in terms 
of reduced installation and maintenance costs.
The technique of using living plant materials to create structures 
that perform some soil related engineering function is referred to as soil 
‘bioengineering’. Often, soil bioengineering is used to treat sites where 
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surface stability and erosion problems exist. Bioengineering solutions can 
be applied to a wide variety of sites disturbed by construction activities. 
These solutions use natural components of pioneering plant communities 
and thus align well with ecological restoration strategies.
It is preferred to use local plant species to construct soil bioengineering 
solutions for naturally disturbed sites. Some recent innovations in recla-
mation approaches include the use of willows and other tree/shrub/plant 
species to control soil erosion and establish a re-naturalisation path. In the 
past 15 years, Shell has proven success in willow staking in several upstream 
projects. Poplars and willows are highly valued for erosion control and 
eff icient control of groundwater due to their rapid growth, high rooting 
capacity, extensive root systems and high water use.
Shell continues to investigate different reclamation methods, using direct 
seeding, nursery stock grown from native seed and possibly peat pucks (seed 
with nutrients), to better understand the feasibility of the technology as 
well as the costs and time involved in growing such solutions.
Pipeline projects involve many stakeholders with specif ic interests and 
concerns. The pipeline right of way often traverses lands with rights of use 
belonging to multiple indigenous communities. The indigenous communi-
ties are often concerned with the fragmentation of the land and its impacts 
on the local ecosystem. Therefore, all solutions are strictly reviewed with 
these local concerns in mind.
Technology maturity
Proven, with improvements being developed.
Investment/costs/time
 – Natural reclamation techniques have the added benefit of having signifi-
cantly lower costs than concrete and metal piling methods.
 – Timelines for implementation generally f it very well with the overall 
project timeline as pipeline construction and tree planting share a com-
mon seasonal criteria and the activities can therefore be executed within 
the same timeframe.
Project management considerations
 – Natural reclamation does not provide a broad base solution, i.e. it is only 
applicable to certain sites.
 – Project teams need to be willing to assess such alternative approaches.
 – Natural reclamation solutions require different skill sets (horticulture, 
biology).
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 – Joining forces with external experts is critical for the success of these 
pilot studies.
 – It is important to build relationships with all key stakeholders early on 
in the project.
 – It is important to identify and mitigate local environmental risks (e.g. 
care was taken to maintain moose habitat in the harvested areas by 
leaving clumps of willows standing).
 – Timing is key for success of this solution (e.g. when to cut and plant 
willows).
 – It is important to secure manual labour for large scale projects.
 – Reclamation is often a compliance-driven sustainability effort.
Benefits
 – Lower overall environmental impact, potentially including CO2 offsets.
 – Solutions are known to be superior overtime compared to the more 
traditional stabilisation methods.
 – Hands-on work can be structured as a team building/educational activity 
for Shell employees.
 – Job creation for local labour.
 – The solution can be designed to be sensitive to the local environment 
(e.g. allow access to local wildlife).
 – These green solutions do not require regular maintenance as compared 
to gray solutions that often require mechanical intervention, e.g. for the 
excavation of existing banks or transport of materials.
 – Low operating and maintenance cost.
Risks/challenges
 – Not a one-stop solution, but very much site specif ic (dependent on soil 
types, moisture level, light, etc.).
 – Requires a different skill set for the design and implementation phase.
 – Time constraints: any project would need to be started as early in the 
winter as possible.
 – Survivability of the planting sites is an important requirement to estab-
lish long-term success.
Resilience aspects
 – The green solution self-repairs and improves performance over time 
as opposed to gray solutions that depreciate over time and require 
maintenance.
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 – Solutions are modular; it is easy to select the required planting density 
along the pipeline corridor.
 – Solutions are multi-functional: they reduce loss and fragmentation of 
wildlife habitat, reduce soil compaction and improve land capability and 
productivity in agricultural, prairie and forested areas.
 – These types of natural re-vegetation systems reduce anthropogenic 
disturbances to local ecosystems.
Key learning
 – The environmental agencies are very focused on achieving sustainable 
outcomes and are typically sympathetic to soft engineering solutions.
 Shell/TNC: coastal pipeline erosion 
control using oyster reefs
Source/organisation: Shell pipeline 
Company Lp
Scale: Approximately one mile of 
shoreline in total, the pilot project will 
be designed with the intention to be 
replicated at other similar sites
Key partner(s): Shell global Solutions 
international, The nature Conservancy
Project phase: Feasibility study 
ongoing; final decision to proceed or 
not will be taken mid­2013, pending 
approval/acceptance of the design
Geographical location: Ship Shoal, 
Louisiana, uSA
© Seth Blitch for The Nature Conservancy
Project overview
Attenuation of soil and marshland erosion around oil and gas pipelines 
located on or near shorelines is a chronic concern for Shell and other com-
mercial operators in the Gulf of Mexico. Erosion is caused by waves from 
marine traff ic, tidal currents, and acute weather events like hurricanes. 
Maintaining these pipelines currently requires an intensive and expensive 
monitoring and maintenance system. The traditional gray approach uses 
hardened structures that armour and stabilise the shoreline; rock reinforce-
ment, wood and metal structures, sand or cement bags to slow erosion, 
particularly in high energy environments.
The main drawbacks of this existing system from the company’s perspec-
tive are the costs and risks related to maintenance activities taking place 
around these hardened man-made structures. There is the ongoing risk 
of pipeline damages related to frequent boat traff ic, as well as the loss of 
intertidal habitat.
To lower these costs and the overall risks to the pipeline, Shell and The 
Nature Conservancy have been exploring shoreline erosion control methods 
using natural infrastructure to further attenuate erosion from waves. The 
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f inal project may encompass a hybrid solution using a combination of green 
and gray infrastructure.
Technology maturity
There is empirical evidence that supports that green infrastructure can 
be an effective measure against shoreline erosion and wave energy. The 
innovation lies in applying the concept of green infrastructure to more 
effectively protect pipelines from coastal erosion while offering multiple 
environmental and social benefits.
Investment/costs/time
A primary objective of this pilot project is to better understand the relative 
costs of using these methods and test the hypotheses that natural infra-
structure is more cost-effective than made-made infrastructure. Histori-
cally, green infrastructure installations, such as oyster reef breakwaters, 
have cost approximately $1 million per mile versus $1.5 to $3 million per 
mile to install traditional gray rock barriers, though this is highly variable. 
GI solutions are expected to require lower initial capital costs and lower 
maintenance costs due to being inherently self-sustaining.
Project management considerations
The approach taken thus far has been to hold workshops and meetings 
to design this project as a joint effort between Shell Global Solutions 
International, Shell Pipeline Company LP and experts from The Nature 
Conservancy. The team organised a field visit and gathered location-specific 
data as part of the bid process to generate conceptual proposals for the Ship 
Shoal pipeline. Due to the importance of pipeline integrity, an internal risk 
analysis will be performed on the proposed solutions.
Selection criteria for the proposals are: installation/maintenance cost 
savings, eff iciency in sediment accumulation for stabilisation, innovative 
edge and the delivery of ecosystem services.
Benefits
 – Creates a natural buffer to protect the shoreline and pipeline from erosion.
 – Can preserve and/or create habitat for benthic, estuarine, shallow water, 
and intertidal organisms.
 – Increases stability for pipelines.
 – Improves local water quality.
 – Lowers installation and maintenance costs compared to gray solutions.
 – Offers potential for local job creation.
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 – Creates land behind the natural defences (open water to marsh; marsh 
to land).
 – Has potential for self-repairing (fixes cracks developed from potential storm) 
and self-organising structure (oyster bed builds up with sea level rise).
Risks/challenges
 – It is important to understand the business case (green vs gray).
 – Shell’s comfort level with long-term liability issues (public access to a 
newly created oyster bed is a concern).
 – GI solutions will need to comply with company and industry standards 
and requirements.
 – These novel approaches require receptiveness of both internal and 
external stakeholders.
 – There may be a need to train new contractors who may not be familiar 
with designing and installing natural infrastructure.
 – The greatest concern may be related to social stresses such as pressure 
from oyster f ishermen who could harvest and potentially inhibit natural 
growth and effectiveness.
Resilience aspects
 – GI solutions have the dynamic capacity to repair themselves and adapt to 
evolving chronic and acute stressors. For example, in response to rising 
water levels due to climate change, an oyster reef will grow to match the 
new water levels, unlike any gray infrastructure.
 – GI solutions offer multi-functional benefits, such as oyster beds providing 
erosion control and other ecosystem services.
Key learning
 – The keys to success for these kinds of methods will be f inding the ap-
propriate project scale, managing any regulatory constraints, proving 
long-term benef its, proving effectiveness at sediment accumulation 
and wave attenuation thereby protecting the pipeline, and creating a 
replicable product and process.
 – A successful pilot should resolve most of the institutional, regulatory 
and f inancial concerns.
 – Key anticipated lessons relate to testing the hypotheses that green 
infrastructure can be a superior alternative to gray infrastructure in 
protecting pipelines in the Gulf of Mexico, and better understanding 
under what circumstances green infrastructure and/or a hybrid combina-
tion of green/gray infrastructure is a cost-effective investment.
 TNC: Cauca Valley water fund1
Green infrastructure type: water 
treatment using forest and land man­
agement
Source/organisation: The nature 
Conservancy
Scale: Seven small watersheds
Key stakeholder(s): The water fund is 
overseen by the Cauca valley’s sugar 
cane producers association (ASOCA­
nA), the sugar cane growers associa­
tion (prOCAnA), each watershed’s lo­
cal environmental authority, vallenpaz 
(a peace and justice organisation) and 
The nature Conservancy.
Project phase: established in 2009, 
projects and investments are under­
way
Geographical location: regional 
around Cali, Colombia; mostly valle 
del Cauca Department
© Timothy Boucher/TNC for The Nature 
Conservancy
Project overview
The East Cauca Valley Water Fund is one of the more recently established 
water funds in Latin America. Water Funds are a f inancial vehicle developed 
at TNC, where main water users put resources into the fund and then the 
fund chooses projects to invest directly in the watershed.
The funds focus on investing in three types of services: water quality, 
sediment retention and water quantity. Typical investments include: chang-
ing land use or intensity (such as less intensive agriculture and ranching); 
fencing, creating silvopastoral systems, forest enrichment and restoration, 
1 Calvache (2009), Goldman (2010), Padilla (2011), Ramos, Benitez and Calvache (2012), Tallis 
and Calvache (2011)
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enhancing protected areas; land acquisitions; and restoring riparian areas, 
slopes, and corridors for biodiversity (Ramos, Benitez and Calvache 2012).
A recent ecosystem services analysis of the Bogota Water Fund deter-
mined that ranching and agricultural lands produce 10% more sediments 
than areas under conservation. That sediment increase requires approxi-
mately $4 to $5 million in additional water treatment costs downstream 
for end users.
The East Cauca Valley Water Fund was established around the private 
sector as sugar cane producers and growers in the region entered into a vol-
untary payment scheme to f inance green projects across seven watersheds. 
Based in the Valle region of Colombia, the fund establishes a payment for 
ecosystem services for the growers based on hectares and tons of sugar 
cane produced. The cane growers were motivated to invest by research 
predicting that, without direct intervention, within ten years they would be 
forced to reduce their irrigation cycles from f ive to four, potentially losing 
US$33 million per year. So far, the primary investments by the fund have 
been in changing land use or intensity; fencing, silvopastoral systems, forest 
enrichment and restoration.
The gray alternatives to the kinds of projects supported by these water 
funds include: building more dams (water quantity), treatment plants (water 
quality) or new pipelines for water supply from other watersheds.
Technology maturity
Science papers show that investments in watersheds improve water quality 
and sediment retention and improve or maintain base flows. Furthermore, 
the f inancial mechanism has proven to be eff icient with the Quito Water 
Fund, Fondo para la Protection del Agua (FONAG, 11 years old, endowment 
of nearly $10 million). The Conservancy alone has created 11 funds with 
approximately 30 more in the pipeline; analysis of green versus gray is 
pending.
Investment/costs/time
The East Cauca Valley Water Fund has committed to investing $10 million 
over the next 5 years (Tallis and Calvache 2011). For the mature Quito Water 
Fund (FONAG) approximately 2% of the water utility revenue is paid into 
the fund. Some of the utility fees go to the endowment while the rest goes 
directly to project implementation.
Establishing an endowment is important to make long-term agreements 
on watershed, with farmers, etc. The Quito-FONAG Fund is currently invest-
ing $2 million and can leverage $2 million to $4 million (FONAG 2010).
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The disadvantage for green infrastructure is in the startup and initial 
f inancing capacity: the East Cauca Valley Water Fund currently has annual 
revenues of $1 million to $2 million but the business plan states that $18 
million is needed for many projects to achieve very signif icant regional 
outcomes, which will take 12 to 15 years to raise. The timeline for outcomes is 
also problematic as some of these projects will take 20 to 30 years to mature 
while stakeholders expect results within ten years.
Project management considerations
The process developed by the water fund and The Conservancy for deter-
mining how investments should be made is as follows: (1) choose objectives: 
through negotiation; (2) choose activities: based on science and experi-
ence; (3) allocate budget: based on experience; (4) conduct a diagnostic 
screen: ranking of projects; (5) select priority areas: return on investment; 
(6) estimate returns: using models; (7) design monitoring programme; 
(8) implement project. The fund uses the GIS-based InVEST model suite 
developed as part of the Natural Capital Project to identify priority areas for 
intervention. (Tallis and Calvache 2011; Ramos, Benitez and Calvache 2012).
The entire process is managed by a board of directors (ideally, 50% public 
and 50% private governance) and guided by annual and long-term plans. 
Water funds identify watershed areas and projects that give the highest 
ROI for water quality, sediment retention, and/or water quantity. TNC and 
several funds are also exploring water pollution as an additional key metric 
to target in the future.
Benefits
 – Increased water supply.
 – Flood risk management.
 – Increased agricultural productivity.
 – Reduced waste and nutrient production and improved treatment.
 – Social benefits: environmental education, local entrepreneurship, com-
mercialisation of facilities.
 – The Water Fund approach is much faster in terms of planning and impact 
versus gray options:
•	 Gray is government-driven and can take upwards of 10+ years to 
commence projects.
•	 Green can also be integrated into gray infrastructure and planning.
 – Insurance costs (possible positive impact, needs research).
 – Risk management changes/improvements for the private sector.
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•	 In Medellín, Colombia, several large industrial companies are explor-
ing Water Fund-style projects to reduce their operational and repu-
tational risk from dangerous bacteria blooms in their water supply.
Risks/challenges
 – Governance issues; questions over who manages the fund, eff iciency 
concerns:
•	 Necessary to build alliances with utilities and key users.
 – Need local government stability and buy-in.
 – Need sound conservation agreements with the local communities; rule 
of law.
 – Need to capitalise/begin projects quickly (two to three years) but results 
can take time to materialise.
Resilience aspects
 – The f ield needs more research and modelling to compare green versus 
gray techniques in terms of resilience before any definitive judgements 
can be made. However, initial results and most experts believe the green 
techniques will be more energy eff icient and require less maintenance 
than the traditional gray approaches.
 – Resilience and flexibility in response to the effects of climate change 
could further tip the scales in favour of more green approaches and 
Water Fund-type projects.
 – A Water Fund offers a more bottom-up approach in contrast to gray 
infrastructure (government planned) which empowers end users to 
invest in future, e.g. sugar cane growers.
Key learning
 – Green disadvantage is in the startup and initial f inancing capacity:
•	 Water for Life currently has annual revenues of $1 million to $2 million 
but business plan says $18 million is needed for many projects with 
the most signif icant outcomes, which will take 12 to 15 years to raise. 
Need to show results in 10 years instead of 20 to 30.
 – It is essential to identify the beneficiaries and water users, but not neces-
sary to engage all stakeholders early on (start with the big users f irst to 
build momentum).
 – Getting the basic science in place is essential and more work must be 
done to quantify the benef its whenever possible, communicate them 
to stakeholders, and frame the benefits, goals, costs, etc. into a science-
based business plan.
 TNC: integrated reservoir-floodplain 
management
Source/organisation: The nature 
Conservancy
Scale: regional; application over the 
whole of a river basin
Key stakeholder(s): Army Corps of 
engineers, institute for water resourc­
es, hydrologic engineering Center, 
TnC, university of California­Davis
Project phase: Study complete, 
implementation being explored on 
the mokelumne river (California) and 
Cedar river (iowa). Full implementa­
tion phase requires governance/finan­
cial mechanisms/political leadership 
to occur.
Geographical location: examples: 
Savannah river (georgia/South Caro­
lina); mokelumne river (California)
© Jerry and Marcy Monkman for The Nature 
Conservancy
Project overview
Most of the tens of thousands of large dams around the world are not 
designed for a single purpose, but instead must balance flood protection, 
water supply, hydroelectric power generation, and other demands. These 
demands on water management often compete. One of the most common 
trade-offs involves choosing between keeping reservoirs relatively empty 
to reduce downstream flood risk or keeping them relatively full to provide 
water for cities and farms, generate hydropower, and support recreation. 
This conflict can be reduced and overall social benefits increased by restor-
ing the natural flood storage and conveyance that downstream floodplains 
provide, thereby enabling the reallocation of some reservoir f lood storage 
to other purposes.
This project investigates the possible benef its of coupling reservoir 
operations with floodplain management. The study components include 
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modelling scenarios of incremental reductions in reservoir flood storage (0-
100%), calculating incremental flood damages associated with flood-storage 
changes and quantifying the cost to mitigate those damages via floodplain 
management, assessing the benef its associated with reallocating f lood 
storage to other purposes (water supply, hydropower generation, recreation 
and environment), and developing business propositions including financial 
models highlighting the costs and benefits of reallocating reservoir f lood 
storage in coordination with changes in downstream floodplain manage-
ment. This study was performed on two very different case study rivers – the 
Savannah basin and the Mokelumne basin.
 – Research the integration of the green and gray infrastructure for flood 
risk management and floodplain service provision.
 – Proposed interventions: change allocation of reservoir storage; adjust 
dam operations; change flood plain management, land uses, relocation, 
etc.; move and/or enhancing levees.
 – Proposed reducing dam flood water storage by 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%.
 – Taking some of the reservoir storage away from flood control (via flood-
plains) allows you to keep more of the reservoir water storage for water 
supply, recreation and other uses.
 – Reallocating water storage away from flood control results in substantial 
social benef its in both basins, including a 25-50% reallocation in the 
Mokelumne that would provide water supply for an additional 450,000 
people (a major issue in California). The same 25-50% reallocation in 
the Savannah River would allow for increased hydroelectric generation 
valued at more than $12 million per year and enhanced recreation worth 
$3 million per year.
Technology maturity
Research and pilot phases; a decade-long collaboration on dam operations 
and supporting work on floodplain management and policy.
Investment/costs/time
 – Signif icant: floodplain land use changes, land acquisitions or easements; 
policy changes for broad implementation; potentially Congressional 
lobbying.
 – Savannah (Georgia and South Carolina, USA): Small changes in floodplain 
management enable the use of up to 50% of the existing flood storage to 
increase hydropower and recreation valued at nearly US$13 million per 
year with no increased flood risk and with additional benefits for water 
supply, recreation, the environment, and climate change resilience.
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 – Mokelumne (California, USA): Modest shifts in floodplain management 
free 25% to 50% of upstream reservoir f lood storage for public water 
supply – enough additional water for nearly 450,000 people – while 
maintaining flood protection, increasing hydropower generation, and 
improving habitat for declining salmon.
Project management considerations
 – The knowledge and tools exist to support full implementation of this 
approach in river basins around the world.
 – Analysis can be furthered by including considerations of dam mainte-
nance, safety and ecosystem services recognised but still not valued, as 
well as more rigorous assessment of costs-benefits under climate change 
futures.
 – Must overcome the hurdles of governance systems/financial mechanisms 
and political leadership.
 – The policy changes to enable fuller implementation are not complicated, 
but the politics are a challenge around private land use issues. However, 
these are potentially overcome through use of incentive-based f inance 
mechanisms rather than government ‘takings’. More feasible in areas 
where floodplain is mostly undeveloped lands or agriculture with fewer 
stakeholders.
Benefits
 – Reduced flood risk and flood damages through mitigation of properties 
currently most at risk.
 – Increased water supply (quality and quantity); current reservoir f lood 
storage in the United States is a large enough volume to meet the annual 
water needs of 800+ million Americans, so reallocating even 10-20% of 
that volume is game-changing.
 – Additional hydropower revenue.
 – Increase revenue from additional recreational use.
Risks/challenges
 – High-levels of engagement with Army Corps of Engineers and potentially 
from Congress to authorise signif icant changes in reservoir plans, dam 
operations, and authority/funding for land acquisitions/easements, etc.
 – Army Corps does not have authority over floodplain land uses.
 – Social needs conflict on the landscape. Example: After a dam is con-
structed, communities develop along river banks in higher f lood risk 
areas.
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 – Approach currently is not practical in areas with a high level of human 
development due to large investment required and complexity involved 
in relocating houses/businesses/farms.
 – Requires strong political will from local leaders and community.
 – Perverse incentives for certain kinds of agricultural production that 
impact floodplains (Farm Bill: crop insurance); these incentives could 
be shifted to be positive.
 – Economic losses for land use changes (e.g. removal of farmland from use) 
and flood risk changes.
 – National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) needs to incorporate a risk-
based approach; initial changes along these lines were made by Congress 
in NFIP this summer.
 – Flooding continues to occur despite the continued large investment in gray 
infrastructure, warranting a change of approach (likely catalyst for change).
Resilience aspects
 – Multi-functional: by reallocating reservoir storage, increase resilience to 
water supply/energy from hydropower/flood control onto the floodplains. 
Enhances social and ecosystem health.
 – Various downstream benefits from ecosystem services not yet valued.
 – Unlike floodplains, current gray infrastructure is rigid and vulnerable 
to breaching during acute events or recurrent droughts, often with a 
breaking point (e.g. Army Corps designed Mississippi levees).
 – Modular: restoration of f loodplains can be built in modular form, e.g. 
f loodplains can serve as a sustainable and controlled relief valve by 
opening up certain critical areas of levees. Preferential f looding (relief 
value) can benefit highly populated urban areas. This is exactly what the 
corps did – by design – on the Mississippi in 2011.
 – Improved operational flexibility to meet environmental flow targets and 
to adapt to more frequent and intense floods and droughts.
 – Great example of hybrid solution: grey infrastructure (dam) already in 
place can be coupled with green infrastructure (floodplain restoration) 
to reach higher level of resilience.
Key learning
Changing dam operations in coordination with floodplain management 
can increase social, economic and environmental benefits, including im-
proved water supply and water quality, increased hydropower, enhanced 
flood protection, restored environmental health, expanded recreational 
opportunities, and increased resilience to the impacts of climate change.
 TNC: managing storm water runoff 
with wetlands2
Source/organisation: The nature 
Conservancy
Scale: municipalities
Key stakeholder(s): water Depart­
ment, TnC, nrDC, eKO Asset manage­
ment partners
Project phase: early implementation, 
extensive planning
Geographical location: philadelphia, 
pennsylvania, uSA
© Tim Pierce at commons.Wikimedia.org
Project overview
Philadelphia has a sewer collection system that is 60% combined sewer and 
40% municipal separate storm sewer system. The city is working to improve 
storm water management and alleviate pressure on this combined sewer 
system (CSS) through restoration and demonstration efforts, regulations 
and incentives for the private sector via a revised storm water billing system. 
Philadelphia is trying to institutionalise green infrastructure as standard 
practice via citywide policies, such as a parcel-based billing system for 
commercial properties, Green Plan Philadelphia, Green Roof Tax Credit 
and the Green Streets programme (EPA 2010).
 – Philadelphia is one of 200 cities that are not in EPA compliance on storm 
water overflow, whereby raw sewage goes into combined sewer systems 
and then into waterways.
 – EPA f ines are a strong regulatory and f inancial driver in the US for cities 
to take action.
 – Philadelphia forecasts expenditures of $10 billion to solve their storm 
water problem over the next decade using gray infrastructure; the same 
estimate using green infrastructure is $2 billion (Natural Resources 
Defense Council et al. 2013)
2 EKO Asset Management Partners (2013), EPA (2010)
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•	 City leaders are committed to green infrastructure solving a signif i-
cant portion (20-30%) of this problem for less than costs of traditional 
gray infrastructure.
 – Examples of green infrastructure include rain barrels, bioswales, pervi-
ous pavement, wetland protection and restoration; and other means to 
increase inf iltration or retain rain water to reduce peak flow.
 – Philadelphia set a new water billing system for commercial and industrial 
properties based on the amount of impervious surface on properties; 
also owners can get a fee credit through implementation of storm water.
 – PWD has allocated $1.67 billion, on an inflation-adjusted basis, over a 
25-year period to green at least 9,564 acres across the city, pursuant to 
a consent order with the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 




 – Revised storm water billing system based the amount of a commercial 
property’s impervious cover and thereby the amount of runoff a property 
will generate.
 – City offers a storm water fee discount for customers who reduce impervi-
ous cover using green infrastructure practices.
 – There are multiple ways to f inance green storm water management 
including public-private partnerships, offsite credit trading, etc. (Natural 
Resources Defense Council et al. 2013).
Project management considerations
 – Metrics used: cost savings.
 – Local political leadership is key.
 – See Creating Clean Water Cash Flows: Developing Private Markets for Green 
Stormwater Infrastructure in Philadelphia for a detailed analysis and 
recommendations for investment in green infrastructure for stormwater 
management (Natural Resources Defense Council et al. 2013).
Benefits
 – Storm water runoff reduction resulting in water quality improvements, 
relief to aging gray infrastructure.
 – Create habitat for wildlife; carbon sequestration; recreation dual use 
spaces (ex. baseball f ields).
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 – New practices will reduce combined sewer overflow (CSO) by 25 billion 
gallons, and save the city as much as $8 billion over gray infrastructure 
alternatives.
Risks/challenges
 – Evaluation of green solutions takes longer, can be more expensive and 
complex; gray is a known, easier.
 – Comfort level of regulators with these newer projects (Philadelphia 
fought for years for a consent decree). Regulators can be concerned over 
precedent and ‘slippery slope’ problems.
 – Financing challenge for both green and gray; green is generally cheaper.
 – Green projects are more visible and potentially polarising whereas the 
gray option is invisible; alternatively, the green options can create com-
munity assets that benefit people.
Resilience aspects
 – In general resilience of either approach is similar but adding green to 
existing gray CSS can provide buffer and add f iltration benefits.
 – Gray advantage: harder to add capacity to a wetland than it is to increase 
pipe size.
 – Energy uses are comparable after construction; gray requires much 
energy more to build.
 – Green produces less waste as wetlands can also f ilter and absorb waste.
 – Maintenance is much less for green.
 – Green f ilters most pollutants on site.
 – Acute stress: A flood can overwhelm both. Green might be more flood-
tolerant and will not lose all function like a burst pipe.
Key learning
 – Mayors have a large role to play in bringing GI to the table for municipali-
ties.
 – Financial incentives could be optimised by taxing impervious surfaces 
differently based on geography.
 – Green co-benefits can be time consuming to evaluate and value.
 – Green can complement gray infrastructure, buffer the worst storm surges.
 – Green infrastructure represents cost advantage versus building new 
CSS capacity.
 – Different skill set is required to fully understand/need to educate the 
key stakeholders.
 TNC: oyster reef building and 
restoration for coastal protection3
Source/organisation: The nature 
Conservancy
Scale: Local. miles of oyster reefs 
installed in the gulf of mexico
Key stakeholder(s): natural Capital 
project, donor organisations, local 
communities, enterprises
Project phase: Several successful 
project sites, expanding in use as 
experience and technology evolve
Geographical location: gulf of mexico, 
potentially other sites as well. Oysters 
are found around the world in temper­
ate and tropical waters. They develop 
some of the greatest structures in 
places like the gulf of mexico, the 
Atlantic seaboard up to new york, as 
well as waters off China, Japan and in 
similar Southern hemisphere oceans.
© Daniel White for The Nature Conservancy
Project overview
Oyster reefs have lost an estimated 85% of their historic extent globally 
(Beck et al. 2011). This loss carries a high economic cost because of the wide 
range of benefits oyster reefs provide to humans. Growing research on reef 
restoration in the last decade suggests that such restoration is feasible on a 
large scale, holding the prospect of recovery of ecosystem services and eco-
nomic benefits. For a large reef restoration project in Mobile Bay, Alabama, 
for example, TNC conservatively estimated that 5,850 m of restored reefs:
 – Produce over 3,100 kg of f inf ish and crab and 3,460 kg of oyster (meat) 
harvests per year.
3 Beck (2011), Kroeger (2012), Kroeger and Guannel (2014)
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 – Reduce the height and energy at shoreline of the average and top 10% of 
waves by 53-91% and 76-99%, respectively.
 – Remove up to 1,888 kg of nitrogen per year from surrounding nearshore 
waters.
Total net benefits (consumer and producer surplus) from f ishery enhance-
ment dominate overall benefits from the reefs along the currently unde-
veloped shores with an estimated $217,000-$225,000 per year and their net 
present value (NPV) exceeds restoration costs ($4.28 million) in year 34.
For 50- and 100-year lifetimes and counting only f ishery benefits, the 
reefs have a combined social return on investment (ROI) of 1.3 and 1.8 and 
a NPV of $1.17 million and $3.23 million, respectively.
Given ambitious restoration plans, the ROI of reef restoration is expected 
to increase substantially due to knowledge gains and economies of scale. 
Especially along developed shorelines, the ROI of reef restoration may 
exceed that of single-purpose alternatives for coastal protection and fishery 
enhancement due to the multi-functionality of reefs (Kroeger 2012).
The Gulf of Mexico is the single best opportunity for large-scale restora-
tion of oyster reefs and sustainable f isheries, even as there has been an 85% 
loss of oyster reef ecosystems around the world. Restoring oyster reefs can 
have positive benefits for storm surge protection and sea level rise, social 
and economic vulnerability and risk, and conservation.
 – Proven value of wave attenuation, reducing the energy and height of 
waves; and just like any breakwater the function varies in space and time.
 – Gulf of Mexico: 6+ miles of oyster reefs implemented as breakwater 
projects.
 – Re(building) reefs is done on a base using bagged oyster shells (best op-
tion) and/or cement structures; this structure is then seeded with oysters.
 – Storm surge protection benefits are immediate as this base, which is a 
hybrid or green and gray.
 – Reefs are self-maintaining and can grow with sea-level change.
Technology maturity
Proven, for wave attenuation/storm protection. Now looking to optimise 
co-benefits like habitat, conservation, biodiversity, etc. But these benefits 
may take more time to prove.
Investment/costs/time
 – Timeline varies slightly by geography because growth rates vary by 
species/strain of oyster, water conditions, etc.
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 – In Gulf of Mexico, benefits appear immediately after f irst stages of project 
(sinking bagged shells or concrete).
 – Cost: About $1.5 million per mile, which is comparable or cheaper than 
gray alternatives in initial costs, with much higher cost/benefit returns 
because of the associated co-benefits
•	 Gray infrastructure is industry- and prof it-supported. Even Army 
Corps of Engineers has a bias toward gray. Engineers understand 
gray choices.
•	 Reef restorations are often conducted by non-prof it organisations, 
volunteer efforts and smaller startup companies, which may be one 
reason costs are as signif icantly lower.
Project management considerations
 – Project and identif ication materials and guidance: http://www.coastal-
resilience.org/gulfmex
 – Depth of water, salinity (oysters somewhat tolerant of variations), histori-
cal and current oyster populations.
Benefits
 – Protection from waves and erosion is very clear; stabilisation of shorelines 
and even expansion of coasts. Storm surge protection and greater safety 
for people and property are highly likely given the engineering results 
from comparable structures (e.g. submerged breakwaters), but are not 
yet proven from direct evidence before and after storms (we simply have 
not had them in place for these events). The potential for lower insurance 
costs is also real.
 – Additional f isheries production; more habitat produces more species and 
populations, including f ish, crabs, shell f ish.
 – Shellf ish f iltration improves water quality.
 – Changes in shoreline, such as increase in marsh abundance.
 – Job creation for local workers, building/maintaining reefs.
Risks/challenges
 – People value oysters as a food source and harvesting slows progress.
 – Growing oysters can smother sea grass habitat; possible conflict with 
other native habitat (in the Pacif ic Northwest). This is not an issue in 
the Gulf of Mexico.
 – Shellf ish industry is afraid of illegal harvesting in sub-optimal waters 
where oysters could be contaminated (these fears are exaggerated).
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Resilience aspects
 – Maintenance advantages (under study); still need to measure the repair/
growth timeline and reduction in costs
•	 Self-repair will be huge over time for both acute and chronic stresses.
•	 Acute damage creates greater water f low around structure, which 
causes faster oysters growth.
 – Oyster reefs will naturally expand upward with sea level, likely adjusting 
to chronic stresses (climate change).
 – Lower energy requirements.
 – Very popular with community, which sees value in protection, improved 
f ish habitat.
Key learning
 – No structure offers absolute protection, and there is a need to increase 
understanding of reefs and not overpromise on protection benefits.
 – The case for oyster reef bed building and restoration is compelling. The 
Gulf of Mexico is the single best and maybe last place where oyster reef 
and f isheries can see value from new structures. Can build them big 
enough to be signif icant.
 – Many reef projects are getting stimulus funding. Restoration creates 
jobs, so projects funded.
 – Most projects had been reefs in front of natural areas. When these started 
showing results, then more green projects for replacing submerged break-
waters ensued with greater interest from municipalities. Now most reef 
projects are situated in front of developed areas.
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